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I. INTRODUCTION
This Survey is the eighth in a series of annual efforts by the Law Review
to present in a concise manner the important developments in the field of
labor relations.' The goal of the Survey is to report those decisions which
consolidate, add substance to, or depart from prior policy in the application
of the Labor-Management Relations Act,2 the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 1 and
other relevant federal statutes. The subject matter comprises decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board and the state and federal courts reported
during the Survey year ending March 1, 1969. In addition, some cases de-
cided before or after the Survey year are discussed at length because of their
relevance to developments during the year.
Any attempt to isolate a single trend or theme characteristic of the de-
velopments during the Survey year would be futile. Several of the cases
discussed below, however, are of unusual significance. While several circuit
courts attacked the reliance of the NLRB on certain evidence in representa-
tion questions,' and the rule-making procedures which the Board favors, 5
the Supreme Court approved a more liberal use of the Board's remedial
powers.° In addition, one circuit has attempted to limit the proscription
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act against federal court injunctions, 7 and another
circuit has maintained that the Board has jurisdiction to remedy an em-
ployer's discrimination based on race. 5
II. BOARD AND COURT JURISDICTION
A. NLRB Refusal to Assert Jurisdiction: Non-Profit Nursing Homes
In University Nursing Home, Inc.,' the Board asserted jurisdiction over
"proprietary" or profit-making nursing homes. The Board based its holding
on a conclusion that the industry had a substantial impact on interstate
commerce. Asserting what it believed to be its discretionary authority, how-
ever, the Board declined to extend this jurisdiction to non-profit nursing
homes. The facts of University merely indicate that non-profit nursing homes
comprise a relatively small portion of the entire industry. Otherwise, the
opinion does not explicity detail the reasons for the Board's refusal to extend
its jurisdiciton.
1 The previous comments are: Labor Law—Recent Decisions on Jurisdictional Prob-
lems, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1059 (1968); 1966-1967 Annual Survey of Labor
Relations Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Coro. L. Rev. 771 (1967); 1965-1966 Annual Survey of
Labor Relations Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 909 (1966) ; 1964-1965 Annual Survey
of Labor Relations Law, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 815 (1965) ; Recent Developments
in Labor Law, 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 629 (1964); Recent Developments in Labor
Law, 4 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 661 (1963); Labor's New Frontier: The End of the
Per Se Rules, 3 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 487 (1962).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
4 See pp. 808-15 infra.
5 See pp. 802-07 infra.
" See pp. 887-88 infra.
7 See pp. 820-27 infra.
8 See pp. 863-64 infra.
1 168 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 63 L.R.R.M. 1263 (1967).
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During the Survey year, the employees of the Drexel Home, a non-profit
nursing home in Illinois, petitioned the Regional Director for a representation
election. In accordance with University, the petition was dismissed on the
ground that the Board had declined jurisdiction over non-profit nursing
homes. The Regional Director's action was sustained by the Board for the
same reason. Frustrated in their efforts to be certified as the exclusive bar-
gaining agent of the nursing home employees, as well as in their efforts to
have the Board entertain certain unfair labor practice charges, the union filed
a complaint in the federal district court. The union contended that the
Board's action was discriminatory and arbitrary, and sought to compel the
Board to assert jurisdiction. The district court, in AFSCME, Council 19 v.
NLRB,- denied the Board's motions to dismiss. It held that it had jurisdic-
tion of the suit under the theory of Fay v. Douds,2 since the Board had
allegedly deprived the union of its constitutional rights. The court reasoned
that in renouncing jurisdiction over non-profit nursing homes, the Board had
deprived the union of a statutory right to represent the Drexel employees and
had made an arbitrary distinction, violative of due process, between non-
profit and proprietary nursing homes.
The case thus presents issues relating not only to the jurisdiction of the
district court, but also, and perhaps of more ultimate significance, to the
Board's assertion of jurisdiction over a class of employees which excludes
those involved in non-profit activities. The practical impact of the decision,
however, may be limited, since the nursing home industry is perhaps unusual
in its inclusion of non-profit employers as well as those operating for profit.
The court recognized three grounds upon which the Board might de-
cline to assert jurisdiction. These included instances where, in the opinion
of the Board, it would not effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert juris-
diction in an individual case, or where refusal was on an ad hoc basis for
religious, eleemosynary or educational reasons. Third, under Section 14(c) (1)
of the LMRA,4 the Board is empowered to decline jurisdiction over any
class or category of employer which in the opinion of the Board does not
have a substantial impact on commerce. The district court in AFSCME,
Council .19 interpreted the Board's opinion in University as holding that
non-profit nursing homes are intrinsically exempt from the purview of the
Act. The court found such a holding to be lacking in authority.
As noted above, the Board in University did not elaborate upon its
grounds for declining jurisdiction over non-profit nursing homes. It did
refer, however, to the Supreme Court's opinion in Office Employees Union v.
NLRB.' In that case, the Court placed a construction upon the LMRA which
would exclude non-profit employees from the provisions of the Act except
in exceptional circumstances or in situations where such employees were
involved in commercial activities. The district court in AFSCME, Council
19, relying upon the same Supreme Court decision, reasoned that it precludes
2 296 F. Supp. 1100, 69 L.R.R.M. 2275 (N.D. -111. 1968).
3 172 F.2d 720, 23 L.R.R.M. 2356 (2d Cir. 1949).
4 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1964).
5 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
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the Board, once it has asserted jurisdiction over a class of employees (nursing
homes, for example), from declining jurisdiction over a category of that
class (non-profit nursing home employees).
In Office Employes the Board had announced that it would decline
jurisdiction over labor unions which were themselves engaged as employers.
The Board concluded that labor unions were similar to non-profit employers
and, therefore, should be excluded from the scope of the Act. Although the
Supreme Court construed the LMRA as not generally applicable to non-
profit employees, it did not agree with the Board's view that labor unions
could be characterized as non-profit employers. Furthermore, the Court noted
that under section 2(2), 6
 the provisions of the LMRA expressly apply to
labor unions when engaged as employers, and for these reasons held the
action of the Board to he in error. The Supreme Court, then, was not con-
cerned with the same issue presented in AFSCME, Council .19, that is, the
Board's discretionary authority to decline jurisdiction over employers en-
gaged in non-profit activities, when it had asserted jurisdiction over em-
ployers similarly engaged, but for profit.
The Supreme Court in Office Employes did indicate, however, that
under exceptional circumstances, or in situations where a non-profit employer
is engaged in purely commercial activities, the provisions of the LMRA would
apply. It was the judgment of the district court in AFSMCE, Council 19 that
non-profit nursing homes were engaged in essentially commercial activities.
Furthermore, the court concluded that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction
over proprietary nursing homes did present circumstances sufficiently excep-
tional to warrant the inclusion of non-profit homes, because no reasonable
distinction could be made between the two. The court's conclusion that the
non-profit nursing homes were engaged in commercial activities was drawn
from the Board's own conclusions in University, upon which jurisdiction over
proprietary homes was predicated. The Board, however, appeared to be re-
ferring only to proprietary homes, and it had made no specific finding regard-
ing non-profit homes.
B. Preemption: State Court Jurisdiction Over Charges of Unfair
Representation
When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act, it not only
formulated a body of substantive law but, further, assigned primary respon-
sibility for the interpretation and application of that law to the National
Labor Relations Board.' Since the passage of the Act, however, the scope of
permissible state action has constituted a recurrent issue. Section 14(c) of
the Ac' expressly grants to the state courts jurisdiction over any labor dispute
in which the Board has, either by rule of decision or by published rule, de-
clined jurisdiction. However, where the Board has not so acted, the state
court must, in each case, consider for itself whether the federal law pre-
empts its jurisdiction. The principal guidelines for this determination are set
0 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964).
I Labor-Management Relations Act § 10, 29 U.S.C. g 160 (1964).
2 29 U.S.C. g 164(c) (1964).
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forth in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon: 3
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which
a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under
§ 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state juris-
diction must yield. 4
Underlying the policy of federal preemption is a concern with latent
conflict between enforcement by both state and federal authorities, with the
procedural disharmonies which would result, and with the inconsistency be-
tween the federal and state substantive law and remedies. 5 As foreseen by
the Court, this potential conflict would arise not only in the enforcement
of public interests but in the protection of private interests as well. Therefore,
as earlier stated in Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 3 "when federal power con-
stitutionally is exerted for the protection of public or private interests, or
both, it becomes the supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed, cir-
cumvented or extended by a state procedure merely because it will apply
some doctrine of private right." 7
Although the Garmon doctrine thus reaches to any activity arguably
protected or prohibited by the Act, state action has not been entirely fore-
closed. Despite the seemingly broad scope of the doctrine, the Court in
Garmon, with due regard for the federal system, did recognize certain activi-
ties over which state court jurisdiction must be respected. These included
activities which were only of peripheral concern to the Act,5 "[o]r where the
regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we
could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act."°
Nor under Garmon were state courts to be deprived of jurisdiction to award
damages in traditional tort actions for violent conduct or threats to public
order. Under such circumstances, the Court recognized, the maintenance of
domestic peace.is a compelling state interest.'"
Generally, then, in recognition of only these limited areas of state juris-
diction, Garmon seemed to settle the vexing problem of the delineation of
permissible state action.
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n't carved out an additional area of permissible state jurisdiction but
did not alter the basic precepts of Garmon. In Smith the Court held that
state courts could assert jurisdiction of suits under Section 301 of the Act
3 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
4 Id. at 244.
5 Id. at 242.
e 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
7 Id. at 500-01.
8 359 U.S. at 243.
9 Id. at 244.
10 Id. at 247.
11 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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for breaches of collective bargaining agreements. Although, in a section 301
suit, the contract breach might also involve an unfair labor practice, the
Court, nevertheless, concluded that under these circumstances Congress did
not intend that the Board have exclusive jurisdiction. 12 A more recent deci-
sion of the Supreme Court, Vaca v. Sipes, 13
 has created even further inroads
on the area proscribed by Garman. Unlike Smith, however, Vaca does not
set clearly defined limits on the areas exempted from the Garmon rule. In
light of several recent conflicting decisions as to the implications of Vaca
for federal preemption, that case warrants further examination.
At issue in Vaca was a breach of a union's duty of fair representation.
The Court held that a state court could assert jurisdiction of a suit by a
union member against his union where it was alleged that the member had
been discharged in violation of the collective bargaining agreement and that
the union had arbitrarily, capriciously and without just or reasonable cause
refused to take the member's grievance to the final step, arbitration. 14 The
complaint was initiated by one Benjamin Owens who, because of poor health,
had been discharged from his job at Swift & Company's Kansas City Meat
Packing Plant. Owens, who had suffered from high blood pressure, had earlier
been granted sick leave, but upon return was denied reinstatement despite
a bill of good health from his own physician. The union subsequently agreed
to process Owens' claim of wrongful discharge, and carried it through the
fourth step of the grievance procedure, but without success. Prior to deciding
whether to continue to the last step, arbitration, the union requested Owens
to submit to another physical examination. Upon receipt of an adverse
report from the examining physician, the union board voted against further
action. Owens' suit resulted from this refusal.
In answer to Owens' complaint, brought in a Missouri State Circuit
Court, the union contended that the court lacked jurisdiction because the
alleged conduct was arguably and basically an unfair labor practice under
Section 8(b) of the Act, and therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Board. Although the trial was permitted to proceed, and Owens was
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages by the jury, the judge
set aside the verdict and entered judgment for the union on the grounds that
the court lacked jurisdiction for the reasons set forth by the union. Ulti-
mately the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court and directed rein-
statement of the verdict.
The union's appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States rested
upon the contention that the Board, in Miranda Fuel Co., 15 had adopted the
theory that a breach of the union's duty of fair representation constituted
an unfair labor practice, and that, accordingly, the broad preemption doc-
trine defined in Garmon precluded state court jurisdiction. The Court, noting
that the Board's decision in Miranda Fuel had been denied enforcement by
12 Id. at 197.
13 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
14 Id. at 173.
15 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172,
54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963).
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the Second Circuit 16
 even though the doctrine had been accepted by the
Fifth Circuit, 17 left open the question whether unfair representation consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice. It reasoned, however, that even if unfair repre-
sentation were an unfair labor practice, the Garman principle would not
apply unless it could also be inferred that Congress intended that the Board
have exclusive jurisdiction. The court found no such inference. Working to
this conclusion, the Court observed that the duty had been developed and
Iong recognized by the Courts, and, further, that the Board itself had, in
Miranda, adopted the judicially developed doctrine. The Court noted, in
addition, that in an unfair representation suit a review of the substantive
positions taken in collective bargaining agreements will be required. It ques-
tioned whether the Board had substantially greater expertise in this regard
than the courts. Moreover, the Court underscored the fact that the duty of
fair representation is a valuable right, enforcement of which should not be left
solely to the unreviewable discretion of the General Counsel of the Board.
The opening language of Vaca is thus broad in its sweep; and has pre-
cluded the Board from exercising exclusive jurisdiction over activity involving
unfair representation. However, the balance and emphasis of the Court's
discussion in Vaca centers upon the intricate relationship of the duty of fair
representation to collective bargaining agreements, and in turn to suits
brought under Section 301 of the Act. In this latter respect, the Court stressed
certain practical considerations warranting judicial cognizance of allegations
involving unfair representation, and pointed to the situation, like that in
Vaca, where the employee is seeking enforcement of contractual rights, that
is, arbitration, which only the union may invoke in his behalf. The Court
noted that under such circumstances it is the employer who commits a breach,
notwithstanding the fact that it was the union's wrongful refusal to process
the grievance that contributed to the breach. In order to establish the em-
ployer's breach, however, it will also be necessary to establish the union's
failure to prosecute the claim. The Court thus suggests that in the context
of a section 301 suit, where the employer's breach of contract results from
the union's breach of its duty of fair representation, a state court should be
able to assert jurisdiction over suits alleging unfair representation. In this
setting, then, Vaca appears to have at least its primary significance.
The Court in Vaca does, however, suggest that state courts may also
assert jurisdiction of suits alleging unfair representation absent a breach of
any collective bargaining agreement. This unrestricted interpretation of
Vaca creates a doubt as to the ultimate scope of the decision, and in turn
as to the effect of the decision on the Garman doctrine.
During the Survey year, issues involving the scope of Vaca have been
presented in several decisions.' 8 Relying upon an interpretation giving an
18 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963).
17 Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395
(5th Cir. 1966).
18 Phalen v. Theatrical Protective Union No. 1, 22 N.Y.2d 34, 238 N.E.2d 295, 290
N.Y.S.2d 881, 68 L.R.R.M. 2427, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1000 (1968); Alaska v. Operating
Eng'rs, 68 L.R.R.M. 2434 (Alas. Super. Ct. 1968); Tyree v. Edwards, 287 F. Supp.
589, 69 L.R.R.M. 2137 (D. Alas. 1968), aff'd mcm., 393 U.S. 405 (1969).
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unrestricted meaning to Vaca, the New York Court of Appeals, in Phalen v.
Theatrical Protective Union No. 1,'9 asserted jurisdiction over a suit brought
against the respondent union by two non-union stage workers. It was alleged
that the petitioners had been refused admission to membership and that,
because of their non-membership, the union had caused them to be subject
to discriminatory practices. Allegedly, they had been refused employment
and summarily dismissed from jobs, and replaced by union members, all at
the instance of the respondent. In their initial complaint the petitioners sought
a writ of mandamus compelling the union to admit them to membership. The
lower court had in part dismissed the petitioners' suit on the ground that their
complaint was arguably within the purview of the Act and, therefore, under
the federal preemption doctrine expressed in Garmon, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed. Al-
though it recognized that the petitioners charged the respondent union with
a violation of a federal statutory obligation to represent the members of its
bargaining unit fairly, the court, nevertheless, relied upon Vaca to assert
jurisdiction. Unlike the charge in Vaca, it was not alleged that the breach of
duty of fair representation had contributed to a violation of any contractual
right. Rather, the petitioners were seeking to enforce an equitable right to
non-discriminatory treatment, and the appropriate remedy envisaged by the
court was an injunction against the union's conduct, as well as incidental
damages.
While the petitioner's complaint in Phalen was thus framed as a breach
of the duty of fair representation, the union's alleged conduct was also, argu-
ably, a violation of section 8(b) (2),20 in that it caused employers to dis-
criminate against employees with respect to whom membership in the union
had been denied on some grounds other than failure to pay dues. An 8(b) (2)
charge would clearly have been within the jurisdiction of the Board. Because
of this factor, Chief Judge Fuld, in a concurring opinion, expressed misgivings
about the majority's reliance upon Vaca in their conclusion that state juris-
diction over the union acivity had not been preempted. 2 ' In agreement with
one commentator's view of Vaca,22 he maintained that the ruling in the case
was restricted to breaches of the duty of fair representation arising within the
context of section 301 actions. Judge Fuld, however, nevertheless concluded
that no federal preemption obtained because the Board did not have the
power to fashion what he felt was the only effective remedy, that is, to order
a labor union to admit the petitioners to membership.
Two other related actions decided during the Survey year further high-
light the disagreement among the courts as to the implications of Vaca. In
Alaska v. Operating Eng'rs, 23 the Superior Court of Alaska placed an inter-
pretation upon Vaca similar to that of the New York Court of Appeals in
Phalen. The Operating Engineers case stemmed from a violation of the Alaska
10 22 N.Y.2d 34, 238 N.E.2d 295, 290 N.Y.S.2d 881, 68 L.R.R.M. 2427.
20 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
21 22 N.Y.2d at 46, 238 N.E.2d at 302, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 891, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2433.
22 Lewis, Fair Representation in Grievance Administration: Vaca v. Sipes, 1967
S. Ct. Rev. 81, 99.
23 68 L.R.R.M. 2434 (Alas. Super. Ct. 1968).
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Local Autonomy Act. Under the provisions of that Act, a labor union repre-
senting 100 or more members residing in Alaska was required to establish
a local within the state. The union, however, was exempted from this pro-
vision if it maintained a local-hire preference in its collective bargaining
agreements within the state. The defendant union local, based in Seattle, and
representing members residing in Alaska, was charged with giving preference
in job opportunities in Alaska to union members living outside the state.
Therefore, the union's failure to establish a local in Alaska constituted a
violation of the Local Autonomy Act.
The court, considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction against
the union forbidding it to do business within the state, faced the initial issue
whether jurisdiction of the matters had been preempted by federal law. It
reviewed the principal decisions regarding preemption, and, emphasizing the
discriminatory conduct of the union in the case, relied primarily upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Vaca for its assertion of jurisdiction. The court
observed that the LMRA did not expressly proscribe such discriminatory con-
duct, and further that, since the General Counsel was not compelled to act
upon any unfair labor practice charge, the administrative remedy was not
sufficient. In this regard, the Alaska court seems to have drawn heavily upon
the Supreme Court's analysis in Vaca of the judicial development of the
concept of unfair representation and of the responsibility of the courts to
entertain such claims.
Unlike the question in Vaca, however, the issue of unfair representation
in Operating Engineers had arisen, as in Phalen, outside the context of a
section 301 action. Absent this condition, a doubt perists, similar to that ex-
pressed by Judge Fuld in Phalen, as to whether Vaca should be given the
unrestricted meaning attached to it by the Alaska court.
The doubtfulness of the Alaska court's conclusions regarding the scope
of Vaca is underscored in a subsequent and related action involving the same
parties in the federal district court in Alaska, Tyree v. Edwards. 24
 In that
decision, not only was the Local Autonomy Act declared unconstitutional,
but enforcement of the injunction against the union was barred. Determi-
native in the opinion of the federal court was its conclusion that Vaca applied
only where it could not be inferred that Congress intended exclusive juris-
diction to lie with the Board. In this instance, the alleged discriminatory
conduct—job referral discrimination to strengthen union authority—was
held by the court to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, be-
cause it would constitute a violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. 25
The federal court thus seemed to conclude that, while the union activity is
tainted with charges of unfair representation, it does nevertheless constitute
a recognized unfair labor practice and, therefore, it falls within the Board's
responsibility to prosecute.
If Vaca, Phalen, Operating Engineers and Tyree are taken together, the
cases demonstrate that issues involving unfair representation may arise in
three ways: alone, in the context of a section 301 suit, or in conjunction with
a charge of a recognized unfair labor practice under section 8(b). Therefore,
24 287 F. Supp. 589, 69 L.R.R.M. 2137 (1968).
25 29 U.S.C. 158(b) (I) (A) (1964).
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it is submitted that the Supreme Court in Vaca purposely avoided charac-
terization of unfair representation as an unfair labor practice in itself, and
thereby removed it from the ambit of the Garmon rule when it arises in a
section 301 action. However, the Court in Vaca did not preclude the pos-
sibility that the issue of unfair representation would arise in a situation
where the Board would have exclusive jurisdiction, that is, in the accompa-
niment of a charge of violation of section 8(b). The court in Tyree apparently
felt the latter instance to be the case before it. An opposite conclusion, that
reached by the majority in Phalen and by the Alaska state court, would per-
mit state courts to assert jurisdiction over any case where unfair representa-
tion has been alleged, regardless of the fact that the conduct may also be
arguably protected or prohibited activity under the Act. Such a result would
invite the conflict between state and federal authorities which the Court in
Garmon sought to avert. For these reasons, the reservations as to an unre-
stricted meaning of Vaca expressed by Judge Fuld in Phalen and the conclu-
sions reached by the federal court in Tyree appear to be a sounder interpre-
tation of the holding in Vaca.
III. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Appropriate Bargaining Unit
1. Single-Store Units.—Section 9(b) of the LMRA1 entrusts to the Board
the responsibility for determination of the appropriate employee unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. The basic statutory guideline is the direc-
tion that the Board "assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising
the rights guaranteed by this Act . ." 2 Thus, where the interests of a group
of employees seeking representation can be clearly identified, it becomes in-
cumbent upon the Board to give maximum consideration to their interests and
desires, unless a unit of such employees would prove disruptive to the em-
ployer's operation. 1 In executing this legislative mandate the Board ruled
in Haag Drug Co.,4 decided during the Survey year, that, absent a bargain-
ing history in a larger unit and absent a significant degree of integration in
the employer's operation, such employee "freedom" is maximized by the
treatment of a unit composed of employees of a single outlet of a retail or
restaurant chain as presumptively appropriate. 5
The Board's decision in Haag Drug expanded the conclusion previously
reached in Say-On Drugs, Inc.,6 that a separate retail outlet unit might be
appropriate. In Say-On Drugs, the Board had overruled an earlier policy
which emphasized the administrative grouping of retail chains over such other
factors as geographic separation, substantial local managerial authority, and
minimal employee interchange.' This earlier policy, it was felt, impeded the
1 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
2 Id.
3 Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 631, 51 L.R.R.M. 1344, 1345 (1962).
4 169 N.L,R.B. No. 111, 67 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1968).
5 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
6 138 N.L.R,B. 1032, 51 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1962).
7 Id. at 1033, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
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employees' rights of self-organization guaranteed by Section 7 of the Acts in
that it ignored organizational efforts at the single-outlet level. The conclu-
sion reached in Haag Drug, that such units should be regarded as presump-
tively appropriate, was prompted by the Board's experience since Say-On
Drugs. A review of the cases following that decision showed that single-out-
let bargaining units had consistently been found to have been appropriate. 9
The Board's opinion in Haag Drug, grounded on this experience, clarifies
that policy.
As expressed by the Board,
[t]he employees in a single retail outlet form a homogeneous, iden-
tifiable, and distinct group, physically separated from the employees
in the other outlets of the chain; they generally perform related
functions under immediate supervision apart from employees at
other locations; and their work functions, though parallel to, are
nonetheless separate from, the functions of employees in the other
outlets, and thus their problems and grievances are peculiarly their
own and not necessarily shared with employees in the other outlets.°
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, paramount to. the determination that separate outlets are suitable
units for collective bargaining purposes is the requirement that they form
distinct, separate and homogeneous groups, possessing a clear community of
interest arising from their own problems and grievances. The centralized
controls which mark chain operations are considered by the Board as largely
record keeping or administrative functions having little relation to the daily
routine of the employees or their interests in employment conditions. There-
fore, while it might be disadvantageous to the employer, who would, no
doubt prefer to set uniform policies regarding wages, hours and conditions
of employment, bargaining on less than a chain-wide basis would not, in the
opinion of the Board, prove disruptive to the employer, and would provide
maximum recognition to the interests of the employees. It
8 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
9
 169 N.L.R.B. No. HI, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1290 n.3. See cases cited therein.
19 Id., 67 L.R.R.M. at 1291.
11 Id.
The Board did not elaborate under which circumstances bargaining on less than
chainwide units would prove disruptive. It merely stated that "[lit does not necessarily
follow that organization of only a portion of the chain would likely result in a lack of
uniformity of working conditions through the chain or, if it would, that this necessitates
rejecting a unit such as here sought." 169 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1291. There-
fore, the fact that each outlet might have different wage and benefit programs and dif-
ferent work rules would rot militate against single store units. Previously, in Purity
Food Stores, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 651, 63 L.R.R.M. 1007 ('1966), enforcement denied,
376 F.2d 497, 65 L.R.R.M. 2261 (1st Cir. 1967), the Board had stated that bargaining
by individual units "is not only entirely feasible, but would not unduly encroach on the
Employer's various administrative controls." 160 N.L.R.B. at 659-60, 63 L.R.R.M. at 1012.
Where such factors as geographic proximity and significant employee interchange
existed, bargaining on a less than chain-wide basis might prove disruptive. Temporarily
transferred employees might be working at wages and under work rules different from
those applied to personnel regularly employed at the outlet. See NLRB v. Purity Food
Stores, Inc., 376 F.2d 497, 500-01, 65 L.R.R.M. 2261, 2264. Similarly, if the outlets were
79
ANNUAL SURVEY OP LABOR LAW
The organization of the Haag Drug Company is illustrative of the degree
of centralized control which a chain headquarters might maintain over its in-
dividual outlets without achieving the degree of centralization necessary to
overcome the presumption that a single-store unit is appropriate. In the
Haag operation, the central headquarters set pay scales and established per-
sonnel policies for the entire chain, and retained the personnel and pay
records. Further, the central office maintained control over fiscal matters. It
established budgets and maintained profit and loss statements for each
outlet. It negotiated and contracted with vendors, paid bills, and kept all
financial records. A company vice president and assistant were in charge of
and supervised the operations of each outlet. Nevertheless, the responsibilities
of the central office were characterized as essentially record keeping or ad-
ministrative, and not directly related to the employee's daily routine.
The local manager, on the other hand, did approximately 60 percent of
the hiring, fixed wages within prescribed ranges, trained his own personnel,
had authority to discharge, and could make recommendations regarding em-
ployee promotions. In addition, the manager ordered his own supplies, albeit
from assigned vendors, and contracted for major repairs. This extent of func-
tional independence and local managerial supervision, coupled with minimal
employee interchange among stores and geographic separation of the outlet,
was deemed sufficient to promote a "community of interest" among the em-
ployees of each store, and to create the degree of autonomy and identity
necessary to constitute a separate unit. 12
The Board acknowledged that where the outlets are not self-contained
economic units, where the central office maintains close supervision, and
where there is substantial employee interchange, such units would not be
appropriate bargaining units, because the identity of the outlets would be
obscured. Therefore, the policy expressed in Haag Drug reflects that of
critical importance are those factors which help to define the separate and
distinct identity of the unit. The fact that the central office retained adminis-
trative control and made policy determinations would not, in the opinion of
the Board, obscure the identity of the single-store unit."
not economically self-contained and frequent exchange and redistribution of inventory
occurred, a labor dispute at one outlet might disrupt operations at other outlets. See
Star Market Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. '130, 68 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1968). These, of course,
would all be factors militating against single-store units.
12 In adhering to the policy announced in Haag Drug, the Board, during the Survey
year, found other single stores appropriate units. In Kostel Corp., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 167,
68 L.R.R.M. 1561 (1968), the Board emphasized such factors as geographic separation,
lack of employee interchange, extent of local control over employees' daily activities and
the absence of a bargaining history in a more comprehensive unit. Id., 68 L.R.R.M. at
1563. In Warehouse Markets, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 70 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1969), the
Board faced the issue whether a new store of a chain operation should be granted sep-
arate recognition or become, by accretion, part of an existing multi-store unit. Despite
the fact that the older stores in the chain were included in one unit, the Board emphasized
the rights of the employees at the new store. Finding that, in addition to being newly
opened, the store had separate, immediate supervision, that minimal employee interchange
occurred, and that the store was separately rated on its performance, the Board concluded
that the store was a separate economic unit and appropriate for collective bargaining
purposes. Id., 70 L.R.R.M. at 1194.
 -
13 During the Survey year the Board has in several instances found single store units
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The Board has previously noted that certain types of bargaining units,
such as plant units or district offices of insurance companies, are presump-
tively appropriate,14 and in Ilaag Drug the Board has adopted similar cri-
teria in reaching the same conclusion regarding retail chain outlets. In a
multi-plant operation, where central control constitutes largely planning and
coordinating functions, and the operational control and direct day-to-day
supervision remains with the plant manager, a plant is an appropriate unit for
bargaining purposes." Likewise, with respect to district offices of insurance
companies, the Board has emphasized the community of interest among em-
ployees of each office, the homogeneous and separate identity of the unit, the
geographic separation, and local supervision over daily operations." Never-
theless, the policy regarding the appropriateness of single-store units has not
met complete acceptance.' 7
Disagreement with the single-store unit policy centers principally on
the degree of autonomy which must exist within the outlet. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, in NLRB v. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 18 concluded that local man-
agers must have extensive authority affecting subjects of collective bargaining,
such as wages, hours and conditions of employment, before the Board is jus-
tified in finding sufficient autonomy to declare a single outlet an appropriate
unit." In the Frisch chain, local managers supervised day-to-day matters.
They also had authority to hire, discipline and discharge. In addition, they
could set wages, albeit within prescribed minimums, and could make recom-
mendations regarding promotions. The court, however, emphasized that the
central office formulated wage and labor policies and that this central con-
trol would seriously hinder separate bargaining units among the outlets. The
inappropriate. In Pep Boys, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 68 L.R.R.M. 1308 (1968), the Board
found a high degree of central control in the chain. In addition, frequent employee inter-
change occurred, and the stores were geographically close and drew from the same general
labor market. The Board emphasized also that the local manager had limited authority
and the district manager maintained close supervision over the operations at each outlet.
Id., 68 L.R.R.M. at 1309. Very similar factors militated against a single store unit in
Star Market Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 68 L.R.R.M. 1497 (1968). See also Horn &
Hardart Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 67 L.R.R.M. 1512 (1968), and Frankel Shops, Inc.,
70 L.R.R.M. 1194 (Dec. of Reg. Dir., 29th Reg., Jan. 31, 1969).
14 See Temco Aircraft Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1085, 42 L.R.R.M. 1538 (1958), and
Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 629, 51 L.R.R.M. 1344 (1962) (single-plant unit
appropriate) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1408, 61 L.R.R.M. 1249 (1966)
(district insurance office appropriate unit).
15 Dixie Belle Mills, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. at 630, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1344.
15 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. at 1412, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1252.
17 See NLRB v. Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 356 F.2d 895, 61 L.R.R.M. 2362
(7th Cir. 1966) ; NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc., 376 F.2d 497, 65 L.R.R.M. 2261 (1st
Cir. 1967) ; NLRB v. Davis Cafeteria, Inc., 396 F.2d 18, 68 L.R.R.M. 2426 (5th Cir.
1968) ; and NLRB v. Solis Theatre Corp., 403 F.2d 381, 69 L.R.R.M. 2664 (2d Cir. 1968).
During the Survey year, several courts have supported the Board's determination
regarding the appropriateness of single store units. See NLRB v. Dee's of N.J., Inc., 395
F.2d 112, 68 L.R.R.M. 2302 (3d Cir. 1968) ; NLRB v. Lou De Young's Market Basket,
Inc., 406 F.2d 17, 70 L.R.R.M. 2262 (6th Cir 1969) ; and NLRB v. Spartans industries,
Inc., 406 F.2d 1002, 70 L.R.R.M. 2475 (5th Cir. 1969).
18 356 F.2d 895, 61 L.R.R.M. 2362.
19 Id. at 897, 61 L.R.R.M. at 2363.
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First Circuit, in NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc.," also placed great em-
phasis on the central control and administration within a chain operation in
concluding that a single-store unit was inappropriate, despite the Board's
earlier finding of significant autonomy in the outlet.
During the Survey year, the view that local managers must be able to
decide questions affecting subjects of collective bargaining has been em-
phasized by two circuits. In NLRB v. Davis Cafeteria, Inc.,21 the Fifth Cir-
cuit denied enforcement of a bargaining order where the Board had deter-
mined that two closely located cafeterias in a group of eight were appropriate
as a bargaining unit. The court emphasized that the central office determined
the labor policies, wages and hours for all the units, notwithstanding the
Board's finding that the local manager had authority to hire and discharge,
to recommend pay increases, and to order food and supplies.
The Second Circuit, in NLRB v. Solis Theatre Corp., 22 also refused to
sanction, as an appropriate bargaining unit, a single theatre which was part
of a chain in the greater New York City area. The local manager was respon-
sible for supervision of the daily activities of the employees, had authority to
discipline them, and conducted initial job interviews. The Board concluded
that sufficient local authority existed to warrant a separate unit. The court
disagreed, noting the geographic proximity of the theatres in the chain. Fur-
ther, the court underscored the fact that "the 'manager' has little or no
authority on labor policy but is subject to detailed instructions from the
central office."23
Thus, the critical issue, upon which ultimate determination by the
Supreme Court may be required, is the degree of managerial authority which
must reside in the single outlet. The position of the Board is that the local
manager need only be responsible for day-to-day supervision and be involved
in matters concerning the employees' grievances and routine problems. This
degree of local supervision, according to the Board, establishes a sufficient
identity in the outlet to have it designated as an appropriate bargaining unit.
As stated in Haag Drug:
It is in this framework that the community of interest of the em-
ployees in a single store takes on significance, for the handling of
20 376 F.2d 497, 65 L.R.R.M. 2261 (1st Cir. 1967). Compare the First Circuit's more
recent decision in Banco Credito v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 110, 67 L.R.R.M. 2718 (1st Cir.
1968), in which the court approved as an appropriate bargaining unit a single branch of
a bank. The bank operation was marked by an appreciable degree of centralization and
uniform policies and standards. The branch manager's authority, on the other hand, in-
volved daily supervision of employees. He could also make recommendations for pro-
motions, pay increases, transfers, discipline, and discharge. The court, in spite of the
central control, concluded that the branch manager's authority, albeit limited, in addition
to the geographic separation and minimal employee interchange, supported the determina-
tion of an independent unit. In that case, the court disavowed that its decision in Purity
Food Stores stood "for the proposition that central policy-making in a chain' precludes a
single unit determination." Id. at 112, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2719.
21 396 F.2d 18, 68 L.R.R.M. 2426 (5th Cir. 1968).
22 403 F.2d 381, 69 L.R.R.M. 2664 (2d Cir. 1968).
23 Id. at 383, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2665.
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the day-to-day problems has relevance for all the employees in the
store, but not necessarily for employees of the other stores. 24
The view espoused by some courts, that the local manager must have
extensive authority over wages, hours and conditions of employment, reflects
a policy of greater deference to the interests of the employer. Under those
circumstances where an employer retains the authority to determine wage
and labor policies, it may be advantageous to be able to maintain uniform
conditions of employment throughout the chain. The Board, however, has
previously concluded that less than chain-wide bargaining is feasible and the
employer can bargain individually with each outlet if the interests of these
employees can be clearly identified. 22 The courts' requirement that a manager
have extensive authority to decide questions affecting wages, hours and con-
ditions of employment appears to exceed the mere identification of an outlet
as an autonomous unit. However, since the LMRA requires that emphasis
be given to the freedom of the employees, the policy reflected in Haag Drug
more properly effectuates the purposes of the Act.
2. Redesignation of Appropriate Bargaining Unit.—The United Glass and
Ceramic Workers represented the employees at ten plants belonging to
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company. The employees at eight of the plants
were organized as a multi-plant unit, while the employees at each of the
remaining two plants were organized as single plant units. The employer is
engaged in the production and fabrication of glass and glass products. The
operations at all ten plants are similar and there is no greater degree of
operational or administrative intergration among the eight plants in the
multi-plant unit then exists among all ten. The existence of three separate
units is attributable to historical factors in the organization of the employees.
Initially, in 1939, the union was certified as the bargaining representative of
the eight plants in the multi-plant unit. Later, in 1943 and 1962, the other
two plants were respectively acquired and constructed, and each was sep-
arately organized. Since then the union has sought in bargaining sessions to
merge the separate units into the multi-plant unit, but the employer has not
acceded to the union's request. Frustrated by the employer's opposition, the
union filed a petition with the Board for unit clarification in order to effect
the inclusion of the two plants. in Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. 26 the Board,
in an unprecedented ruling, and with two members dissenting, ordered an
election among the employees at the two separate plants to determine whether
they desired to remain as separate units or to merge with the multi-plant unit.
In the past, "Globe" or self-determination elections have been held only
where a question of representation has existed. 27 Accordingly, it was the
position of.Libbey-Owens-Ford that any question involving unit determination
24 169 N.L.R.B. No. III, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1291-92.
25 See note 11 supra, and Purity Food Stores, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 651, 659, 63
L.R.R.M. 1007, 1012 (1966), enforcement denied, 376 F.2d 497, 63 L.R.R.M. 2261 (1st
Cir. 1967),
26 169 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 67 L.R.R.M. 1096 (1968).
27
 The term "Globe" election is derived from the Board's decision in Globe Mach.
& Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294, IA L.R.R.M. 122 (1937), in which the Board first pre-
scribed this type of election.
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necessarily presents a question of representation. Therefore, the employer
argued, the appropriate procedure would require the union to file a repre-
sentation petition under Section 9(c) of the Act." The Board could then
decide questions regarding the appropriateness of the unit and arrange for a
self-determination election. The "catch" to the employer's position, and the
obvious reason why the argument was advanced, was that the existing con-
tracts would bar any elections at this time. Therefore, the majority avoided
the characterization of the question as one of representation. Furthermore,
the Board was careful to note that no question of representation existed. It
was undisputed that the union represented the employees at all ten plants
and, therefore, that the redetermination of the unit would be for purposes of
future bargaining only. Thus the failure of the employer to agree to a merger
compelled the Board to resort to a self-determination election.
Libbey-Owens-Ford presents the principal issue whether the Board has
power to make a unit determination absent a question of representation."
The use of an election appears to be the only practical means to aid the
Board in this determination and, therefore, it becomes an integral part of
the issue. The Board held that its statutory duty required it to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit wherever the issue should arise. It did not pre-
sent any express statutory authorization to make this determination where a
question of representation was not also presented. Nevertheless, the majority
maintained that the need to resolve a long-standing dispute justified its
action. Moreover, the Board reasoned that a failure to decide the question
would constitute a breach of the Board's statutory duty.
We are unable to perceive any reason why a further delay should
be required where, as here, no question of the presumptive pro-
priety of the employer-wide unit exists and only the technical prob-
lems of bargaining history and employer opposition have prevented
its establishment. 3 °
The absence of such express statutory authority led Members Fanning
and Jenkins to dissent. They could not agree that only "technical problems"
had prevented resolution of the dispute regarding the appropriate bargain-
ing unit. These Board members believed that the question of merger of
units must be left to voluntary bargaining. The dissenters emphasized that
the statutory provisions for an election are very explicit. Section 9(c) (1) of
the Act3 ' authorizes an election where a "question of representation" exists.
Members Fanning and Jenkins pointed to the fact that "only by reason of
the selection of a particular representative rather than another representative
28 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c) (1964).
29 The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia asserted jurisdiction of
a suit by the employer to enjoin the Board from conducting the election on the theory
that the Board had acted in excess of its statutory duty. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co.
v. McCulloch, 67 L.R.R.M. 2712 (D.D.C. 1968). The district court, however, was later
reversed and the case ordered dismissed. McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403
F.Zd 916, 68 L.R.R.M. 2447 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
no 169 N.L.R.B. No. 111, 67 L.R.R.M. at 4098.
31 29 U.S.C.	 159(c) (1) (1964).
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does the employee register a preference as to unit." 32 They stressed other
express provisions for elections, such as votes by professional employees
regarding inclusion in units with non-professional employees and votes for
craft severance, and conluded that "these provisions are actually limitations
imposed by Congress on the Board's authority to define units—limitations
within the overall pattern of Section 9 of the Act specifying the circum-
stances in which elections shall be held."33
 The dissenters posed questions
regarding the effect to be accorded such elections, specifically whether the
rule barring elections for one year following a previous election was appli-
cable, and whether a union which desired to challenge the incumbent union's
status as employee representative should be allowed to participate in such
an election. The recalcitrance of the employer in the instant case toward a
merger perhaps explains the Board's use of the extraordinary remedy of a
self-determination election in order to resolve the dispute over the proper
unit for future bargaining purposes. The position of the dissenters, however,
is well taken; the express provisions of the Act limit the circumstances under
which an election can be held to those involving representational issues.
Therefore, the question whether the Board had authority to take extraordi-
nary action in this case will no doubt prove a significant one for judicial
resolution.
B. Union Communication With Employees: "Names and Addresses" Rule
In Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,' the Board first announced a rule which
requires an employer, within seven days following the scheduling of a repre-
sentation election, to furnish the Regional Director with a list containing the
names and addresses of all employees eligible to vote. In turn, the list is to
be made available to the union. The failure of the employer to comply will
be ground for setting aside the election.'
The Excelsior rule was prompted by the contentions of two unions,
following elections in which each had been defeated, that the employers'
refusal to furnish the unions with the names and addresses of the employees
interfered with the elections. The unions argued that this refusal precluded
them from answering the employers' letters and campaign propaganda mate-
32 169 N.L.R.B. No. Ill, 67 L.R.R.M. at 1099.
33 Id.
1 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1966).
2 Id. at 1240, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1218. The Board made one exception to the rule's
application. It will not apply to an expedited election conducted pursuant to § 8(b) (7) (c)
of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (c) (1964). 156 N.L.R.B. at 1242 n.14, 61 L.R.R.M.
at 1219 n.I4. The Board has also since held that the rule is not to be applied mechanically
where there has been substantial compliance. See Fuchs Baking Co., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 108,
70 L.R.R.M. 1294 (1969), and Telonic Instruments, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 69 L.R.R.M.
1398 (1968). In Telonic the Board ruled that the omission of four names from the
eligibility list, even though the union lost the election by one vote, was not reason enough
to set aside the election. Upon discovery of the omissions the employer immediately ad-
vised the Regional Director. Also, there was no evidence that the omissions were due to
gross negligence or unwillingness by the employer to afford the union access to all the
employees. Id., 69 L.R.R.M. at 1399. In Fuchs there had not been substantial compliance
and the election was set aside, 174 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1294.
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rial. In spite of these objections, the Board certified the results of the elec-
tion. The Board did announce, however, that in the future an employer's
refusal to furnish such information would constitute grounds for setting
aside an election. Thus the ruling was prospective only, and not applied to
the parties in the Excelsior case itself.
Both the validity of the Excelsior rule and the Board's power to pro-
mulgate it were quickly challenged. The Board countered by stressing that
the importance of full information to employees concerning both the union's
and the employer's views on election issues dictates that the names and
addresses be furnished to the union. Many of the specific objections to the
rule had been anticipated and rebutted by the Board in the Excelsior opinion
itself. The courts generally upheld the Board's conclusions that the rule
did not infringe upon the employees' section 7 right to refrain from concerted
activity, and that the rule would not expose employees to harassment or
tempt the unions to abuse the information. 3
The method relied upon by the Board for the enforcement of the rule
has also been challenged. Under Section 11(1) of the Act, the Board "shall
at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and
the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded
against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question." 4 The
Board has, in effect, considered the eligibility list as "evidence" that relates
to a matter under investigation, and has relied upon the subpoena power of
section 11(1) and the jurisdiction of the federal district courts under section
11(2) 5 to enforce by court order the subpoena issued by the Board. It has
been contended that the list is not "evidence," but this objection has been
overruled and the Board's method of enforcement upheld. 5
3 Sec NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 384 F.2d 188, 66 L.R.R.M. 2264 (4th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968) (the rule does not infringe on the § 7 rights of em-
ployees and will not expose them to additional harrassment); NLRB v. Bohlen, 385 F.2d
52, 66 L.R.R.M. 2481 (7th Cir. 1967) (the rebuttal of the Board in Excelsior Underwear
was fully adopted) ; NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 68 L.R.R.M. 2930 (D.S.C. 1968) (the
rule does not invade the privacy of employees and expose them to harrassment); Howell
Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 213, 69 L.R.R.M. 2032 (5th Cir. 1968) (the possibility that
the union abused the opportunity to communicate with employees was insufficient to
invalidate the rule; the Board's order was denied on other grounds); NLRB v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 2756 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 1968) (in spite of the fact that 219
employees demanded their names not be divulged, the court sustained the validity of the
rule and enforced the Board's subpoena of the names and addresses); NLRB v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 70 L.R.R.M. 2241 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 1968) (enforcement of rule does not
constitute an unlawful invasion and interference of employee privacy).
4 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1964).
5 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1964).
6 NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 384 F.2d 188, 66 L.R.R.M. 2264 (4th Cir. 1967) ;
NLRB v. Rohlen, 385 F.2d 52, 66 L.R.R.M. 2481 (7th Cir. 1967). During the Survey
year the Board's use of the § 11(1) subpoena power to enforce the rule has received
continued endorsement. See NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 6$ L.R.R.M. 2980 (U.S.C. 4.968);
NLRB v. Daniel Constr. Co., 69 L.R.R.M. 2206 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 1968) (enforced on the
specific condition that the employer furnish the names and addresses with the express
restriction that the union could only communicate by mail with those employees who had
not been on the payroll within 30 days of the order) ; NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 69
L.R.R.M. 2756 (W.D,N.C. Nov. 14, 1968); NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 406
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During the Survey year, however, the First Circuit, in Wyman-Gordon
Co. v. NLR13,7
 upheld a novel attack on the Excelsior rule. The court held
that the rule was promulgated in disregard of the notice and publication
requirements of Sections 552 and 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 8
 In addition to the formal rule creating procedures prescribed by the
APA, the court recognized that as an administrative body the Board might
also promulgate rules through decisions in adjudicative proceedings, where
the case is decided between parties and the result "stands as a guide for
the future and may be spoken of as a rule." 9 In Excelsior, however, the rule
announced was not applied to the parties before the Board, but rather was
to take effect 30 days from the date of the order. The fact that the Excel-
sior rule was to have only prospective effect was fatal, in the opinion of the
First Circuit in Wyman-Gordon, since it could not be regarded as having
been properly formulated in an adjudicative proceeding. Therefore, "to the
extent the Board was not deciding a case, this is precisely where Congress
has instructed it as to the procedure it should adopt." 1 ° These procedures,
which are set forth in the APA, would require the Board to have first pub-
lished notice of and conducted a hearing on the proposed rule, and then
F.2d 253, 69 L.R.R.M. 2846 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1624 (1969); British
Auto Parts, Inc. v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 1182, 70 L.R.R.M. 2065 (9th Cir. 1968).
7 397 F.2d 394, 68 L.R.R.M. 2483 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 932 (1968). See
note 21 infra.
8 .5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 553 (1964). Section 552 provides in part:
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal
Register for the guidance of the public-
. ..
(C) rules of procedure . . . ;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as author-
ized by law	 . ; and
(E) Each amendment, revision or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the
terms thereof, a person may not in any manner he required to resort to,
or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the
Federal Register and not so published.
Section 533 provides in part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Fed-
eral Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally
served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. . . .
•
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does
not apply—
(A) to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure or practice • 	 .
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presen-
tation.
' 397 F.2d at 397, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2485.
10
 Id.
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published the rule as finally adopted in the Federal Register." This, of
course, the Board had not done.
Judge Coffin, 'dissenting, contended that the Excelsior rule should be
characterized as merely procedural, because it establishes a positive require-
ment that the employer furnish names and addresses; it has no proscriptive
effect. Therefore, according to the dissent, the rule was valid with respect to
parties who had knowledge of it, despite the absence of the formal notice
required by the APA." The Federal District Court for South Carolina, faced
in NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp." with the same question as was presented in
Wyman-Gordon, adopted this view. The majority in Wyman-Gordon, how-
ever, found the rule to be substantive, because it requires the employer to
furnish the interested unions with affirmative assistance in the conduct of
their election campaigns. In the majority's opinion, such a rule could not be
characterized as merely procedural. The majority, however, deemphasized
the importance of this distinction, feeling that it was advanced only for
avoidance of the effect of the APA. As the majority opinion stresses, the basic
issue is whether the Excelsior rule was properly formulated through an ad-
judicative proceeding of the Board. In the opinion of the Wyman-Gordon
court, it was not. Therefore, it must fall because neither was it promulgated
in accordance with the formal rule-making procedures of the APA."
At this writing, the Wyman-Gordon case itself is before the Supreme
11 See note 8 supra.
12 Under § 5.53(b) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1964), the notice and hearing
requirements are waived with respect to a proposed procedural rule. Therefore, if the
Excelsior rule were characterized as procedural it would fall within this exception, and
under § 552(a), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1964), it could be applied to any person with actual
and timely notice of it.
13 68 L.R.R.M. 2980 (D.S.C. 1968).
14 Since the possibility that the rule failed to comply with the APA was not an
issue in Excelsior Underwear, the Board did not address itself to the question whether the
rule was procedural or substantive. The reasons offered by the Board in formulating
the rule, however, may provide some hint as to the precise character of the rule. The
Board first reasoned that, being entrusted by Congress to control the election proceeding
and to determine the steps necessary for a fair election, it regarded it as its function to
conduct elections where employees have the opportunity to cast their ballots free not
only from interference, restraint and coercion, but as well from other elements which
may impede or prevent a free choice. The Board concluded that lack of information
with respect to the available choices is such an impediment to communication, and the
rule was directed to this poor communication. This conclusion suggests at first blush the
requirement of an act which would interfere with the election process and, therefore,
would be substantive in nature. The Board, however, was careful to avoid characterizing
the failure to comply as an unfair labor practice, and merely rested on its view that the
rule was to provide a necessary safeguard. This treatment suggests that the rule is pro-
cedural and could be likened to any other procedural rule controlling the election pro-
ceeding. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1245, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1221.
Secondly, the Board believed that the prompt disclosure of names and addresses
would eliminate post-election challenges based upon the union's lack of knowledge as to
the voters' identity, and that it would facilitate early and informal settlement of such
disputes. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1242-43, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1219-20. Judge Coffin, in Wyman-
Gordon, felt that this secondary purpose, to expedite the handling of election challenges,
was "uncontrovertedly procedural." 397 F.2d at 399 n.1, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2486 n.1.
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Court on this precise issue.' 5
 It is significant that several circuits have re-
jected contentions based upon the holding in Wyman-Gordon." The Second
Circuit, in NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 17
 perhaps best articulated
the view that the Excelsior rule was properly formulated in the course of an
adjudicative proceeding. The employer in Beech-Nut first contended that
rules of general applicability and future effect, even if applied to the parties
in a quasi-judicial proceeding, could not be promulgated by decision; rather
only "orders" with special applicability could be formulated in such pro-
ceedings. The court answered that this was too narrow an interpretation of
the powers given to the Board and of the manner in which they could be exer-
cised. The court concluded that it remained within the discretion of the
Board as to how it should resolve problems encountered in the administration
of the federal labor laws. The Board could facilitate its administration of
the Act by the promulgation of general rules in quasi-legislative proceedings,
with general notice as to the proposed rule making and with hearings on the
rule, as prescribed by the APA. Alternatively, if a problem should arise as an
issue before the Board in an adjudicative proceeding, the Board could resolve
it by decision, even though that decision might give rise to a "rule" to be
applied in the future.
It was further contended in Beech-Nut that, even if rules of general and
future applicability could be formulated in an adjudicative proceeding, they
must result from an adjudication of the rights of the parties before the Board.
This argument follows the decision of the First Circuit in Wyman-Gordon.
Answering this contention, the Second Circuit maintained that the mere fact
that the rule was not applied to the parties in Excelsior did not in any way
militate against the conclusion that the rule was properly formulated in a
quasi-judicial agency proceeding. Critical to this holding is the fact that the
Excelsior rule, although not applied to the parties in the case, was neverthe-
less substantially related to the facts and issues before the Board. 18 The
Second Circuit noted that the rule evolved directly from the arguments of
15 Cert. granted, 393 U.S. 932 (1968). The Board has itself rejected the contention
that the promulgation of the Excelsior rule violated the APA but does not offer any
reasons in rebuttal. See Laars Eng'rs, Inc. 173 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 69 L.R.R.M. 1376 (1968).
In argument before the Supreme Court, the government, represented by the Solicitor
General, contended that the election rule was the result of adjudication. 70 Lab, Rel. Rep.
284 (1969). Pending the resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court, the Board has
modified its election procedure within the First Circuit regarding an employer's refusal to
furnish eligibility lists. Accordingly, it has deferred seeking court enforcement of sub-
poenas to force compliance with the rule, but still has permitted the filing of timely ob-.
jections to elections conducted without a list, and will pass on these if the Supreme Court
holds in favor of the rule. See Endicott Johnson De Puerto Rico, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. No.
194, 69 L.R.R.M. 1002 (1988).
10 Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 70 L.R.R.M. 2268 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1628 (1969); NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 406 F.2d 253,
69 L.R.R.M. 2846 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1624 (1969) ; Howell Ref. Co. v.
NLRB, 400 F.2d 213, 69 L.R.R.M. 2032 (5th Cir. 1968); British Auto Parts, Inc. v.
NLRB, 405 F.2d 1182, 70 L.R.R.M. 2065 (9th Cir. 1968) ; NLRB v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
70 L.R.R.M. 2241 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 1968).
17 406 F.2d 253, 69 L.R.R.M. 2846 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1624 (1969).
18
 406 F.2d at 258, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2849. See also British Auto Parts, Inc. v. NLRB,
405 F.2d 1182, 1183, 70 L.R.R.M. 2065, 2066 (9th Cir. 1968).
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the union in Excelsior that the election should not have been certified be-
cause of the employer's failure to furnish the names and addresses of the
employees. Although the rule extended beyond the immediate facts pre-
sented in Excelsior, this factor was not fatal, in the opinion of the court in
Beech-Nut, because "the Board in devising a rule is not limited to the par-
ticular facts of the case presented to it for adjudication."" Furthermore, the
Second Circuit felt that "[t]here is nothing anomalous about a prospective
change in a legal rule occurring in an adjudicative setting. In all fairness suf-
ficient time may be required to permit persons to change systems and modes
of dealing with one another." 2°
The argument as to the validity of the Excelsior rule, then, appears to
center upon the question whether the rule was properly formulated in an
adjudicative proceeding. If the Supreme Court should sustain the rule on
these grounds, the Court would appear to have sanctioned the Board's con-
tinued use of adjudicative proceedings to formulate rules of general and
purely future applicability. On the other hand, if the Court should invalidate
the Excelsior rule, or if it should sustain the rule by characterizing it as
merely procedural, and thus not subject to APA notice requirements, as did
Judge Coffin in Wyman-Gordon, far-reaching implications would arise with
respect to the discretion exercised by the Board. It would seriously limit the
use of quasi-judicial proceedings to formulate rules and would force the
Board to utilize the formal rule-making procedures prescribed by the APA. 2'
19 406 F.2d at 258, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2849.
29 Id.
21 The actual tack taken by the Court, in its opinion of April 23, 1969, 89 S. Ct.
1426, was apparently toward some middle ground between these extremes, The Court,
in a 7-2 decision, reversed the First Circuit and upheld the Board's order directing the
employer to furnish the names and addresses. Yet the majority opinion, delivered by Mr.
Justice Fortas, expressed its agreement with the circuit court's conclusion that the Ex-
celsior rule, in itself, had been improperly promulgated because of the Board's failure to
comply with the requirements of the APA. The majority acknowledged that the Board
could decide, in an adjudicatory hearing, whether a particular employer should be re-
quired to furnish a list. But, the Court noted, the Board had not done this in Excelsior;
the rule of that case was not applied to the parties in the proceeding. As stated by Mr.
Justice Fortas, "Instead, the Board purported to make a rule: i.e., to excercise its quasi-
legislative power." Id. at 1429. Nevertheless, the majority concluded that because the
Board had, in an adjudicatory hearing, directed Wyman-Gordon, the respondent in the
instant case, to furnish the list, that particular order was valid, even though the order
was based on the infirm Excelsior rule. The Court sustained the Board's authority to
make the order upon the Board's "wide discretion to ensure the fair and free choice of
bargaining representatives." Id. at 1430. The order in Wyman -Gordon is, in substance,
the same as the Excelsior rule and, as an order resulting from an adjudicatory proceed-
ing, will serve as precedent for future Board action. Thus, the Court has come full circle
to save the rule.
Mr. Justice Black, concurring, contended that the majority was inconsistent in find-
ing on the one hand that the Board had not complied with the APA, yet upholding
enforcement of what he termed the Excelsior "practice." His characterization is signifi-
cant, because by it he avoids the conclusion that, if it was a "rule," the Board should
have followed the APA procedures. He was "convinced that the Excelsior practice was
adopted by the Board as a legitimate incident to the adjudication of a specific case
before it, and for that reason I would hold that the Board properly followed the pro-
cedures applicable to 'adjudication' rather than 'rule making.'" Id. at 1432.
Mr. justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Harlan, in separate dissents, maintained that,
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C. Recognition Without Election: Authorization Cards
In the course of a typical organizational campaign, a labor union will
distribute to the employees cards to be signed and returned, which, accord-
ing to the usual language on the face of the cards, designate the union as the
employees' exclusive bargaining agent. If at least 30 percent of the employees
sign these so-called "authorization cards," the union may petition the Board for
a representation election.' If a majority of the employees return the cards, the
union may even make a direct demand for recognition upon the employer, offer-
ing the cards as evidence of its majority support. In the latter instance the
employer may, if he entertains a good faith doubt as to the union's majority,
nonetheless decline to bargain, and insist upon an election. Accordingly, much
of the union organizer's discussion with the employees regarding the purpose
of the cards will lay emphasis upon a petition for an election.
Authorization cards thus serve a two-fold purpose—to obtain an elec-
tion and to support a demand for recognition. The question of representation
will generally be reviewed in a carefully supervised Board election. Such a
procedure is preferable because the conditions under which authorization
cards are normally solicited are in sharp contrast to the "laboratory condi-
tions" of an election. In an election, an employee may cast his ballot in the
quiet and secrecy of a ballot booth or his own home. When asked to sign an
authorization card, on the other hand, the employee may be exposed to
pressure and hard selling. Even then he may sign in the belief that he is ask-
ing only for an election. Nevertheless, the Board may still order the em-
ployee to bargain on the basis of a card majority if it is found that the
employer lacked a good faith doubt as to the union majority, despite the
fact that the union may have, after the unlawful refusal to bargain, proceeded
to an election and lost. As stated by the Supreme Court in Franks Bros. Co.
v. NLRB.:'
Out of its wide experience, the Board many times has expressed the
view that the unlawful refusal of an employer to bargain collectively
with its employees' chosen representatives disrupts the employees'
morale, deters their organizational activities, and discourages their
membership in unions. The Board's study of this problem has led it
to conclude that, for these reasons, a requirement that union mem-
bership be kept intact during delays incident to hearings would
result in permitting employers to profit from their own wrongful
refusal to bargain.3
The assumption underlying the use of this remedy is, therefore, that
the union enjoyed majority support at the time it demanded recognition
because the Board had not complied with the APA in promulgating the Excelsior rule, it
was invalid and unenforceable against the respondent, Wyman-Gordon.
1
 From the Board's administrative experience it has determined that "in the ab-
sence of special factors the conduct of an election serves no purpose under the statute
unless the petitioner [for an election] has been designated by at least 30 percent of the
employees." 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1969).
2 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
3
 Id. at 704.
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from the employer. The cards will be the only evidence of the union's sup-
port, and in this context their validity, and more specifically the possibility
of misrepresentation resulting from their twofold use, will be in issue.
The Board, in its determination of the validity of authorization cards
looks to the rule, first set forth in its Cumberland Shoe Corp. 4 decision, that
a card will be considered valid unless the solicitor represented to the em-
ployee that the sole and only purpose of the card was to seek an election.
The rationale of the rule, as reflected in the Board's recent decision, Levi
Strauss & Co.,5 is that if the wording of the card is unambiguous it must be
assumed that the employee will act intelligently and responsibly, and that "if
he can read he is at least aware that by his act of signing he is effectuating the
authorization the card declares."° In Levi Strauss the Board ascribed to the
card and its signing the same solemnity and binding effect ascribed to the sign-
ing of a will, deed, contract or note, and found no basis in law for the denial
of face value to the card, in the absence of affirmative proof of misrepre-
sentation. The Board thus dismissed consideration of the possibility that
discussion of a contemplated election might mislead employees as to the
purpose of the cards. It pointed to the fact that authorization cards serve a
twofold purpose, and, therefore, any declarations to the effect that the union
is seeking an election are "no more than truthful statements of a concurrent
purpose for which the cards are sought . . . entirely consistent with the
authorization purpose expressed in the cards, as well as with the use of the
cards to establish majority support"? This belief is grounded also in what
the Board viewed as the realities of union organizational practices. The
Board theorized that authorization cards are used primarily for the showing
of the requisite interest in an election and, consequently, discussion regard-
ing an election is to be expected. Therefore, little reason exists to mention
that the union may also seek immediate recognition on the basis of such
cards, because the opportunity for such a demand will arise infrequently.
Increasingly, the courts have demonstrated a hesitancy to adopt the
Board's apparent faith in the reliability of authorization cards, reflected by
its continued adherence to the Cumberland Shoe rule. The inquiry of the
courts is now being directed toward the subjective intent of the employees
signing the cards. One court's reason for this closer scrutiny is succinctly ex-
pressed by Judge Medina of the Second Circuit, in Schwarzenbach-Huber Co.
v. NLRB: 8
This "representation" card business is an abomination. As pres-
ently administered it is a pro-Union device that serves no other
purpose than to afford a method by which elections can be by-
passed and the Unions ushered in without giving the employees in-
dividually or collectively any voice in the matter.°
4 144 N.L.R.S. 1268, 54 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1963), enforced 351 F.Zd 917, 60 L.R.R.M.
2305 (6th Cir. 1965).
5 172 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1968).
6 Id., 68 L.R.R.M. at 1341.
7 Id.
8 408 F.2d 236, 70 L.R.R.M. 2805 (2d Cir. 1969).
9
 Id. at 249, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2815.
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Judge Medina was referring to the danger inherent in the twofold use of
authorization cards, of misleading employees who signed the cards into the
belief that they are only supporting an election when in fact they are un-
intentionally designating the union as their exclusive bargaining agent.
The facts in Schwarzenbach followed the typical organizational pattern.
The union had both made a demand for recognition and filed a petition for
an election. When the union lost the election, it sought to have the result
set aside, to establish that the employer had committed various unfair labor
practices, and to have the employer bargain without a new election. The
Board sustained the claims of the union, held that the employer's earlier
refusal to bargain had not been based upon a good faith doubt, and con-
cluded that a new election would be impractical. The Board, therefore,
ordered the employer to bargain with the union. Contrary to the Board,
the Second Circuit concluded that a number of cards, sufficient to reduce
the union's support below a majority, were invalid. Therefore, the employer's
refusal to bargain was justified, and under the circumstances a bargaining
order was inappropriate."
What had sparked Judge Medina's remarks and led to the court's denial
of enforcement to the Board's order was the court's conclusion that numerous
cards had been obtained through misrepresentation by the union. The atten-
tion of the court had focused on whether the employees signing the cards
had realized that they were designating the union as their bargaining repre-
sentative in addition to merely lending their support to a petition for an
election. In reviewing this question, the Board had relied upon its Cum-
berland Shoe rule. The circuit court, however, questioned whether certain
employees really intended to designate the union as bargaining representative,
despite the overt act of signing the cards. The court noted that at a meeting
where a number of cards had been signed, the union solicitor, although he
had read the card aloud, had nevertheless emphasized that the union sought
an election, and had stated that if the union lost the election the cards would
be returned. He had failed to mention that the union might also use the
cards to support a demand for immediate recognition. The court concluded
that such an ommission must have led the employees to believe that they
were not accepting union membership unconditionally. The statement was,
•therefore, deceitful, and a flagrant misrepresentation.'i
During the Survey year, the Fifth Circuit, in NLRB v. Lake Butler
Apparel Co.,' 2 and NLRB v. Southland Paint Co.,13 has concurred with the
10
 As stated by the court,
(tJhe propriety of enforcing an order to bargain after a union has lost a
representation election depends on the resolution of three questions: (1) whether
the Union in fact had a majority; (2) whether the employer refused to bargain
because of a good faith doubt of such majority, if the Union had a majority;
(3) whether on all the facts of the election situation a bargaining order is an
appropriate remedy for enforcing the policy of the National Labor Relations
Act.
Id. at 240, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2807.
11 Id. at 242, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2809.
12 392 F.2d 76, 67 L.R.R.M. 2883 (5th Cir. 1968).
13 394 F.2d 717, 68 LR.R.M. 2169 (5th Cir. 1968).
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Second Circuit in its criticism of authorization card procedure. In Lake
Butler Apparel, the court placed the burden upon the "General Counsel, once
representation cards are challenged as here because of misrepresentation in
their procurement and proof is offered which substantiates the challenge, to
show that the subjective intent to authorize union representation was not
vitiated by the misrepresentation.""
The circumstances in Lake Butler Apparel were similar to those in
Schwarzenbach. The union had obtained signed cards from a majority of
the employees and first made a demand for recognition, but without waiting
for a reply had also filed a petition for an election. When the union subse-
quently lost the election it charged the employer with unfair labor practices,
and contended that these practices had frustrated the election by dissipating
the union's majority support. The Board concluded that the union had ob-
tained valid authorization cards from a majority of the employees, and that
under the circumstances the employer should be ordered to recognize the
union.
There had been testimony that some employees had been advised that
the purpose in signing the cards was to obtain an election. Adhering to the
Cumberland Shoe rule the Board held that such statements did not invalidate
the cards, because the trial examiner's findings disclosed that the employees
had not been told that this was the only purpose. The court, while it noted
that the language of the cards was unambiguous, emphasized that the em-
ployees were not affirmatively advised that the union would also claim to
represent the employees on the basis of the cards alone. Furthermore, the
employees had failed to read the back of the card containing the conditions
to which they subscribed, and they were not furnished with a copy of the card.
Generally, the union solicitor had emphasized the election as the purpose of
the cards. The notion that the solicitors were seeking only an election re-
ceived support from the fact that they had not waited for the employer to
respond to their demand before petitioning for an election. The court thus
concluded that the challenged cards had been executed upon the misrepre-
sentation that they sought an election, and therefore declared them invalid.
The union then lacked the necessary majority support at the time of their
demand.
In Southland Paint the union had made a demand for recognition, but
the employer had refused to bargain. The Board found that he had lacked
a good faith doubt as to the union's majority and therefore ordered him to
bargain. Again, the question centered on the validity of the cards, upon
which the Board had based its finding of the union majority. The cards
were unambiguous, but the court indicated that, if they were to be relied
upon in lieu of an election, the card should so state. The omission of such a
statement, in light of the solicitor's representation that the card signing
sought an election, constituted misrepresentation. The card also omitted
any reference to union membership, something which the court felt the em-
ployee would readily understand. It was also the belief of the court that
the statement in the card to the effect that it would be kept confidential
14 392 F.2d at 80, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2885.
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created the impression that the act of signing was only preliminary, and
that the cards would form the basis for a secret election.
Ultimately, the criticism of the Second Circuit in Schwarzenbach, and
the Fifth Circuit in Lake Butler Apparel and Southland Paint, is directed
at the Cumberland Shoe rule, through which the Board, in effect, sanctions
the existing practices in the solicitation of authorization cards. As indicated
by the Second Circuit in Schwarzenbach, that court will not enforce a bar-
gaining order, despite the long-standing recognition of such an order in situa-
tions where an employer's unfair labor practices have dissipated a union's
majority, and where the evidence of the majority support upon which the
order is predicated "is accomplished by the invention of new per se rules of
evidence and new standards by which the proofs are to be evaluated, that
fly in the face of common sense and elementary concepts of justice and fair
play. 7" 5
 At stake in the opinion of both circuit courts were the section
7 rights of the employees—the rights to engage in or to refrain from engaging
in concerted activity." A scheme whereby employees could be misled into
the belief that they were merely seeking a free election, when in fact they
were unknowingly designating the union as their bargaining representative,
was considered a clear violation of these rights. As the Second Circuit con-
cluded, the bargaining order under those circumstances "nullifies the benef-
icent purposes of the Act and in no possible way can be said to effectuate
the purposes of the Act." 17
The principal objection to the Cumberland Shoe rule is that the Board's
inquiry fails to reveal whether the employee has been afforded the oppor-
tunity freely to choose a bargaining representative or to decline representa-
tion. The Board assumes that the employee is sophisticated, but the Fifth
Circuit in Southland Paint made particular mention of the low educational
level of most employees, inferring that they are more susceptible to the mis-
leading statements of solicitors and less likely to appreciate the full signif-
icance of signing the card, notwithstanding the declaration printed on the
cards. 18
The circumstances or conditions under which authorization cards are
solicited do not duplicate the laboratory conditions of which the courts make
repeated mention. But an election may not always be feasible, particularly
where the employer has dissipated the union strength through unfair labor
practices. Here, the only remaining remedy is to order the employer to bar-
gain on the basis of the earlier demand for recognition. Outright rejection
15 408 F.2d at 249, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2815.,
18 29 U.S.C. § 137 (1964).
17 408 F.2d at 250, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2815.
18 394 F.2d at 729-30, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2178. Sec also the statement of Judge Friendly
in NLRB v. S.E. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438, 65 L.R.R.M. 2655 (2d Cir. 1967)1
It is all too easy for the Board or a reviewing court to fall into the error of
thinking that language clear to them was equally clear to employees previously
unexposed to labor relations matters; to treat authorization cards, which union
organizers present for filling out and signing and then immediately take away,
as if they were wills or contracts carefully explained by a lawyer to his client
is to substitute form for reality.
Id. at 442-43, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
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of the authorization cards as evidence would, therefore, deny the Board the
only practicable basis for a determination whether the union had obtained
the requisite support. This consideration may have restrained the courts
from condemning their use altogether."' Nonetheless, this prospect did not
restrain the District of Columbia Circuit, in Amalgamated Clothing Workers
v. NLRB,2° from remanding that case to the Board for a determiaation of
some alternative method of ascertaining the union strength at the time of the
demand for recognition."" t
 Workers concerned the organization of a textile plant which
had been erected in a poverty-stricken town, Eloy, Arizona. The employer
had been encouraged to locate in the area through the efforts of the local
development corporation, established to attract industry to the town. The
employees of the new plant were in a large part drawn from the Spanish-
speaking residents of the town, and had formerly been employed as agricul-
tural workers. A short time after the opening of the plant, the petitioner
union commenced an organizational campaign and solicited signatures on
bilingual cards, the printed language of which signified a designation of the
union as bargaining representative. Of 182 employees, the union obtained
113 signatures, but, nevertheless, requested an election rather than directly
demand recognition. The presence of the union, however, sparked strong
opposition, not only from the employer, but from the community as well,
and in particular from the development corporation which had initially spon-
sored the construction of the plant and attracted the textile manufacturer
to lease it. A vigorous anti-union campaign was begun by this group. The
local newspaper ran a strong editorial against the organizing effort, and even
the local parish priest contributed with an anti-union sermon. The company
itself urged voting against the union, apparently with overtones of possible
dismantlement of the factory and bankruptcy. As a result of this activity,
the union lost the election, 48 to 124, a complete reversal of the majority
which it had earlier enjoyed, at least insofar as it was reflected by the number
of signed authorization cards. A hearing was held and the Board adopted
19 The criticism of the Cumberland Shoe rule should not be misconstrued as a col-
lateral attack on the Board's use of the bargaining order remedy. Referring to the oft
cited decision of the District of Columbia Circuit, Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185
F.2d 732, 27 L.R.R.M. 2012 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951), which
held that an employer could not refuse to bargain where he lacked a good faith doubt
or where he desired only to gain time in order to dissipate the union's strength, the
Fifth Circuit in Southland Paint emphasized that no issue had been raised in Joy Silk
regarding the validity of the cards. The Fifth Circuit noted, however, that the Board
has relied on Joy Silk to make the act of signing an authorization card decisive—re-
gardless of the employee's understanding of what he was signing and what he was told
about the purpose of the card, ... [T]he Joy Silk rationale is sound only if the em-
ployees understand that if a majority sign cards designating the union as their bargaining
agent an election will be unnecessary." 394 F.2d at 725, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2174.
20 
— 
F.2d —, 70 L.R.R.M. 2207 (D.C, Cir. Jan. 9, 1969).
91 It is interesting to note that the District of Columbia Circuit had only recently
adhered to the Cumberland Shoe rule in UAW v. NLRB (Preston Products), 392 F.2d
801, 66 L.R.R.M. 2548 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968). The court
distinguished its decision in Clothing Workers on the ground that Cumberland Shoe
"does not articulate an absolute rule, but rather a useful and well founded rule of
thumb." — F.2d at —, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2209.
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the trial examiner's finding that the employer had committed unfair labor
practices, and his recommendation that the employer be ordered to recog-
nize the union because no means existed for conducting a fair election. There-
fore, it was necessary to accept the conclusion evidenced by the authorization
cards. Under Cumberland Shoe, the trial examiner's findings disclosed that
the campaign had not been conducted as though an election were the union's
only goal, and, therefore, the card signers were not victims of misrepre-
sentation.
Despite the impracticability of a second election, the circuit court
denied enforcement to the Board's order because it could not accept the
cards as reliable evidence of the employees' true desires. The court found
that the card majority was the result of hard campaigning; that the union
solicitors had given the employees a one-sided view of the nature of the
union, and of the benefits of representation; that the declarations of the
solicitors, while they did not state that an election was the sole purpose,
were nevertheless permeated with the idea that the signing of the card
would lead to an election. The court even raised a question whether the
employees were presented with any choice in the election itself.
The court emphasized, as had the Second and Fifth Circuits, the right of
the employees to a free choice whether to have a bargaining agent. Con-
fronted with evidence not only of employer interference, and of the possi-
bility of union pressure and influence as well, the court viewed as the proper
considerations for decision not such "off target inquiries" as what might have
been said to the employees concerning an election, but, rather, inquiries
"directed precisely at the prime question in the case: What was the real
choice of these employees in respect to a collective agent?" 22 The D.C. Circuit,
therefore, even dismissed inquiry into the employee's subjective intent in
signing the card. It was the conclusion of the court that, where the Board
admitted that it did not really know the employees' choice, where the results
of the election and the authorization cards are in flat contradiction, the
Board must inquire further to ascertain what that choice might be. In the
opinion of the court, authorization cards amount to no more than "an un-
supervised poll taken individually in private by agents of one of the inter-
ested parties .... 723
The court, in remanding the case to the Board, provided little guidance
for the ascertainment of employees' choice. In response to this absence of
standards, the dissenter, Judge Robinson, stressed the very practical observa-
tion that if there existed "a method superior to card counting for ascertain-
ing employee desires in the circumstances here, I would assume that the Board
would not need judicial prompting to resort to it." 24 He concluded that the
evidence of the authorization cards was the Board's nearest approach to the
actual wishes of the employees, and that the court "must defer to the Board's
broad discretionary powers to devise remedies suitable to rectify violations of
the Act."25 Judge Robinson also pointed to the judicial support for the use
22 Id. at —, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2210.
23 Id. at	 , 70 L.R.R.M. at 2211.
24 Id. at —, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2215.
25 Id. at —, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2212.
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of authorization cards. In doing so, he reaffirmed the Cumberland Shoe
rule and, applying it to the facts of the case, he did not find that under
the circumstances the purpose of the cards had been misrepresented.
The extreme result reached in Clothing Workers may possibly be ex-
plained by the unusual circumstances—very unsophisticated employees, whose
background of poverty, language, and industrial inexperience made them
particularly susceptible to misunderstanding not only about an election, but
generally about the purposes of labor organizations. Therefore, Clothing
Workers may not foreshadow the ultimate rejection by the courts of the use
of authorization cards. The holding of the court for the moment seems con-
fined to the facts. However, if it is assumed that the cards are not consid-
ered totally reliable, Judge Robinson raises the practical question: What
superior method of ascertaining employee wishes might be utilized?
The use of authorization cards as evidence of employee support for
recognition thus remains, at the conclusion of the Survey year, in a very
unsettled state. The Board, on the one hand, continues to take the position
that they are a reliable indication of employee wishes and, therefore, limits
its inquiry to the narrow question whether they were solicited under any
overt misrepresentation. The probability that the cards may not be so re-
liable, however, has stimulated closer judicial scrutiny of the practice, which
in turn has led to the imposition of more stringent limitations on the manner
in which the cards may be solicited. The limitations, particularly those pro-
posed by the Fifth Circuit, do not seem impractical or burdensome to imple-
ment. Particularly in light of the fact that the employees' freedom of choice
will be more adequately insured, it is submitted that other circuits will follow
and adopt the position of the Fifth Circuit, and that the Board will be obliged
to modify the Cumberland Shoe rule. It seems unlikely, however, that reliance
on authorization cards would be altogether rejected. The very practical reason
for their continued use is that they do furnish an alternative method by
which the Board might ascertain employee wishes when a fair election would
not be feasible. Past judicial acceptance of the practice would seem to support
this thesis. 2 °
IV. ARBITRATION
A. New-Contract Arbitration
There have been few significant arbitration cases during the current
Survey year. The courts appear to have heeded the Supreme Court's teach-
ings in the field of arbitration. Current decisions consistently reflect the view
26 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 37 U.S.L.W. 4536 (U.S. June 16, 1969) (Nos.
573, 691, 585), the Supreme Court upheld the Board's application of the Cumberland
Shoe rule. The opinion of the Court referred to the criticism by several circuits of the
"sole purpose" test of Cumberland Shoe, but conceded that the issue was not presented
clearly in three of the four cases consolidated before it. Id. at 4544. The fourth case, how-
ever, where the trial examiner refused to find misrepresentation in the union's statements
that the cards were secret and were to be shown only to the Board (id. at 4538 n.5), was
held to "represent the limits of the Cumberland rule's application." Id. at 4545. Thus,
while the Board's rule was approved in general, the circuit courts appear to have been
left some latitude in defining the "limits" of the rule.
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that arbitration is the favored means of settling labor disputes;' that the
role of the court in suits to compel arbitration is merely to decide whether
the collective bargaining agreement forecloses such arbitration; 2 and that
the arbitrator may use his expertise and knowledge of the industry to make
any award consistent with the powers granted by the union-management
agreement,' With the exception of the cases noted below, the writers have
not discovered any arbitration cases constituting sufficient deviation from
prior law to merit discussion here.
The federal courts have been in conflict in recent years over whether
a court could enforce a union-management agreement to submit unresolved
differences in new contract terms to arbitration. 4 During the current Survey
year, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a collective bar-
gaining agreement envisioning arbitration of the terms of a new contract
was judicially enforceable.' In Winston-Salem Printing Pressmen Union v.
Piedmont Publishing Co., 6
 the court affirmed a lower court order obligating
the employer to submit to arbitration.
Piedmont Publishing Company and the Printing Pressmen Union entered
into a contract effective April 13, 1964, containing a detailed arbitration pro-
cedure,' and providing:
This agreement shall continue to and including the 31st day of
October, 1965, except that either party on thirty days notice prior
1 See, e.g., Winston-Salem Printing Pressmen Union v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 393
F.2d 221, 67 L.R.R.M. 2939 (4th Cir. 1968).
2 See, e.g., District 50, Mine Workers v. Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co., 291 F. Supp.
578, 69 L.R.R.M. 2403 (N.D. W. Va. 1968) ; Local 73, Meat Cutters v. Fred Rueping
Leather Co., 67 L.R.R.M. 3045 (ED. Wis. 1968) ; International Organization of Masters,
Mates & Pilots v. American Oceanic Corp., 67 L.R.R.M. 2951 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2 See, e.g., Local 135, Rubber Workers v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 391 F.2d 897,
67 L.R.R.M. 2887 (2d Cir. 1968); Textile Workers Union v. Textile Paper Prods., Inc.,
405 F.2d 397, 69 L.R.R.M. 2578 (5th Cir. 1968); Local 342, UAW v. T.R.W., Inc., 402
F.2d 727, L.R.R.M. 2524 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1742 (1969);
Anaconda Co. v. Smeltermen's Union, 402 F.2d 749, 69 L.R.R.M. 2597 (9th Cir. 1968).
4 Succeeding text and notes will indicate the directions taken on this issue by various
courts.
r. Winston-Salem Printing Pressmen Union v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 393 F.2d
221, 67 L.R.R.M. 2939 (4th Cir. 1963).
6 393 F.2d 221, 67 L.R.R.M. 2939 (4th Cir. 1968).
7 The parties hereto will settle any and all differences affecting wages, hours,
working conditions, and shop practices that may arise between them, by concili-
ation; and if conciliation fails, then by arbitration, as provided below: "A stand-
ing committee of ... representatives selected by the Publisher . . . and the Union
. . . shall be appointed. ... To this committee shall be referred all disputes which
may arise as to the scale of wages hereto attached, the construction to be placed
upon any clause of this agreement, or alleged violations thereof, which cannot
be settled otherwise. . . Should the joint committee be unable to agree, then
it shall refer the matter to a Board of Arbitration ....
Both parties recognize that their respective rights under this agreement
will have been accorded by the performance and the fulfillment of the terms
and conditions of said agreement, and that the complete obligation of each to
the other is expressed herein. Under all circumstances the terms of this agree-
ment are paramount.
Id. at 222-23 n.1, 67 L.R.R./VI. at 2939-40 n.1.
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to November 1, 1964, may reopen the agreement for the consid-
eration of wage adjustment only.
Should either party desire to negotiate for changes in any or
all of the provisions of this contract as of November 1, 1965, writ-
ten notice to the effect must be given to the other party on or before
September 1, 1965, together with a written statement in detail of
the changes desired. Otherwise this agreement shall continue from
November 1 through October 31 from year to year and can be
changed only by mutual consent or through negotiations started by
written notice of one of the parties to the other, on or before Sep-
tember 1st of any succeeding year. Should either party propose such
amendments or a new contract, and an agreement proves impossi-
ble, the difference or differences shall be arbitrated as herein pro-
vided.°
By letter dated August 30, 1965, the union gave notice of its desire to make
changes and add new provisions to the contract. Collective bargaining ses-
sions were conducted on September 29, December 2 and December 3 but no
final agreement was reached. Concluding that an impasse had been reached,
the union informed the company on December 7, 1965, of its intention to
submit the issue to arbitration. The company refused, advising the union
that it considered the contract to have expired as of October 31, 1965, and
that it was therefore no longer obligated to arbitrate. The union instituted
suit to compel the company to arbitrate the unresolved differences as provided
in the agreement.° The company defended against the union's action on two
theories. First, it contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to compel
arbitration under a contract which, by its own terms, had terminated. Second,
it maintained that courts were precluded from commanding what has come
to be known as "prospective" or "quasi-legislative" arbitration.
The distinction between so called "prospective" or "quasi-legislative"
arbitration and "retrospective" or "quasi-judicial" arbitration was developed
in 1956 in the case of Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter Press. 1°
An arbitrator with "quasi-legislative" power could formulate or "legislate"
terms over which the parties bad not previously agreed. The arbitrator hav-
ing only "quasi-judicial" power would be restricted to interpretation or en-
forcement of terms already agreed upon by the parties." The situation in
Potter Press was identical to that in Piedmont Press. The Potter Press court,
however, concluded that it could not enforce the parties' agreement to submit
unresolved differences in the new contract to arbitration. The court's conclu-
sion rested on the following line of reasoning. At the time when Potter Press
arose for consideration, the Supreme Court had decided that "[t]he aim [of
8 393 F.2d at 222-23, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2940.
9 The union also sought damages, but damages were not awarded by the lower
court order. 263 F. Supp. 952, 64 L.R.R.M. 2337 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
to 141 F. Supp. 553, 556, 38 L.R.R.M. 2211, 2213 (D. Mass. 1956), aff'd, 241 F.2d
787, 39 L.R.R.M. 2524 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957).
11 See Fleming, Reflections on the Nature of Labor Arbitration s 61 Mich. L.
Rev. 1245, 1254-58 (1963) ; Note, Quasi-Legislative Arbitration Agreements, 64 Colum.
L. Rev. 109 (1964).
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section 301P 2
 was to open the federal courts to suits on agreements solely
because they were between labor organizations and employers without pro-
viding federal law for such suits." 13
 (Footnote and emphasis added.) The
Potter Press court, therefore, concluded that section 301 was merely jurisdic-
tional, and it declined to hold an arbitration clause enforceable under that
section. Finding the controlling substantive law to be in the United States
Arbitration Act," the court decided that the Act would permit only enforce-
ment of "quasi-judicial" arbitration. Thus, it refused to enforce the "quasi-
legislative" arbitration agreement before it."
After Potter Press, the Supreme Court's conception of section 301
evolved to the point where the court was able to conclude
that § 301(a) is more than jurisdictional—that it authorizes federal
courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these
collective bargaining agreements and includes within that federal
law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under
collective bargaining agreements. . . . 16 We conclude that the sub-
stantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws." (Footnote omitted.)
Subsequently the Supreme Court itself developed the federal law applicable
to arbitration agreements in labor-management contracts. Arbitration was
seen not only as an acceptable means of resolving labor disputes. The Court
actively encouraged it's The function of the courts was "confined to ascer-
taining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its
face is governed by the contract."'" "An order to arbitrate the particular
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."20
12 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), which provides in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
18 Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 447
(1955).
14 9 U.S.C. El 1-14 (1964).
16 141 F. Supp. at 558, 38 L.R.R.M. at 2214.
16 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957). .
17 id. at 456.
18 Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of
private law for all the problems which may arise and to provide for their solu-
tion in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of
the parties.
... An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not sus-
ceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
United Steelwokkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960).
19 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) .
26
 363 U.S. at 582-83.
818
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
In basing its decision on the substantial background policy in favor of
arbitration, the Piedmont Press court clearly achieved the right result. The
parties had unequivocally agreed to arbitrate unresolved differences in any
new contract. The court should have and did do no more than determine
that the contract did not foreclose arbitration of such issues. It properly
concluded that an express contract provision making such issues arbitrable
required court enforcement. "Nothing would be more out of step with our
national labor policies than for courts to refuse to enforce a voluntary agree-
ment to arbitrate differences." 21
The court recognized that a substantial number of recent decisions had
affirmed the holding in Potter Press," but it concluded that "these cases are
entitled only to the remaining force and validity underlying the rationale of
[Potter Press]." 23 The court embraced other recent opinions challenging the
statutory predicate of Potter Press in the light of more recent Supreme Court
decisions. 24
The second issue raised by the company's defense was whether the court
could compel arbitration in view of the union's failure to request arbitration
until more than a month after the contract expiration date. Pointing out that
the contract provided that the arbitration panel should decide any disputes
involving construction of contract terms, the court concluded that the arbi-
trators must decide whether the union's arbitration request was timely.25
Again, its conclusion on this issue is consistent with the Supreme Court's
views on the relative powers of courts and arbitrators."
The persistent question in Piedmont Press is not whether a court could
enforce the clause submitting new contract terms to arbitration. The court
could do no less if it was to remain consistent with the national labor policy
favoring arbitration. Rather, the question is whether management and union
negotiators were well advised to agree on such a provision. Although the
parties have created a stable relationship, one wonders whether either party
should surrender its traditional economic power to enforce its demands in
21 393 F.2d at 227, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2943.
22 International Typographical Union v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 247
F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Cal. 1965); Austin Mailers Union v. Newspapers, Inc., 226 F. Supp.
600 (W.D. Tex. 1963), aff'd, 329 F.2d 312, 55 L.R.R.M. 2693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1964); In re Valencia l3axt Express Co., 199 F. Supp. 103, 49 L.R.R.M. 2126
(D.P.R. 1961) ; Couch v. Frescolite Mfg. Corp., 191 F. Supp. 737, 49 L.R.R.M. 2080
(WD. Ark. 1961).
28 393 F.2d at 227, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2943.
24 Division No. 892, Street Ry. Employees v. M.K. & 0. Transit Lines, Inc., 210 F.
Supp. 351, 51 L.R.R.M. 2470 (N.D. Okla, 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 319 F.2d 488,
53 L.R.R.M. 2662 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963); Builders Ass'n v.
Greater Kansas City Laborers, 326 F.2d 867, 55 L.R.R.M. 2199 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 917 (1964) ; Seltzer & Co. v. Livingston, 253 F. Supp. 509, 61 L.R.R.M. 2581
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 361 F.2d 218, 62 L.R.R.M. 2079 (2d Cir. 1966).
25 393 F.2d at 228, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2944.
26 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
The Enterprise Wheel case presented a question similar to that in Piedmont Press. The
Court decided that the arbitrator must determine whether the parties intended the arbi-
tration clause to cover disputes arising before, but not submitted to arbitration until
after, the termination date.
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order to achieve such stability. 27 , Moreover, management and unions usually
seek to minimize the risk of unwanted working relationships by means of a
tightly drawn collective bargaining agreement specifying the limits of third-
party interference. Usually this interference is limited to grievance arbitra-
tion. The Printing Pressmen-Piedmont Press Company contract not only
permitted resolution of differences in the existing contract, but also allowed
third-party participation in the formulation of the next contract. The curious
result is that, so long as one party refuses to terminate the existing contract
(which would have the effect of removing the arbitration clause), the parties
must sit at the bargaining table with a third party. Instead of the parties'
specification of the limits of third-party interference, the third party may
well specify the limits of union's and management's powers to affect each
other's interests. 28
The decision in Piedmont Press, considered in the light of the recent
history of section 301 suits to compel arbitration, is simply a restatement
of the general rule that a court will compel arbitration when it cannot be
said with "positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." The court gave the
parties exactly what they had bargained for, and it did so consistently with
the national labor policy to foster stable labor-management relations through
the use of the arbitration process. While the result of the decision may be
somewhat startling—the prospect of an unending contract or a third party
sitting between union and management at the bargaining table—the moral
is clear: the parties should not agree to arbitration of unresolved differences
in new contracts unless they are prepared to abide by that agreement.
B. Arbitration Awards: Enforcement by Injunction
1. Power of Federal Courts to Enforce Injunctive Arbitration Award.—In
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,' the Supreme Court considered whether a fed-
eral court had jurisdiction to enjoin union strikes in breach of a no-strike
agreement. Alleging that it had no adequate remedy at law, the employer
had brought an action under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act2 seeking an injunction against strikes over grievances which could, under
the existing contract, be submitted to arbitration. 3 Mr. Justice Black, writing
for the majority stated:
The question this case presents is whether § 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act, in giving federal courts jurisdiction of suits between
employers and unions for breach of collective bargaining agreements,
27 The failure of either party to submit to arbitration would put that party in
breach of the existing contract, as the principal case holds.
28 There is no indication in the Printing Pressmen-Piedmont agreement that the
arbitrator's function would be confined to compromising the difference between the
parties' positions. Rather, the arbitrator could give effect to the entire demand of the
party without regard for the asserted interest of the other party.
1 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
2 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
3 The collective bargaining agreement contained a clause declaring that "any dif-
ference regarding wages, hours or working conditions between the parties hereto or be-
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impliedly repealed § 4 of the pre-existing Norris-LaGuardia Act,
which, with certain exceptions not here material, barred federal
courts from issuing injunctions "in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute."' (Footnote omitted.)
Having cast the legal issue in these terms, the Court was required to make
two essential decisions. First, was the altercation between union and manage-
ment a "labor dispute" within the meaning of Section 13 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act? 5
 Second, if this was a "labor dispute," did the anti-injunc-
tion mandate of Norris-LaGuardia" preclude an injunctive remedy in a suit
for breach of contract?
Justice Mack disposed of the first issue by concluding that the case
did involve a "labor dispute" which is defined in Norris-LaGuardia as "any
controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
charging, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regard-
less of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of em-
ployer and employee."' Each of the work stoppages, said the Court, came
well within the definition. The Court was unimpressed by the possibility
that the strikes may have constituted a breach of contract. This possibility
did not "alter the plain fact that a 'labor dispute' within the meaning of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is involved." 8
The second issue—whether Norris-LaGuardia retained its vitality in a
suit for breach of contract—was not so easily resolved. The Court reasoned
as follows: The controversy between union and management was clearly
a "labor dispute," and therefore the Norris-LaGuardia Act would deprive a
federal court of jurisdiction to enjoin union strikes growing out of that dis-
pute. Norris-LaGuardia must control unless Section 301 of the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act—authorizing suits in federal courts for breach of
collective bargaining agreements—could be found to repeal or modify the
operation of Norris-LaGuardia under the circumstances of the case. The legis-
lative history of section 301 and the omission of any provision within it
tween the Employer and an employee covered by this working agreement which might
arise within any plant or within any region of operations" should be submitted to com-
pulsory, final and binding arbitration. 370 U.S. at 197. Apparently the union had engaged
in work stoppages or strikes repeatedly over a 19-month period and had refused to
submit to arbitration of its grievances. In another proceeding arising out of this same
activity, the Supreme Court ruled that the employer could recover damages from the
union because of union strikes in violation of the no-strike contract. Atkinson v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
4 370 U.S. at 196.
Is 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1964).
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or inter-
ested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment .
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
7 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1964).
8 370 U.S. at 200.
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specifically repealing Norris-LaGuardia indicated that Congress intended the
vitality of Norris to be unimpaired by section 301. Because Norris-LaGuardia
is the controlling law in the case, the lower court properly ruled that a fed-
eral court is without jurisdiction to enjoin a "labor dispute" strike which
is also a breach of a no-strike contract. 9
Two Justices joined in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. Section 301
of the Labor-Management Relations Act did not "repeal" the anti-injunction
provisions of Norris-LaGuardia, the dissent conceded,
[b]ut the two provisions do coexist, and it is clear beyond dispute
that they apply to the case before us in apparently conflicting
senses. Our duty, therefore, is to seek out that accommodation of
the two which will give the fullest possible effect to the central pur-
poses of both. Since such accommodation is possible, the Court's
failure to follow that path leads it to a result—not justified by either
the language or history of § 301—which is wholly at odds with our
earlier handling of directly analogous situations and which cannot be
woven intelligibly into the broader fabric of related decisions. . . . 10
Justice Brennan's reference to the "broader fabric of related decisions"
brings into consideration the substantial body of law developed under section
301. Beginning with Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills"- and continuing
with the Steelworkers Trilogy,'`' the Supreme Court had consistently empha-
sized the power of the federal courts to "fashion a body of federal law for
the enforcement of ... collective bargaining agreements .. . ."i 3 In the Lincoln
Mills opinion, the Court had quoted substantial portions of the Senate report
indicating the purpose of section 301:
If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then
such agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. The
execution of an agreement does not by itself promote industrial
peace. The chief advantage which an employer can reasonably ex-
pect from a collective labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted
operation during the term of the agreement. Without some effective
method of assuring freedom from economic warfare for the term of
the agreement, there is little reason why an employer would desire
to sign such a contract.
Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to
promote industrial peace through faithful performance by the par-
ties, collective agreements affecting interstate commerce should be
enforceable in the Federal courts. Our amendment would provide for
suits by unions as legal entities in the Federal courts in disputes
affecting commerce. (Emphasis added.)' 4
0 Id. at 203.
1 ° Id. at 216 (dissenting opinion).
11 353 U.S. 448 (4957).
12
 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
13
 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
14 Id. at 454.
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The Court also included the following passage from House debate on its
version of section 301:
It is my understanding that section [301] the section dealing
with equal responsibility under collective bargaining contracts in
strike actions and proceedings in district courts contemplates not
only the ordinary lawsuits for damages but also such other remedial
proceedings, both legal and equitable, as might be appropriate in the
circumstances; in other words, proceedings could, for example, be
brought by the employers, the labor organizations, or interested
individual employees under the Declaratory Judgments Act in order
to secure declarations from the Court of legal rights under the con-
tract.15 (Emphasis added.)
The Textile Workers case and the Steelworkers Trilogy essentially decided
(1) that federal courts have the power under section 301 to fashion a body
of law to provide both legal and equitable relief to parties in suits for breach
of collective bargaining agreements; (2) that arbitration is the favored means
of settling differences; and (3) that the courts' power under (1) should be
used to effectuate the policy of (2).
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Sinclair points up the difficulty en-
countered by both courts'° and commentators 17 in attributing full effect either
to the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction statute or to the concept of full legal
and equitable relief apparently available under section 301. The fact is that
the two concepts are mutually exclusive—a court does not have full power
to grant equitable relief if it does not have the power to issue an injunction.
Unless one is to assume—as did Justice Black in Sinclair—that, absent an
express repeal of its effectiveness, Norris-LaGuardia overrides section 301,
then Justice Brennan is correct in calling for an accommodation of the two
concepts.18
15 Id. at 455-56.
18 See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n,
389 U.S. 64 (1967), in which the Court set aside a lower court order "specifically en-
forcing" an arbitration award which had the effect of enjoining a strike. It appears that
the district court sought to achieve the effect of an injunction without specifically de-
nominating the order an "injunction." In view of the facts in the case, it can only be
assumed that the district court was seeking to enjoin union activity but that it declined
to characterize its order as an injunction for fear of reversal under the doctrine of
Sinclair. The Supreme Court set aside the order on the theory that it was ton vague to
be enforced.
17 See, Gregory, the Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 635 (1959) ;
Stewart, No-Strike Clauses In The Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 673 (1961) ; Rice,
A Paradox of Our National Labor Law, 34 Marg. L. Rev. 233 (1951).
18 It should be noted that the dissenting justices in Sinclair apparently have not
given up hope of overturning that decision. In International Longshoremen's Ass'n v.
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64 (1967), Justice Douglas, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, stated, ". . . I feel strongly that [Sinclair] caused a severe dis-
location in the federal scheme of arbitration of labor disputes[;] I think we should not
set our feet on a path that may well lead to the eventual reaffirmation of the principles
of that case. . . . IT ihere must be an accommodation between the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and all other legislation on the books dealing with labor relations." Id. at 78. In the
same case, Justice Brennan concurred in the result but wrote a separate opinion em-
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Recently, a significant decision was rendered by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals which brings into play the alternative forces of Norris-LaGuardia
and section 301. In New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers
Local 1418 (Steamship),n) a unanimous bench held that a federal court has
jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration award directing the union to desist from
further work stoppages. In so doing, the court reversed the district court
which had concluded that Sinclair, as it interpreted the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, prohibited enforcement of an arbitration award where the effect of en-
forcement would be to enjoin striking.
The contract between the parties contained a no-strike clause, an arbi-
tration clause and a clause empowering the arbitrator to issue a desist order.""-"
After work stoppages by the union at the port of New Orleans, the employer
submitted the matter to arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitrator found
that the stoppages had occurred in violation of the contract. He directed the
union, its officers, agents and members to "cease and desist from work stop-
pages in violation of their contract." 21 Alleging that work stoppages had
occurred subsequent to the award, the employer sought an order from the
district court enforcing the arbitrator's award. Thus the Steamship case came
before the Fifth Circuit.
Rather than meet Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson head-on by simply en-
joining further striking violative of the arbitrator's award, the court chose
phasizing that the case did not imply that Sinclair would determine the applicability of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act under the circumstances. Id. at 76-77. In Avco Corp. v.
Machinists Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), Justices Harlan and Brennan joined in
the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, which emphasized that the Court's opinion
reserved decision on the effects of Sinclair in the circumstances of the case. "The Court
will, no doubt, have an opportunity to reconsider the scope and continuing validity of
Sinclair upon an appropriate future occasion." Id. at 562. It appears therefore that at
least four Justices are waiting for the opportunity to reconsider Sinclair.
10 389 F.2d 369, 67 L.R.R.M. 2430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968). See
Comment, Labor Arbitration and Anti-Injunction: The Case for Accommodation, 10
B.C. Incl. & Com. L. Rev. 898 (1969).
20 The contract provided:
(a) No Strikes---No Lockouts
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages, nor shall there be any lockouts.
(b) Disputes Procedure and Arbitration
The parties accept the principle that any dispute involving the interpretation
or application of the terms of this agreement shall he resolved in an orderly and
expeditious manner. They commit themselves to the procedure outlined below.
Failure by either party to staff and maintain the permanent disputes committee
provided for herein and failure to deal with disputes under the disputes pro-
cedure shall constitute a violation of this agreement.
(d) Either party to a dispute may bypass the procedure leading up to arbitra-
tion and obtain arbitration forthwith whenever a violation of sections (a) and/or
(b) of this Article shall be alleged. In this event, a notice of such allegation
shall be made by telegram to the other party and to the arbitrator. The arbi-
trator shall hold a prompt hearing within seventy-two (72) hours after receipt
of the notice and shall render an award within twelve (12) hours after the hear-
ing. In such case the arbitrator shall make findings of fact concerning the alleged
violation and shall prescribe appropriate relief, including an order to desist there-
from."
389 F.2d at 370, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2431.
21 Id,
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to distinguish Sinclair. It did so on two grounds. First, Sinclair did not - involve
an arbitration award. "It involved an effort to obtain an injunction to enforce
a no-strike clause where strikes were ensuing but where there had been no
arbitration. The Supreme Court has not considered the precise question with
which we are now concerned." 22
 Second, the court concluded that it could
distinguish Sinclair "on the more than semantical ground that there is a real
difference between an ordinary injunction and an order enforcing the award
of an arbitrator although the end result is the sarne. 2" Because the parties
had agreed to the remedy of a desist order, the "court in enforcing such
order or award, although injunctive in nature, would be doing no more than
enforcing the agreement of the parties."24
Summing up its conclusions, the court decided that the case did not
present a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The parties' contractual agreement to submit their differences to an arbitrator
having power to issue a desist order removed their remedy of self-help in
labor disputes. "Once the arbitration was completed, the matter became ripe
for specific performance and fell outside the scope of Norris-LaGuardia." 25
Moreover, the court concluded, the logic of the arbitration policy compels
this result. Otherwise, a party may successfully bargain for an arbitration
clause giving the arbitrator power to issue a desist award, and it may compel
the other party to submit to arbitration.
[The court does] not believe in light of the body of law which has
grown from § 301 that the law will now say to this party that,
having done these things, there is no remedy in the event the oppo-
site party decides to ignore the award of the arbitrator to desist the
stoppage. No such result should be imputed to Congress; the Su-
preme Court did not go so far in Sinclair.26
The Steamship case accomplishes a division between those cases that
come to a court before submission to arbitration and those cases that come
to the court after issuance of an arbitral award. The court admits that
Sinclair precludes an injunction in the former, but finds that the latter situa-
tion is more nearly contractual in nature and therefore that an award may be
enforced by an order having the effect of an injunction. It may well be asked
22 Id. at 371, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2432.
23 Id. at 372, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2432-33.
24
 Id. The court was also compelled to distinguish its decision in Gulf & South
American Steamship Co. v. National Maritime Union, 360 F.2d 63, 62 L.R.R.M. 2083
(5th Cir. 1966), which the district court had held to be precedent for dismissal of the
employer's suit for enforcement of the arbitration award in Steamship. The circuit court
explained that Gulf & South American Steamship held only that a court could not order
enforcement of a cease and desist arbitration award when the arbitrator had exceeded
his authority in making the award. Absent contractual authority in the arbitrator to issue
a cease and desist award, "the case was nothing more than an effort to obtain a federal
injunction to enjoin a work stoppage arising out of a labor dispute." 389 F.2d at 371,
67 L.R.R.M. at 2432. Sinclair was seen as direct authority on that issue, and it would
prevent the enforcement of the award. The court emphasized that Steamship was distin-
guishable since it was clear that the parties had expressly conferred upon the arbitrator
the power to issue a desist award.
2r,
	 F.2d at 372, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2433.
26 Id.
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whether any substantial difference exists between the two situations. Both
actions would be brought on breach of contract theory under section 301.
Both actions would seek equitable relief in view of the inadequacy of legal
relief and the speculative nature of the damage remedy. In both cases the
parties have contractually agreed to arbitrate disputes rather than resort to
strikes or lockouts. In short, the dispute seems no less contractual in nature
where arbitration has taken place than it does where the parties have agreed
to arbitrate disputes but where arbitration has not yet occurred.
The Steamship court gave added weight to its conclusion that the dispute
was purely contractual in nature by reference to the express contractual
authority given the arbitrator to issue a desist award. While this circum-
stance may make the court's enforcement of the desist award somewhat
easier in view of the Sinclair case, it would seem that the court need not have
relied on the existence of such power in the arbitrator. The broader limits of
the arbitrator's power in Steamship included the power to "prescribe appro-
priate relief." 27 It is submitted that, if the court had power to enforce the
award at all, it could have enforced a desist award based solely on this
power to prescribe appropriate relief. The inclusion of a clause giving the
arbitrator such broad power implies an agreement to settle disputes by awards
in the nature of equitable decrees. At least, such a clause implies contractual
agreement to enlarge, rather than restrict, the arbitrator's power to make
an appropriate award. Since the purpose of arbitration is to avoid the limited
forms of relief available in a court of law, it is fair to infer that broad arbi-
tration clause would include the power to issue a desist order.
Whether or not one considers the differences between the Sinclair and
Steamship situations to be substantial, it is apparent that the Fifth Circuit
was careful to point out all the distinguishing factors in order to avoid
reversal on the basis of a renewed application of Sinclair reasoning. The
Supreme Court has denied the Longshore Workers' petition for a writ of
certiorari," and therefore the case stands as settled law within the Fifth Cir-
cuit. The circumstances of the case and the convincing opinion of the lower
court would not have presented an optimal occasion for the Supreme Court to
accomplish a tacit reversal of Sinclair. An affirmation of the court of appeals'
decision might have resulted in the rubric that a federal court's injunctive
power might be employed only after arbitration had occurred. If this result
were coupled with the power of the federal courts to compel arbitration
already extant under section 301, the net effect would be to overrule Sinclair,
since an employer would be required merely to bring two court actions—
the first to compel arbitration, the other to enforce a desist award—instead
of one in order to accomplish the objective unachievable under Sinclair. Had
the Supreme Court granted the certiorari and reversed on the basis of Norris-
LaGuardia, it could be assumed that under no circumstances would a federal
court be able to enjoin union striking where that union is involved in a "labor
dispute." The Court's denial of certiorari avoids both the creation of a cum-
bersome two-step process of court enforcement implicit in affirmation of
Steamship and the Draconic exclusion of all federal court jurisdiction in the
27 See note 20 supra.
28 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
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"labor dispute" area implicit in reversal. As Mr. Justice Stewart suggested
in Avco Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge 735, 0 "[t] he Court will, no doubt,
have an opportunity to reconsider the scope and continuing validity of Sin-
clair upon an appropriate future occasion."3° Unfortunately, Steamship did
not present that precise opportunity.
2. The Relationship of State and Federal Court Power to Enforce: Removal
to Federal Court.—Shortly after the Fifth Circuit decided, in New Orleans
S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers,31 that a federal court had juris-
diction to enforce an injunctive arbitration award, the Supreme Court in a
related development decided whether a federal court possessed the power
to remove a case originally brought in a state court and resulting there in
an injunctive order against a strike. In Avco Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge
735,32 the Court held that federal courts do possess the power to remove from
state courts actions to enjoin breach of collective bargaining agreements a3
In Avco the employer had obtained a state court injunction against union
striking which was held to be a breach of the no-strike provision in the contract.
The defendant union removed the action to a federal court, whereupon the
injunction was dissolved.
The Avco decision removed a conflict which had existed between the
lower court's holding in the case34 and an opposite conclusion reached three
years earlier by the Third Circuit in American Dredging Co. v. Local 25,
Operating Engirs. 33 American Dredging decided that federal courts did not
have power to remove cases from state courts. it did so on the somewhat
technical ground that because Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act"
29 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
39 Id. at 562 (concurring opinion).
31 389 F.2d 369, 67 L.R.R.M. 2430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968). See
discussion at pp. 820-27 supra, and Comment, Labor Arbitration and Anti-Injunction:
The Case for Accommodation, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 898 (1969).
32 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
33 The power of federal courts to remove cases from state courts is governed by 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), which provides in relevant part:
Actions removable generally
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants,
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action'is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence
of the parties ... .
34 Avco Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge 735, 376 F.2d 337, 65 L.R.R.M. 2193 (6th
Cir. 1967).
35 338 F.2d 837, 57 L.R.R.M. 2407 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
36 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restrain-
ing order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or inter-
ested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
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deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to issue strike injunctions, a federal
court could not have the original jurisdiction over the case required by the
removal statute." Stated otherwise, the removal of a case requires that it
appear to a federal court that it had original jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit. But federal courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin union
striking. Therefore the federal court has no original jurisdiction over actions
to enjoin striking allegedly in breach of a no-strike contract."
In opposition to the line of reasoning in American Dredging, the Supreme
Court in Avco concluded that section 301 provided the required basis of
original jurisdiction over suits for breach of collective bargaining agreements.
The injunction prohibition in Norris-LaGuardia is relevant only in the
determination of the "nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches.'"
The importance of Avco cannot be overestimated. The anti-injunction
provisions of Norris-LaGuardia are not directly applicable to state courts, 4"
State courts may therefore enjoin union striking which federal courts could
not enjoin. Avco obviates this situation by permitting union defendants to
remove cases from state' courts in which the strike might be enjoined to
federal courts lacking jurisdiction to enjoin such activity. 41
Avco, of course, is not an arbitration case. Tt is useful to consider it
here, however, because it illustrates and partially resolves questions concern-
ing the relative powers of state and federal courts to grant relief in actions
for breach of collective bargaining agreements. Avco holds that state court
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) (emphasis added).
37 See note 3 supra.
88
 A more complete statement of the machinations in this line of reasoning is set
out in janofsky & Vaughn, The Affirmative Role of State Courts to Enjoin Strikes in
Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 869, 877-81
(1966).
341 390 U.S. at 561.
4 ° Sec McCarroll v. District Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322
(1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
41
 The Avco case is perhaps as significant for what it does not hold as for what
it does hold. First, because the district court decision did not specify the reasons for
ordering dissolution of the strike injunction, the Supreme Court refused to assume that
the lower court had considered itself compelled by Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195 (1962), to order such dissolution. After removal, a federal court has broad power
to dissolve a state court injunction. 28 U.S.C. 1450 (1964). Such power exists inde-
pendently of any national labor policy expressed in Siniclair. Because of the ambiguity
of the original dissolution order, the Supreme Court expressly stated that its affirmance
of the removal power in this case could not also be taken as an indication that the
district court's dissolution order was required by Sinclair. 390 U.S. at 561 n.4. The
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart also states that the Court's decision cannot
be taken as a reaffirmation of Sinclair. Id. at 562.
Second, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on the court of appeals' holding that
"the remedies available in State Courts are limited to the remedies available under Fed-
eral law." 376 F.2d at 343, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2193. Such a conclusion would suggest that
state courts are precluded by Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act from issuing injunc-
tions in labor disputes, even though the defendant did not exercise his right to remove the
case to a federal court. Because the defendant did elect to remove in Avco, the Court did
not consider the applicability to state courts of remedy limitations imposed on federal
courts in breach of contract actions. 390 U.S. at 560 n.2.
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actions for breach of contract are removable to federal courts even where
the action is brought to enjoin union striking. It appears that this holding
would be equally applicable to removal of state court actions to enforce arbi-
tration awards where the effect of the award is to enjoin striking.
Whether a federal court has the power to enforce an arbitral award,
the effect of which is to enjoin striking, was considered earlier here in the
discussion of New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers (Steam-
ship).' Under the circumstances of that case the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that a federal court has jurisdiction to enforce such an
award. The case cannot be taken as settling the question, since the Supreme
Court merely denied certiorari. If the Steamship case does not settle the
matter, it may still be important in terms of the court's enforcement power
whether an action to enforce an injunctive arbitral award is originally com-
menced in a strike court or in a federal court. A state court would not be
constrained by Norris-LaGuardia to deny enforcement of such an award,'"
whereas a federal court might consider Supreme Court decisions construing
Norris" to militate against enforcement.
During the current Survey year, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
considered a case relating both to the potential disparity in the enforcement
powers of state and federal courts vis-à-vis injunctive arbitral awards and
to the federal court removal power. In United Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 46
the union charged, among other violations, that the employer had committed
an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (5) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act" in that it refused to bargain in good faith. The basis of the
charge consisted of the employer's bargaining to an impasse over a proposed
arbitration clause. In particular, the union objected to that part of the provi-
sion giving the arbitrator the power to bring an action in the state courts of
New York to enforce an order by him against violations of the contractual ban
on strikes and lockouts. Under the employer's proposal, in the event that the
arbitrator brought such an enforcement action, both union and employer
promised not to seek removal to a federal court.
The employer's purpose in making this proposal is readily apparent.
It recognized that New York state courts could enforce an injunction arbitral
aware' and suspected that federal courts could not. It therefore sought to
limit enforcement actions to the New York courts. Moreover, the employer
may have anticipated the Avco ruling," and hoped to avoid its impact by
42 389 F.2d 369, 67 L.R.R.M. 2430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
Steamship is discussed herein beginning at p. 820 supra.
43 See Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
4•t
	 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
AI; 409 F.2d ISO, 170 L.R.R.M. 2529 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
48 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964). Section 8(a) (5) provides as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) of this title.
47 Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y,2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
48 Collective bargaining between the Electrical Workers• and the employer (Star
Expansion Industries Corp.) began more than three years before the Supreme Court
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gaining the union's contractual agreement not to seek removal of the enforce-
ment action to a federal court.
The unfair labor practice aspects of Electrical Workers have received
detailed discussion elsewhere in this Survey."' One facet of the court's opinion
deserves attention here, however, for it appears to be a significant develop-
ment in the law concerning collective bargaining for arbitration clauses. The
basic question facing the court was whether the employer's refusal to sign
a contract not containing its proposed arbitration clause amounted to a
refusal to bargain in good faith. The union urged that under the doctrine
of NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,ro the employer had
violated its duty to bargain in good faith by conditioning its agreement to
a contract on acceptance of a company proposal not within the mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining under section 8(d)—"wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment."" The court rejected the union's
argument that grievance arbitration procedure was not a mandatory bargain-
ing subject. It cited several opinions indicating that arbitration and no-strike
clauses were considered mandatory bargaining subjects. 52 Furthermore, in
view of the "federal policy of promoting industrial peace through a combina-
tion of no-strike clauses and effective arbitration provisions, there can be no
qustion but that such proposals are mandatory subjects of bargaining.""
(Emphasis added.)
It is significant to note that none of the cases cited by the court on the
question whether an arbitration proposal constitutes a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining had been directly concerned with whether an em-
ployer could refuse a contract not containing the proposed clause." The
Electrical Workers case appears to establish new law in this regard.
The court went further to conclude that the employer had bargained in
good faith and thus had not committed a section 8(a) ( 5) violation. In
opposition to the union's contention that the employer's proposed arbitration-
removal clause collided with national labor policy, the court could not find
that the proposal was so at odds with the national policy as to make the
decision in Avco. The employer could therefore have done no more than anticipate the
Avco ruling.
45 See pp. 854-55 infra.
5 ° 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
51 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), which, in part, provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the em-
ployees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation
of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession . .
52 409 F.2d at 156 nn. 9, 10, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2533.
53 Id. at 156, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2533.
54 NLRB v. United Nuclear Corp., 381 F.2d 972, 66 L.R.R.M. 2101 (10th Cir. 1967) ;
Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615, 53 L.R.R.M.
2878 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1963) ; NLRB v. Cclotex Corp., 364 F.2d 552,
62 L.R.R.M. 2475 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966) ; Hughes Tool Co. v.
NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 15 L.R.R.M. 352 (5th Cir. 1945).
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company's motives "patently meretricious." 55 "The issue is one of the Com-
pany's good faith, not its infallibility as a legal prophet." 55 Finding that the
company had demonstrated a willingness to bargain over its proposals, the
court was led to the conclusion that the company did not make its arbitra-
tion proposals as a means to avoid agreement with the union.
Whether a court would uphold the legality of and enforce a contract
provision barring a removal action was not settled in Electrical Workers.
The decision goes only to the question whether at the time of bargaining the
employer could in good faith insist upon such a provision. The Electrical
Workers bargaining occurred long before the A vco decision. Possibly, then,
the next court to consider this type of employer proposal will find that it
does collide with the national labor policy. In such case, the court may find
an absence of good faith bargaining. The proposed arbitration-removal clause
surely does conflict with federal labor policy after Avco. It seems very un-
likely that the next court to consider such a contract proposal would hold
that an employer might bargain in "good faith" and yet refuse to reach
agreement solely because the union would not embrace the proposal.
The value in discussion of Electrical Workers lies not in the hard con-
clusions available from the decision, but rather in two other respects. First,
it is a useful vehicle for examination of the unsettled delineation of the rela-
tive powers of state and federal courts to enforce injunctive arbitral awards.
Second, it vividly illustrates one means by which an employer sought to
avoid the impact of the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction rule.
C. NLRB Jurisdiction Concurrent with Arbitration
The case of Dock Loaders Local 854 v. W. L. Richeson & Sons, Inc.,'
decided during the Survey year, has raised a substantial problem regarding
the effect of arbitral awards in work-assignment disputes where the NLRB
has asserted jurisdiction. W. L. Richeson & Sons, Inc. had maintained a col-
lective bargaining relationship with both the Teamsters Union (Teamsters)
and the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) for over ten years.
A loading operation in Richeson's plant had traditionally been performed by
members of the Teamsters. After a change in the operation, the ILA informed
Richeson that it claimed the loading job. When its claim was rejected, the
ILA filed a grievance pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement with
Richeson. The result was a determination by the grievance committee award-
ing the loading job to the ILA. Richeson still refused to assign the work to
the ILA. Certain members of the ILA then brought suit under Section 301 of
the Labor-Management Relations Act, 2 alleging that defendant Richeson had
breached its collective bargaining agreement with the ILA by its refusal to
remove Teamsters members from the disputed jobs and to replace them with
ILA members pursuant to the grievance committee decision. Richeson there-
55 409 F.2d at 157, 70 L.R.11.M. at 2534.
56 Id.
I 280 F. Supp. 402, 67 L.R.R.M. 2560 (ED. La. 1968).
2 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
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after advised the Teamsters that, in order to protect itself from any liability
arising out of the ILA suit, it would not employ Teamsters to perform the
disputed work. The Teamsters threatened to strike if they were not permitted
to continue performance of the work. The NLRB regional counsel then sought
an injunction under section 10(0 3
 which resulted in a stipulation by the
parties not to engage in acts of picketing pending the outcome of litigation.
In the meantime, Richeson filed on unfair labor practice charge with
the NLRB alleging that a jurisdictional dispute existed within the meaning
of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (D). 4 A section 10(k)' hearing was held, and six
months later the NLRB issued its decision awarding the work to the Team-
sters. The ILA did not thereafter challenge assignment of the work to the
Teamsters, but it maintained its section 301 damage action because of
Richeson's failure to honor the grievance committee decision.
The federal district court hearing the section 301 suit had to consider
whether the NLRB award required the court to deny damages accruing prior
to the NLRB decision to ILA members not assigned the disputed jobs de-
spite a grievance committee award requiring such assignment. In short,
would the subsequent NLRB award save the employer from answering in
damages for his deliberate refusal, in violation of the contract, to honor a
grievance committee decision? Finding no specific authority on the question,
the court ruled that the employer would not be liable under the circum-
stances. It relied on dicta in Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,° in which
the Supreme Court stated:
Should the [NLRB] disagree with the arbiter by ruling, for exam-
ple, that the employees involved in the controversy are members
of one bargaining unit or another, the Board's ruling would, of
course, take precedence; and if the employer's actions had been in
accord with that ruling, it would not be liable for damages under
§ 301. 7
3 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1964). Section 10(1) provides federal district courts with power
to issue injunctions upon application of the regional counsel of the NLRB. Section 10(e)
proceedings are limited to those cases in which a party has allegedly engaged in an unfair
labor practice under §§ 8(b) (4) (ii) (A), (B), (C) or (D), § 8(e), or § 8(b)(7), Work
assignment disputes are covered under § 8(6)(4) (ii)(D) which provides as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents— • . .
(4) . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or
in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is:
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees
in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather
than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft or
class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of
the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing
such work.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(D) (1964).
4
 29 U.S.C. § 158(6) (4) (ii) (D) (1964), quoted in note 3 supra.
29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964). Section 10(k) empowers the NLRB to award the dis-
puted work to one of the contending unions. See NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast
Eng'rs Union, 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
8 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
7 Id. at 272.
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This statement constituted only dicta because in Carey the Court was deciding
only whether one of the competing unions could compel arbitration of the
work assignment dispute.
The Carey case in essence reaffirmed Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 8 in
which the Court had ruled that a party to a collective bargaining agreement
might sue for breach of contract under section 301 even though the activity
complained of also constituted an unfair labor practice. Having decided in
Smith that a party could sue for damages, the next logical step was to permit
suit to compel arbitration under the same circumstances. The Carey decision
made this step.
The question left unanswered in Carey was the disposition of the arbi-
tral award should the NLRB decision conflict with it. The dicta quoted
above comprised the Court's nearest foreshadowing of an answer to that
question. The dicta, however, answered only the question of which union
would finally perform the work.° It did not decide whether the "precedence"
of the NLRB award would excuse the employer from paying damages accrued
under an arbitration award which it had refused to honor. The latter ques-
tion had not been decided prior to the Dock Loaders decision.
The Dock Loaders rationale concluded that underlying congressional
policy required that NLRB decisions take precedence over contractual
arbitration:
If the parties were free to race to the forum, one to the arbitrator
and the other to NLRB, there is the counter risk that the party
who successfully reached arbitration first would imperil the effec-
tiveness of the statutory remedy by making an employer liable in
damages even when his position had been correct under the stan-
dards considered appropriate by the NLRB pursuant to its stat-
utory mandate. 1°
The court found that a conflict existed between a national labor policy en-
couraging arbitration and a policy requiring resolution of jurisdictional
disputes by the NLRB. When these policies conflict, one must yield. The
court properly concluded that it would be inconsistent to subject the party
whose cause has prevailed in a final judgment under a statutory procedure
to liability for damages occasioned while it was seeking its statutory remedy.
The Dock Loaders decision seriously undermines the practical effect
8 713 U.S. 195 (1962).
9 Sec New Orleans Typographical Union, , 147 N.L.R.B. 191, 56 L.R.R.M. 1169
(1964), aff'd, 368 F.2d 755, 63 L.R.R.M. 2467 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Smith Steel
Workers, '174 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 70 L.R.R.M. 1145 (1969). In Smith the majority of the
Board found that the dicta in Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. confirmed the power
of the Board to make a final determination in a unit clarification decision. Upon petition
by the employer, the Board had redefined bargaining units at the employer's plant. One
union that lost membership as a result of the regrouping requested the employer to
bargain over matters pertaining to the lost employees. Meeting resistance from the em-
ployer, the union brought a § 301 suit to compel arbitration of the matters. The trial
examiner found, and the Board confirmed, that the union had committed a § 8(b)(3)
violation in its insistence that the employer bargain with the union over employees who
were no longer part of its bargaining unit.
10 280 F. Supp. at 405, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2562.
833
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
of the Supreme Court's holding in Carey that the employer may be required
to arbitrate a work assignment dispute. No value lies in the union's ability
to compel the employer to arbitrate the disputed work assignment if the
union cannot recover damages for the employer's refusal to honor the arbi-
tral award. To protect itself from liability to one of the two competing unions,
the employer may now seek the cover of the statutory procedure by obtain-
ing an NLRB award.
The question is raised, therefore, whether arbitration will continue to be
a useful method for settlement of work assignment disputes. The answer
would seem to be that bilateral arbitration between the employer and one
of the competing unions can no longer be useful. In the Dock Loaders sit-
uation, for instance, the arbitration took place between the employer and the
ILA. The Teamsters were not even represented. It is unlikely that the ILA-
Employer grievance committee would award the disputed work to the un-
represented Teamsters. The NLRB will "voluntarily withhold its . . .
authority to adjudicate alleged unfair labor practice charges involving [arbi-
trable matters], unless it clearly appears that the arbitration proceedings
were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness or serious procedural irregular-
ities or that the award was clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of
the Act."" The NLRB surely would not defer to an arbitral award where
one of the unions had not been represented.
If arbitration is to continue to be useful in this area, a process of tri-
lateral arbitration will be necessary."' Under this procedure the employer
and both competing unions may submit the work-assignment dispute to a
single arbitral body. Its decision should settle the matter. Because all inter-
ested parties would have been represented in the arbitration proceedings, the
NLRB might be persuaded to withhold its authority to adjudicate the juris-
dictional dispute.
V. SECTION 301 SUITS
A. Right of an Individual Employee to Sue
During the current Survey year few significant cases were decided
with regard to the right of an individual to bring suits against his em-
ployer, his collective-bargaining representative, or both. For the most
part, the significance of those recent cases considered here lies in their in-
terpretation and application of principles set out by the Supreme Court in
Humphrey v. Moore' and V aca v. Sipes. 2 This discussion will consider first,
individual suits against employers, and second, individual suits against
unions. The following material will indicate that the Iaw governing the in-
dividual employee's right to sue his employer has developed to the point
11 International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155, 1157
(1962).
12 See Jones, An Arbitral Answer to a Judicial Dilemma: The Carey Decision and
Trilateral Arbitration of Jurisdictional Disputes, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 327 (1964).
1 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
2 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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where some definite guidelines can be relied upon. Among these are the in-
herent power of the individual to sue for breach of contract 3 under Section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1
 tempered by the requirements
that he attempt to obtain available remedies under the contract grievance
procedure,° and that he be fairly represented by his union in the grievance
proceeding.°
A lesser degree of certainty prevails in the area of individual suits
against collective-bargaining representatives. The representative clearly has
a duty to represent each member of the bargaining group fairly? and a group
member may obtain relief for his representative's failure to fulfill that duty.°
Still in doubt, however, are the nature of the relief available and the basis
upon which it is predicated. Three different bases have been evident: (1) an
unfair labor practice charge for which the NLRB may make an appropriate
corrective order;° (2) a suit for damages based on an alleged breach of the
judicially developed duty of fair representation:'° (3) a suit for damages
brought under section 301 either directly against the union" or as an ad-
3 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
4 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), of which part (a) reads as follows:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
5 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). See also Haynes v. United
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 62 L.R.R.M. 2389 (5th Cir. 1966), in which
the court decided that a final determination by union and management under the griev-
ance procedure may operate to deprive the employee of his right to sue in court.
6 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) ; 1966-1967 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 771, 835 (1967).
7 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S, 248 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192 (1944).
8 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953).
0 See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172, 54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963), But see Local 12, United Rubber
Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171, 198 (1967) (concurring opinion).
I° See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335, 351 (1964), in which he wrote:
I concur in the judgment and in the holding of the Court that since "Moore
has not.. .. proved his case . . ," the decision below must be reversed. . .
I do not, however, agree that Moore stated a cause of action arising under
§ 301(a). .. . It is my view rather that Moore's claim must be treated as an
individual employee's action for a union's breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion—a duty derived not from the collective bargaining contract but from the
National Labor Relations Act. . .
11 See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), in which a union member brought
an action to enjoin implementation of a decision of a management-bargaining representa-
tive committee to dovetail seniority lists. The court stated that
IT1his action is one arising under § 301 . . . and is a case controlled by federal
Iaw. . . . iT1he complaint here alleged that Moore's discharge would violate
the contract and was therefore within the cognizance of federal and state
courts . , . .
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junct to a 301 suit against the employer." The cases to he considered below
are illustrative of current judicial thought as to the appropriate causes of
action and types of relief available to the individual employee.
Vaca v. Sipes," decided by the Supreme Court in 1967, has become the
touchstone for judicial consideration of individual suits against the em-
ployer as well as individual suits against the union. In Vaca an employee
was discharged by the employer on the ground that he was medically unfit
to continue working. The employee sought to use the union grievance pro-
cedure, and the union processed the grievance up to the point of submission
to arbitration. The union refused to proceed further because its doctor con-
curred in the opinion of the company doctor that the employee was med-
ically unfit to continue working. At this point the employee brought two
suits in state court—one against the union, and one against the employer—
for damages for wrongful discharge.
The suit against the union eventually found its way to the Supreme
Court. The union had defended on the ground that the courts had no juris-
diction because the charge was arguably an unfair labor practice subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The lower court overturned a jury
verdict for the plaintiff-employee on that ground, but the Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed and reinstated the jury verdict. Although the Supreme
Court reversed the latter state court decision because it had applied the
wrong standard of union conduct," the Court upheld the Missouri court's
ruling that the cause of action was within the jurisdiction of both state
and federal courts.
The issue whether the courts are precluded from consideration of suits
by employees against their collective bargaining representatives by the
Garmon 15
 preemption doctrine has received treatment elsewhere in this
Survey." It will suffice to mention here that the Court concluded that state
and federal courts are not precluded from deciding cases involving such em-
ployee suits. In support of this conclusion the Court stated:
A primary justification for the preemption doctrine—the need to
avoid conflicting rules of substantive law in the labor relations area
and the desirability of leaving the development of such rules to the
administrative agency created by Congress for that purpose—is not
Id. at 343-44.
12
 Sec Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
13 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
14
 The state court had ruled, in effect, that the union's failure to proceed to arbi-
tration was wrong if the evidence showed that the plaintiff-employee was wrongfully
discharged. The Supreme Court disagreed with this standard since it would make the
'union liable if, after the union's decision not to proceed to arbitration, a judge or jury
decided that the employee's grievance was meritorious. The proper standard of union
conduct, concluded the Court, was whether the union had been "arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or in bad faith" in processing the employee's grievance. 386 U.S. at 190.
15 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Court stated
there: "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the states as
well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board . . ." Id. at 245.
16 See pp. 789-95 supra.
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applicable to cases involving alleged breaches of the union duty of
fair representation.'
The decision on this issue left the Court uncommitted as to whether an
action by an employee against his union for breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation is an unfair labor practice as the NLRB's and two circuit courts'"
have held. The Court decided only that courts had jurisdiction over such
causes of action whether or not the NLRB may also have unfair labor prac-
tice jurisdiction.
Having decided that courts are competent to hear the employee's suit
against his union, the Court approached what must be considered the cen-
tral issue in the case: "The problem . . is to determine under what cir-
cumstances the individual may obtain judicial review of his breach-of-
contract claim despite his failure to secure relief through the contractual
remedial procedures." 2° The emphasis of Mr. Justice White's majority opin-
ion thus shifted from the employee's suit against his union—the only one of
the plaintiff's two suits that reached the Court—to a general discussion of
the conditions under which the employee might obtain judicial review of his
claims against the employer. 2 ' From this discussion most of the recent cases
in this area draw their conclusions.
Under the doctrine of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,"" 2 the Court
pointed out, an employee could not seek judicial review of his grievance
unless he had at least attempted to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbi-
tration procedures established in the bargaining contract. Because these
contractual remedies are devised and controlled by the union and the em-
ployer, they could prove unworkable for the individual employee. The ques-
tion arises as to when the employee could have his case heard by a court
even though denied relief by the contract grievance machinery. The most
obvious situation is that where the employer repudiates those procedures. 22
In addition, said the Court, "we think the wrongfully discharged employee
may bring an action against his employer in the face of a defense based upon
17 386 U.S. at 180-81.
18 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172, 54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963).
1- 0 Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 65 L.R.R.M. 2309 (D.C. Cir.
1967) ; Local 12, United Rubber Workers V. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395
(5th Cir. 1966).
20 386 U.S. at 185.
21 In a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan,
Justice Fortas stated: "I regret the elaborate discussion in the Court's opinion of prob-
lems which are irrelevant. This is not an action by the employee against the employer,
and the discussion of the requisites of such an action is, in my judgment, unnecessary."
Id. at 199-200. The majority opinion itself commenced by stating: "We granted certiorari
to consider whether exclusive jurisdiction lies with the NLRB and, if not, whether the
finding of Union liability and the relief afforded . . 'the plaintiff-employee] are con-
sistent with governing principles of federal labor law." Id. at 174. It would seem that
the Court had already decided this much by the time it came to consider the employee's
rights against the employer.
22 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
23 386 U.S. at 185, citing Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370
U.S. 254, 260-63 (1962).
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the failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided the employee can prove
that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation in
its handling of the employee's grievance." 2 ' An employee's suit against his
employer is no less a section 301 action because the employee must prove a
breach of duty by the union in order to have standing. "The court is free to
determine whether the employee is barred by the actions of his union repre-
sentative, and, if not, to proceed with the case!'" The employee might join
both the employer and the union. "The action is still a § 301 suit. . .
The Court had thus come to the point of permitting an employee suit
against the employer if the union had breached its duty of fair representation
by its failure to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure. Many
situations would arise in which a court would be required to pass upon
whether a breach of the union's duty had occurred in the context of a
section 301 action against the employer, and in such cases the court would
have to fashion appropriate remedies. 27 "The governing principle .. . is to
apportion liability between the employer and the union according to the
damage caused by the fault of each." 28
Insofar as the theory of union liability is concerned, Vaca v. Sipes
apparently retreats from the Humphrey v. Moore decision that a suit for
breach of the duty of fair representation is a section 301 action. 2" Vaca
would require at least a concurrent 301 action against the employer in order
to adjudicate the union's breach of duty." (1 No indication exists that the
Court would entertain an employee action solely against his union grounded
on a section 301 breach of contract theory.
1. Individual Suit Against Employer.—The district court considering
Rivera v. NMU Pension Planet was required to interpret and apply the
principles of Vaca v. Sipes. Plaintiff-employee brought suit under section
301 against her former employer seeking reinstatement, back pay and dam-
ages. According to plaintiff's complaint, the employer had violated the col-
lective bargaining agreement by dismissal of plaintiff without sufficient
warning or the required two-week notice." 2 Plaintiff further alleged that,
although the contract provided for a grievance procedure and arbitration,
she was advised not to press her claim and was not given an opportunity
to appear at a hearing as provided in the contract. Plaintiff's poorly drafted
complaint concluded "that said [union?] acts constitute unfair representa-
24 386 U.S. at '186.
Id. at 187.
29 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 497.
28 See note 12 supra.
30 386 U.S. at 186.
31 288 F. Supp. 874, 69 L.R.R.M. 2249 (E.D. La. 1968).
32 Article VII B of the contract provided:
The employer agrees not to dismiss any worker except for just and sufficient
cause. Employees shall receive two (2) weeks notice before being discharged. No
employee shall be dismissed for cause unless he has received sufficient warning of
such dismissal within a reasonable period prior to receiving notice of discharge,
except in cases of an extremely serious or flagrant nature.
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tion, and entitles [sk] her to redress against the defendant herein [i.e.,
the employer]." 33
 Plaintiff did not join her union as a defendant nor did she
even mention it by name. The employer submitted uncontroverted affidavits
showing that a meeting was held between representatives of the employer
and of the union, and that these representatives agreed that plaintiff's dis-
charge was for just cause. Defendant employer moved to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action and, alternatively, for a summary
judgment.
The court was faced with a difficult problem. It had, on the one hand,
a claim lodged against the employer for wrongful discharge violative of the
collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, there was uncontroverted
evidence that management and union had conferred and agreed that plain-
tiff-employee's discharge was for just cause. Moreover, even though plaintiff's
complaint contained a vague statement about "unfair representation," it did
not join the union as a defendant, nor did it even mention the union by
name. The issue was whether, under the doctrine of Vaca v. Sipes, the plain-
tiff had stated a cause of action against the employer (as opposed to the
union), and, if so, whether the management-union agreement that the dis-
charge was proper amounted to the sort of grievance procedure finality"
entitling the employer to summary judgment.
First, the court considered whether plaintiff had stated a cause of action
against the employer. It noted that the Supreme Court in Vaca had "endorsed
the right of an employee in certain situations to sue his employer with-
out joining the union on a claim based on the collective bargaining agree-
ment. . . . "35 In order to gain relief against the employer under Vaca, the
Rivera court thought that plaintiff must allege and prove "a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement by the employer and a breach of the
statutory duty of fair representation by the union."36 The complaint had
alleged a breach of contract by the employer and, if the most liberal con-
struction possible were adopted, 37 it had alleged a breach of duty by the
union since it had mentioned "unfair representation" which could result
only through union conduct. 38 Therefore, though technically deficient, the
complaint had put the defendant employer on notice of plaintiff's claim,
and it would not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
As to whether plaintiff's claim should have been directed toward her
union rather than the employer, the court noted that "[u]ndoubtedly, the
employee does have a remedy against the union." 39 It was obvious, however,
33 288 P. Supp. at 876, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2250.
34 See Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 62 L.R.R.M.
2389 (5th Cir. 1966).
39 288 F. Supp. at 876, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2250.
:In Id. at 877, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2251.
37 On the question whether plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged a breach of duty
by the union, the court stated: "Me feet that the complaint can be construed to fall
within the outermost bounds of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (2). The complaint
does allege unfair representation, and unfair representation can result only through union
conduct." Id. at 878, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2252.
38 See note 37 supra.
39 288 F. Supp. at 878, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2251.
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that plaintiff was not seeking redress against her union. She was seeking
relief which the union could not give her, namely, reinstatement by the
employer.
Further, it would be unrealistic to suppose that an order compel-
ling the union to fairly represent the employee in the grievance
procedures would suffice. It smacks against common sense to be-
lieve that a judidical declaration is capable of erasing the acrimony,
bias, prejudice or other feeling that may have infected the union-
employee relationship. 40
Regarding the second aspect of defendant's motion—that for summary
judgment—the court pointed out that a controversy still existed as to
whether the union representatives acted unfairly in their representation of
the plaintiff. If such unfairness had occurred, then the grievance proceeding
which affirmed plaintiff's discharge would not be binding on the court. Be-
cause this important issue of fact was yet to be decided, the court refused
to grant summary judgment.
It is useful to consider here some of the points which the Rivera court
adopted from Vaca. First, it pointed out that absent unfair representation by
the union, the contract grievance procedure determination would be binding
on the individual employee. Second, there is no requirement that the
plaintiff-employee join the union as a defendant. However, in order to gain
relief against the employer, the employee must allege and prove both a
breach of contract by the employer and a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation by the union. Finally, the court touched upon one of the difficult
problems only partially resolved in Vaca: the overall question of the form of
relief sought, the relative liability of union and management, and the ap-
portionment of damages. The Rivera court disposed of this aspect of the
case with relative ease, since it was called upon only to decide whether plain-
tiff had stated a cause of action against the employer. The court recognized,
however, that the union, as well as the employer, might be liable to the em-
ployee and that the employee could seek different forms of relief from each
party. Correlatively, neither union nor management would be liable for
damages caused by the other.
While the Rivera court was combing the plaintiff-employee's complaint
to see whether the requisite claim of unfair union representation was present,
the Third Circuit, in a similar case, appears to have gone one step farther.
In Rothlein v. Armour & Co. 4 ' the court reversed the lower court's summary
judgment for the employer on the ground that, although the plaintiff-
employees had not alleged unfair representation in their complaint, the facts
adduced at a trial on the merits might show that the union had breached its
duty.
Plaintiff-employees brought a class action on behalf of 86 members of
the bargaining unit against the employer under section 301. They sought an
accounting and payment of amounts allegedly owed them under a pension
plan. The "Armour" plan had been initiated as part of a collective bargain-
4 ° Id. at 877-78, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2251.
41 391 F.2d 574, 68 L.R.R.M. 2104 (3d Cir. 1968).
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ing agreement signed in 1952. In 1964 the union obtained the employer's
agreement to make payments to a different pension plan maintained solely
by the union. The 1964 agreement said nothing about the amounts contrib-
uted by the employer to the Armour plan. The company submitted affidavits
showing that during negotiations for the 1964 plan the union agreed that all
employees would withdraw from and cease to have any interest in the
Armour plan.
The company defended on the ground that the binding grievance pro-
cedure had been exhausted and that the management-union grievance com-
mittee had concluded that the employees had no interest in the Armour plan.
While the district court held that the grievance committee determination
was final and binding on the court, 42 the circuit court found that substantial
issues of fact remained for court consideration. Most important was the
question whether the grievance concerning the Armour plan should have
been decided under the 1964 contract grievance procedure or whether the
original 1952 contract procedure was appropriate. The court further in-
structed the district court:
[13 efore a district court should accept a contractural "merits"
determination as a basis for granting summary judgment under
Section 301, the judge should be satisfied that the quality of the
contractural grievance procedures, in actual practice and "legally,"
is commensurate with the substantiality of the claim or dispute
presented by the employee. If the procedures suffer because a union
is in breach of its duty of fair representation, clearly the individual
should have recourse to the courts. 43
The circuit court pointed out the possibility that a unity of interest
may have existed between the company and the union in negotiations for
the 1964 pension plan agreement. For instance, the company might have
demanded lower payments to the new plan if it were not permitted to con-
tribute amounts accumulated under the Armour plan. The union might
side with the company in an attempt to keep, payments to its pension plan
as high as possible. If in fact this unity of interest existed, the plaintiff-
employees might have a basis for proving a breach of the duty of _fair
representation and thus for overturning the otherwise "final" grievance
committee determination. 44
As was indicated at the outset of this discussion, the significance of
Rivera and Rothlein does not lie in deviation from prior law in the area of
individual suits against the employer. Rather, they represent a consolidation
of prior law. Rivera concentrated on the allegations by a plaintiff neces-
sary in order to come within the terms of Vaca v. Sipes. It found that the
employee would not suffer a summary judgment so long as there remained
42 The district court relied on Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362
F.2d 414, 62 L.R.R.M. 2389 (5th Cir. 1966). The Haynes case is discussed at length in
1966-1967 Annual Survey of .Labor Relations Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Coro. L. Rev. 771,
830-34 (1967).
43 391 F.2d at 580, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2113.
44 Id.
•
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sufficient allegation and question of unfair representation by his • union.
Rothlein elaborated upon essentially the same question but took a somewhat
bolder approach in that it did not require an allegation of unfair representa-
tion where the available evidence indicated the possibility of its existence.
Both cases reveal the tendency of the judiciary to scrutinize carefully those
grievance proceedings which under the contract would result in a "final"
determination of the employee's rights.
2. Individual Suit Against Union.—The tendency of recent decisions to
interpret and refine cases in the area of private suits against employers is
paralleled by the past year's developments in the individual's right to sue
his collective bargaining agent. The two cases to be considered below are
directed toward an answer to questions raised in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in V aca v. Sipes and Humphrey v. Moore.
The employee claim in Humphrey v. Moore 45
 arose from a situation in
which one employer was forced to absorb another. A joint management-union
committee was assigned the task of dovetailing employee lists of the two
former employers. As a result of the committee's decision, Moore was dis-
charged. Moore brought an action claiming that his exclusive bargaining agent
had deceived him concerning his rights to a job and to seniority and had
combined with the employees of the other employer and the International
union to deprive him of his employment rights. The Supreme Court held that
the allegations were sufficient to charge a "breach of duty by the union,""
and that "this action is one arising under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act." 47
There was—and still is—considerable doubt whether Moore's action
against the union actually arose under section 301. Mr. Justice Goldberg's
concurring opinion stated his belief that the claim should be treated as an
individual employee's action for breach of the union's duty of fair repre-
sentation, not as a 301 suit." One commentator suggested that Humphrey
meant either (1) that when a valid 301 cause of action is alleged, the fair
representation issue may be litigated in the nature of ancillary jurisdiction,
or (2) that 301 "includes the fair representation claim when it is alleged
that such unfair representation has resulted in a breach of contract.""
Humphrey has also been viewed as a rather hastily fashioned pronouncement
by the Court to insure that the judiciary would retain jurisdiction over an em-
ployee's claims against his union in the face of NLRB decisions to the effect
that such claims were in the nature of unfair labor practice charges." What-
ever may have been the Court's underlying rationale in Humphrey, the case
still contained inescapably clear language declaring that an individual em-
ployee's suit against his bargaining representative for breach of the duty of
fair representation stated a cause of action under section 301.
45 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
48 Id. at 343.
47 Id,
48 Id. at 351. See note 10 supra.
48 Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. Rev.
373, 387 (1965).
58 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 771, 839 (1967).
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Earlier discussion noted that in Vaca v. Sipes the Court appeared to retreat
from its position in Humphrey. Vaca affirms the employee's right of recovery
against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation in a 301 suit.
But Vaca limits the employee's right to bring a claim against his union to
those situations in which the union has unfairly represented the employee in
the assertion of contractual rights against the employer—a party against
whom the employee clearly has a 301 cause of action. To reach the union
under this 301 jurisdiction, the employee must at least bring a concurrent
301 suit against the employer. The claim against the union is cognizable
under 301 simply because the employee must explain to the court why, after
he has exhausted his contractual grievance remedies, he must seek the court's
assistance. That reason, of course, is the union's breach of duty. Under Vaca
the court may then apportion damage liability between the employer and the
union.
During the current Survey year, the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California had an opportunity to consider the implications of Hum-
phrey and Vaca. In Hall v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n51 the plaintiff-employee
alleged that a joint management-union committee decision depriving plain-
tiff of his job was the result of a conspiracy between management and union.
The committee's decision proceeded from a complaint brought to it after
plaintiff fought with two other union members over work procedures to be
used in unloading a ship. The other union members complained to the com-
mittee that plaintiff had assaulted them with a deadly weapon. Plaintiff the-
orized that the committee decision was unfavorable to him because of union
pressure to expel him, since one of the two persons with whom he had fought
was the brother of a high union official.
Though the action was brought against both union and employer, the
emphasis lay in the claims against the union. Thus, the case was very similar
to the situation in Humphrey v. Moore. In deciding the nature of the claim
presented, however, the court did not come to the conclusion reached in
Humphrey, that the claim against the union was a section 301 "violation of
contract" action. Rather, the court concluded that
I ti he allegation that management joined in an unfair and discrim-
inatory plot to deregister plaintiffs alleges a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement .. . . 52
while
pllaintiffs' allegation that the union initiated the complaint and
joined in the action of the Joint Port Committee with unfair and
arbitrary intent states a cause of action against the union which is
the breach of its statutory duty to fairly represent its members in
any such proceeding.°
What the court appears to conclude is that even where management-union
complicity is alleged, the statutory basis giving rise to those claims is dif-
31 281 F. Supp. 54, 67 L.R.R.M. 2756 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
52 Id. at 59, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2759.
53 Id.
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ferent vis-à-vis each of the defendants. A section 301 breach of contract
action will lie against the employer, while a right of recovery against the
union must be predicated upon breach of its statutory duty of fair repre-
sentation.
It is submitted that the Hall court's decision is correct. Although the
majority opinion in Humphrey v. Moore indicated that claims against the
union were 301 actions, the Court in Vaca v. Sipes implicitly rejected this
possibility. The court in Hall has drawn upon Vaca to bifurcate the bases of
relief against union and management. This bifurcation gives recognition to
the contractual' relationship existing between employer and employee on the
one hand, and the representational relationship between union and employee
on the other. If Hall represents current judicial thinking in the wake of
Vaca, it would appear that the courts have achieved a proper formulation
of the relationships which employer and union bear to the individual
employee.
In a similar decision during the past year, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals further diminished the vitality of Humphrey v. Moore. In Nedd v.
United Mine Workers," retired coal miners brought an action, which they
claimed was based on section 301, solely against the union. The plaintiffs
alleged that the union had failed to require mine operators to contribute
"royalty" payments to trustees of the United Mine Workers Health and
Welfare Fund as required by the collective bargaining contract between the
operators and the union. Alleging that the mine operators' contributions were
more than ten million dollars in arrears, plaintiffs sought a judgment against
the union for the amount of the arrearages. The lower court had denied
defendant union's motion for summary judgment, and defendant brought the
case to the circuit court on interlocutory appeal.
Plaintiffs had invoked federal jurisdiction under section 301 on the
theory that theirs was a suit for violation of a contract between an employer
and a labor organization. The circuit court rejected section 301 as a basis of
federal jurisdiction over an individual employee's suit against his union
representatives. The court recognized that the conduct attributed to the union
"may well constitute a breach of the union's equitable duty as a fiduciary
representative of employees to act in their interest, fairly and in good
faith . . ."55
But this responsibility arises out of the union-employee relationship
and pervades it. It is not created by any contract between union
and employer although the bargaining for and the administration
of such a contract may supply the context in which the obligation
inherent in representative status controls the representative's con-
duct. Accordingly, though the administration of a labor contract
provided an occasion upon which the union's preexisting obligation
to serve the plaintiffs came into play, we think that the union's
failure to act, wrongful though it may have been, was not "a viola-
tion of [a] contract between an employer and labor organization,"
54 400 F.2d 103, 63 L.R.R.M. 3012 (3d Cir. 1960.
Id. at 105, 68 L.R.R.M. at 3014.
844
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
the only type of wrong which section 301(a) brings within federal
jurisdiction."
Because plaintiffs had not asserted a viable basis upon which to rest
federal court jurisdiction, the court vacated the lower court order denying
summary judgment. The court preserved the right of the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint to state a claim based on the union's breach of its duty of
fair representation.
The Nedd court cited Vaca v. Sipes as support for the conclusion that
plaintiffs had not stated a claim cognizable under section 301. It found in
Vaca reasoning that "though the employer might be guilty of a breach of the
labor contract, the wrong charged to the union was not a violation of the
contract but rather a breach of its duty [of fair representation]. . . . "57
Drawing upon this line of reasoning, the court in Nedd decided that sec-
tion 301 would not support an individual employee's action brought solely
against his union. In turn, the decision in Nedd lends support to the con-
clusion reached here that Vaca must be interpreted as permitting relief
against the union under 301 only where that 301 suit is brought against the
employer. 28
B. Injunctive Remedial Powers Under Section 301
1. State Court Power to Enjoin Union Strikes.—Stale courts continue to
operate outside the ambit of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and may, therefore,
enjoin union striking in breach of a no-strike collective bargaining agree-
ment. As discussed earlier, federal courts are precluded from enjoining such
strikes by the Supreme Court's application of Norris-LaGuardia to this situa-
tion in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson.' The Supreme Court has not had occa-
sion to decide whether, in the context of a section 301 breach of contract
suit, the remedial power limitations imposed on federal courts are also im-
posed on state courts. Cases and commentators have arrived at different con-
clusions in their efforts to determine in advance of a Supreme Court decision
whether the state courts' power is so restricted. 2 Because there has been ex-
tensive discussion of this topic elsewhere, it is sufficient to note here that in
each of three state court decisions during the past year, the court has reaf-
firmed its power to enjoin union striking'
513 Id. at 106,
57 Id.
Sce p. 838 supra.
1 370 U.S. 195 (1962). Discussion of Sinclair and related decisions commences at
p. 820 supra.
2 See cases and commentary cited in 1965-1966 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 909, 928 (1966). In addition, compare the Sixth Cir-
cuit's blanket pronouncement in Avco Corp. v. Machinists Acro Lodge 735, 376 F.2d
337, 65 L.R.R.M. 2193 (6th Cir. 1967), that state courts were prohibited by Norris from
enjoining union striking, with the Supreme Court's decision in the same case in which
the court expressly reserved decision on that question. 390 U.S. 557, 560 n.2 (1968).
3 International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Producers Grain Corp., 437 S.W.2d 33, 70
L.R.R.M. 2375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) ; Rust Eng'r Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners, 210 So. 2d 154, 69 L.R.R.M. 2115 (La. 1968) ; Millwrights Local 2484 v. Rust
Eng'r Co., 424 S.W.2d 283, 68 L.R.R.M. 2340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Avco Corp. v. Machinists Aero Lodge
7354 during the current Survey year appears to have rendered academic the
entire question whether state courts may enjoin strikes in breach of a no-
strike contract. Avco has been discussed at length earlier in this Survey. 5
The Court held in Avco that federal courts may remove from state courts
actions to enjoin breaches of collective bargaining agreements. More specifi-
cally, the Court affirmed a lower court decision in which an employer's action
to enjoin striking was removed to the federal court whereupon the state-issued
injunction was dissolved. The law is, then, that state courts may enjoin
striking in breach of the bargaining agreement; however, state courts may
be deprived of this power when the union elects to remove the action to a
federal court.
2. Power to Enjoin Plant Removal.—Two cases arising during the current
Survey year considered the novel question whether a court may enjoin an
employer from closing his plant when the union alleges that such closing
would constitute a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. Both deci-
sions affirm the view that courts possess the power to enjoin plant closings in
such circumstances.
In UAW v. Hamilton Beach MM. Co.,6 the union brought a section 301
action in a state court alleging that the employer breached the collective
bargaining agreement between the parties by a threatened plant removal to
another state. The basis of the alleged breach was a clause in the agreement
authorizing the union's members to perform certain jobs in the production
operation and conferring seniority ratings on union members. The union
contended that the plant removal would deprive union members of job and
seniority rights and thus would constitute a breach of contract. The union
sought damages and an injunction restraining the company from moving.
The trial court sustained defendant-employer's demurrer upon the ground
that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided, first, that, as to the
union's action for an injunction, "it is our opinion that the courts, both fed-
eral and state, do have jurisdiction by virtue of sec. 301(a)." 7 The court con-
sidered itself competent to enjoin the plant closing if the shutdown would
violate the contract.
On the issue whether the closing would constitute a breach of contract,
the court reviewed the basis upon which the trial court had found the com-
plaint deficient. Unlike the trial court, the supreme court did not consider
it necessary for the union to allege that the threatened shutdown would he
an unfair labor practice.8 Citing Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,9 the court
pointed out that actions founded in breach of the collective bargaining agree-
4 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
5 See pp. 827 - 29 supra.
6 40 Wis. 2d 270, 162 N.W.2d 16, 69 L.R.R.M. 2563 (1968).
7 Id. at 277, 162 N.W.2d at 20, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2565.
8 Id. at 278, 162 N.W.2d at 20, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2565.
9 371 U.S. '195 (1962).
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ment may be brought independently of any unfair labor practice charges. The
court agreed with the trial court, however, that in the absence of an explicit
contract provision limiting the employer's right to close the plant, no such
provision would be inferred. The contractual provisions relied upon by the
union—those relating to job specification and seniority rights—were con-
sidered insufficient to show that the company had bargained away its right
to decide the location of production facilities.'" 'Consequently, the lower
court's order sustaining defendant's demurrer was affirmed.
An injunction was issued prohibiting an employer from closing a dis-
tribution facility in the case of Local 328, Teamsters v. Armour and Co." In
Armour the employer announced to the union on October 17, 1968, that it
would close its distribution outlet in Marquette, Michigan, on November 2,
1968. Affidavits presented to the court showed that the outlet had been losing
money for over a year, with heaviest losses sustained in September and
Ocober, 1968. Three Armour employees who were members of plaintiff union
would have been affected by the closing.
The union's 301 action sought an injunction against the closing, alleging
that the threatened shutdown would violate the contract. The union relied
upon a contract provision guaranteeing that the employer would not permit
employees of one bargaining unit to perform work recognized as being in the
province of members of another bargaining unit. Also cited was a clause
under which the employer agreed to "discuss" with the union any anticipated
reduction in the number of employees. The union claimed that there was no
such discussion. The contract did not contain an arbitration clause.
The decision of the district court consisted of an oral opinion issued by
the judge one day prior to the planned closing. In deciding whether he had
jurisdiction to issue an injunction, the judge considered himself faced with
a dilemma. On the one hand, he recognized the apparent applicability of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 12 which deprives federal courts of jurisdiction
to issue injunctions in "labor disputes." On the other hand, the court looked
to decisions construing section 301 in which the Supreme Court had con-
ferred authority on federal courts to fashion appropriate remedies in breach
of contract cases. With some exasperation, the judge pronounced the statutes
and cases in this area "in hopeless conflict.' 13 "[F]rankly, it places the
Court in what could only be termed a hopeless dilemma; which forces the
Court, then, under the circumstances, to resort to the general rules of
equity." 14 The court concluded that the question whether the contract pre-
cluded a closing of the distribution facility should be decided at a hearing on
the merits. Accordingly, it enjoined the closing pending a hearing scheduled
for two months later.
At first blush, it may appear that Hamilton Beach and Armour achieve
a result of disparate treatment of the employer, on the one hand, and the
union, on the other. While Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson and the Norris-
10 40 Wis. 2d at 283, 162 N.W.2d at 23, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2567.
11 294 F. Supp. 168, 69 L.R.R.M. 2895 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
12 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
13 294 F. Supp. at 171, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2896.
14 Id., 69 L.R.R.M. at 2897.
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LaGuardia Act prohibit the injunction of a union strike in breach of
contract, 'Hamilton Beach and Armour indicate that the employer may he
enjoined from refusing to provide work if the contract is thereby breached.
Indeed, in Armour, it appeared that the issuance of an injunction would
cause the distribution outlet to go even further into the red.
It is submitted, however, that these two decisions reach a correct
result. The courts were faced with a situation in which the employer may
have contractually guaranteed another party—in these cases, the union—
that it would not move its production facilities, and in reliance on that prom-
ise the other party—in these cases, the union and its members—made ar-
rangements accordingly. Reduced to their basic elements, both Hamilton
Beach and Armour considered a simple contract situation involving mutual
promises, reliance and breach. The legal remedy being inadequate, equity
would dictate the issuance of an injunction.
An injunction against a breach of contract under these circumstances
should be distinguished from an injunction against the employer's use of a
lockout in a legitimate "labor dispute!' Faced with the threat of a non-
enjoinable union strike in a labor dispute, the employer should retain his
countervailing economic weapon, the lockout. Where union and employer
have balanced economic power and the union's exercise of its power could
not be enjoined, the employer's use of its economic weapon should not be
enjoined. In the case of a threatened plant removal, on the other hand, the
countervailing threat of a union strike does not exist. Where the com-
pany has clearly bargained away its right to remove its plant during the col-
lective bargaining agreement, it should be subject to appropriate remedial
sanctions in the event of breach, including an injunction.
C. Seniority Rights: Plant Removal
During the current Survey year, the Second Circuit, in Local 1251,
UAW v. Robertshaw Controls Co.,' decided that when an employer moves
its plant to a distant location the employer has no duty to give priority to its
original employees in hiring for the new plant. In so holding, the court
expressly overruled its 1961 decision in Zdanok v. Glidden Co.? Robertshaw
thus finally laid to rest the much criticized Glidden doctrine!' The court's
reasons for reversing Glidden were summarized as follows:
We are persuaded that the reasoning of the majority opinion
in the Glidden case was erroneous and that that erroneous reason-
ing led to an incorrect result. For example the basic proposition of
the opinion that seniority is a vested right, finds no support in
authority, in logic or in the socio-economic setting of labor-manage-
ment relations. Seniority is wholly a creation of the collective
agreement and does not exist apart from that agreement. The inci-
dents of seniority can be freely altered or amended by modification
68 L.R.R.M. 2671 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 288 F.2d 99, 47 L.R.R.M. 2865 (2d Cir. 1961).
3
 The court's majority opinion in Robertshaw cites numerous law review articles
critical of Glidden. Moreover, the court points out that labor arbitrators have refused
to follow Glidden. 68 L.R.R.M. at 2672-73.
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of the collective agreement. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330, 31 LRRM 2548 (1953). In giving seniority a conceptual
status apart from the provisions of the collective agreement and
the intentions of the parties the Glidden opinion seriously mis-
conceived the nature of the employment relationship and dealt "a
blow to labor-management relations."4 (Footnote omitted.)
Absent a contractual provision to the effect that employee seniority rights
persist beyond the term of the collective bargaining agreement, the court will,
henceforth, imply no duty on the employer to rehire old employees after
plant relocation.
D. Relationship of State-Imposed Time Limitations to Section 301 Suits
In UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp.,' the Supreme Court refused to
formulate a uniform federal statute of limitations to govern actions under
section 301. Finding that variations in state statutes of limitations would
not frustrate consensual processes of dispute settlement, the Court held that
the appropriate state statute of limitations should apply to an action under
section 301. The Hoosier Court pointed out that
statutes of limitations come into play only when these processes
have already broken down. Lack of uniformity in this area is
therefore unlikely to frustrate in any important way the achieve-
ment of any significant goal of labor policy. 2
Recently, in West Rock Lodge 2120, Machinists v. Geometric Tool Co., 3
the Second Circuit had occasion to consider the relationship to 301 cases of
another form of state-imposed time limitation. In Geometric the employer and
the union had submitted a union grievance to arbitration. After more than
100 days of deliberation, the arbitrator gave an award in favor of the em-
ployer. The union brought an action in the Connecticut state courts to vacate
the award because of a Connecticut statutes providing that when an arbi-
trator's award is not rendered within 60 days of submission, the award should
have no legal effect. The employer removed the case to a federal court under
section 301. The union's position was that the Connecticut state limitation
was controlling in matters of federal law under section 301, in much the same
way that the state statute of limitations was found applicable to 301 actions
in Hoosier. Agreeing with the union, the district court vacated the arbi-
trator's award.
The Second Circuit reversed. It found that the statute was incompatible
with federal labor law policy. The court noted that in the statute of limita-
tions case, private means of dispute settlement had already broken down
or the parties would not be before a court. In the Geometric situation, how-
ever, the state statute intruded into and blocked settlement of the parties'
4 Id. at 2674.
I 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
2 Id. at 702.
2 406 F.2d 284, 70 L.R.R.M. 2228 (2d Cir. 1968).
4 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-416 (1960).
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dispute by the type of consensual proceedings favored by federal labor
policy. "Thus, unlike the Hoosier Cardinal situation, we have a very strong
need for federal uniformity here, and an incorporation of this Connecticut
statute into labor-management resolution in that state derogates from that
need."5
 The court chose a flexible standard for determination of the applica-
bility of state-imposed time limits on arbitration:
In adopting a uniform federal standard, we ought not to
accept an arbitration rule which encourages post-award technical
objections by a losing party as a means of avoiding an adverse
arbitration decision . Rather we believe it to be a better rule
that any limitation upon the time in which an arbitrator can render
his award be a directory limitation, not a mandatory one, and that
it should always be within a court's discretion to uphold a late
award if no objection to the delay has been made prior to the ren-
dition of the award or there is no showing that actual harm to the
losing party was caused by the delay .°
The court's decision is consistent with the federal labor policy which
adopts a uniform set of standards to be applied in section 301 cases. State
law will not be permitted to intrude into this federal domain where the
objectives of the two systems conflict. Furthermore, Geometric represents a
correct interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion in Hoosier. It should
not be overlooked that the Court's endorsement in Hoosier of state statutes
of limitations was qualified by the prerequisite that such limitations do not
collide with federal labor policy.
VI. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Duty to Bargain
1. The Requirement of Good Faith.—Section 8(a) (5) 1 declares that it is
an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees. Section 8(d) 2
 makes it clear that
the employer does not satisfy the Act's requirement of "collective bargain-
ing" merely by meeting with the employees' representatives and performing
the empty motions of bargaining. Section 8(d) insists that he bargain in
"good faith" with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment ...." If the Board is to ferret out the apparent from the real
bargaining by means of this test, it must consider to some extent the reason-
ableness of the employer's position at the bargaining table. 3
On the other hand, section 8(d) cautions that "good faith" does not
compel the employer "to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
5 406 F.2d at 286, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2229.
6 Id.
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
2
 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
3 See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134, 32 L.R.R.M. 2225, 2228
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
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concession. . . ." The Board's duty to consider the reasonableness of the
employer's bargaining position to some extent, compelled by the good faith
standard of section 8(d), thus appears to contradict directly the "no con-
cession" clause of that same section. Board surveillance of the bargaining
process will have the effect of pressuring employer concessions on those issues
on which the Board deems the employer to have taken an unreasonable
position.
However, if one accepts as a starting point that sections 8(a) (5) and
8(d) minimally require the employer to respect the negotiator on the other
side of the bargaining table as the true representative of the employees, and
therefore as worthy of the respect due an equal, then, perhaps, some under-
standing emerges as to the intended harmony between the paradoxical direc-
tives of section 8(d).4
 In a context presenting a range of issues open to
negotiation, little harm would result from the Board's examination of the
employer's position on relatively minor issues.5 If he is not willing to yield
in any degree on at least some of these issues, one could fairly infer that
the employer is unilaterally seeking to impose terms on the employees and
is completely ignoring the representative procedure provided for by the Act.
This stance would constitute bad faith bargaining on his part. However, the
Board's review of the bargaining results in little harm to the process of "free
negotiations" because the employer's stand on major issues is not even open
to question. It is submitted that the "no concession" clause of section 8(d)
was meant to guarantee that no inference of bad faith would be drawn from
an employer's unyielding stance on a major issue. 6 Section 8(d) signifies a
recognition by Congress of the possibility of numerous valid reasons support-
ing the employer's position on such an issue.
Furthermore, "good faith" would not require employer concession on
all minor issues. Such, a requirement would be unnecessary for a reasonable
resolution of the apparent contradiction within section 8(d). Rather, the
employer's mere insertion of himself into the give-and-take process should
constitute a sufficient demonstration of his willingness to work within the
representative system. This obligation does not require that he concede on
all minor demands put forward by the employees' representative. Section
8(d) seeks to effect a compromise between complete freedom of negotiation
and the duty to observe the representative system, which is made necessary
by the good faith requirement. A requirement of total employer concession
on these minor demands would not effect the desired compromise, but rather
4 See Cox, The Duty to Bargain In Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. '1401, 1407-09
(1958).
5 A "minor" issue may be defined as one that has no proximate effect on the alloca-
tion of economic value between workers and employers. For example, a union request
for bulletin board space (see NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 32 L.R.R.M.
2225 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 US. 887 (1953)), or for financial data upon which
a company bases its wage position (see General Eke. Co., Battery Prod. Cap. Dept.
v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 713, 69 L.R.R.M. 2081 (5th Cir. 1968)) should be considered minor
issues. Union requests for a wage increase or for fringe benefits, on the other hand, should
be considered "major" issues.
6 The duty to bargain and the provisions of § 8(d) apply to the employee repre-
sentative as well under § 8(b) (3).
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would unduly restrict freedom of negotiation. Successful bargaining contem-
plates the trading of demands by both parties in the belief that their gains
exceed their losses. Trading on minor issues can play an important part in
the achievement of this result. To the extent that both sides have minor
demands, each party to the negotiations will presumably desire to trade them
for ends considered more valuable. A requirement of concession on all such
issues will dampen the desire to trade and thus chill the bargaining process.`
Therefore, while employer concession as to some minor issues may be neces-
sary to demonstrate good faith, total concession is not only unnecessary, but
also undesirable.
a. Impasse on "Minor" Demand. The line between legitimate, hard
bargaining and bad faith bargaining may not lend itself to easy definition
in a particular case. In United Steelworkers v. NLRB 8 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a Board finding of an 8(a) (5)
violation. The Board had found that the employer had bargained in bad faith
on a single checkoff issue, even though it had also found the employer's over-
all bargaining conduct demonstrative of a desire to reach an agreement with
the union. In these general terms, the decision appears to conflict with the
requirements of collective bargaining described above. Checkoff should be
considered a minor issue since it comprises merely a facilitative arrangement
in aid of union stability, and does not affect the economic relation of em-
ployer and employee. An employer is not required to yield on all minor
issues. Employer concession on some minor issues is required only as an in-
dication of the employer's willingness to give real recognition to the union.
In this case, the Board's finding that the employer's bargaining conduct
demonstrated a desire for ready agreement with the union would seem to
satisfy this requirement.
Among the factors considered by the court were (1) the employer's
preelection statements indicating a belief that the union's survival de-
pended on the implementation of a checkoff; (2) the granting of a check-
off to a favored local union in its previous collective bargaining contract;
(3) the absence of a business purpose to grant the checkoff where the union
was willing to assume its full maintenance cost; (4) a blanket refusal by the
employer to consider alternatives; and (5) vigorous anti-union animus demon-
strated by the employer. In light of these considerations the court regarded
the employer's complete rejection of the union's request for a checkoff as
motivated by a desire to destroy the union. Such motivation was viewed as
inconsistent with good faith bargaining, despite the finding of an overall
desire of reaching agreement with the union.
It is submitted that the court's decision in the Steelworkers case is a
sound one. Sections 8(a) (5) and 8(d) require genuine recognition of the union
by the employer. If an employer equates union survival with the granting
of dues-collection assistance to the union, he denies this recognition by flat
rejection of all union requests for such assistance. What kind of proof is neces-
sary to demonstrate that the employer equates union survival with a partic-
7 See 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1874, 1878 (1968).
390 F.2d 846, 67 L.R.R.M. 2450 (D.C. Cir. 1967, opinion amended 1968).
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ular issue is the difficult question presented by the case. In Steelworkers, the
employer made inculpatory statements to the effect that he had equated
union survival with its success in securing a checkoff provision. The court
can hardly be criticized for taking the employer at his own word.
In the absence of such statements, however, would the Board and the
courts be justified in inferring such employer equation? As a matter of logic,
it would seem they would not be. Good faith does not require total em-
ployer concession on minor union demands. An employer may take a firm
stand against granting a checkoff purely as a matter of bargaining tech-
nique. He might have changed his position if the union had offered a suf-
ficient inducement. Nevertheless, even without inculpatory statements, it is
conceivable that the Board or the courts would draw the inference of bad
faith in the face of all the other considerations present in Steelworkers. Evi-
dence short of this, however, would seem clearly insufficient to support such
an inference.
b. Wage-Scale Requirements of Union Bylaws. In NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union,° the Supreme Court held that no inherent incon-
sistency exists between application of economic pressure by a union during
negotiations and good faith bargaining on its part. Therefore, union strikes
and concerted on-the-job activity designed to harass the employer during
negotiations are permissible under section 8(b) (3). The Court reasoned
that if the Board could regulate the choice of economic weapons permissible
within collective bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise considerable
influence upon the substantive terms of the ultimate contract. Section 8(d)
was designed to prevent such Board influence on collective bargaining
contracts.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Katz 1°
that an employer's unilateral change on subjects of mandatory bargaining
which are, in fact, under discussion at the time does not constitute legitimate
economic pressure but rather a per se violation of section 8(a) (5). The Court
concluded that the employer had refused to "negotiate in fact—qo meet .. .
and confer' "—about the subjects on which he has initiated unilateral
change." Again he was failing to recognize the representative system as pro-
vided for by the Act.
In Cutler v. NLRB, 12 a union, during contract negotiations with an em-
ployer, unilaterally amended its bylaws to raise minimum wage scales and to
establish a new welfare fund requiring employer contributions. The union
threatened its members with fines if they worked for an employer who had
not agreed to pay this new minimum wage or to contribute to the new wel-
fare fund. A complaint issued charging an 8(b) (3) violation and alleging
that the unilateral union action constituted a per se violation of section 8(b)
(3) under Katz. The Board dismissed and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that, since the employer had
complete control over the purse strings, the change in bylaws supported by
9 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
I° 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
11 Id. at 743.
12 395 F.2d 287, 68 L.R.R.M. 2317 (2d Cir. 1968).
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enforcement of member compliance should be regarded only as union de-
mands and thus as protected economic pressure under the Insurance Agents'
case. Katz was distinguishable because there the employer had power him-
self actually to effect the unilateral changes in working conditions.
2. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining.—Despite a finding of subjective
good faith on the employer's part, his bargaining conduct may still constitute
an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (5). Section 8(d) requires that
he bargain in good faith concerning "wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment." These are the so-called mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining. In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.," the Supreme
Court held that an employer, despite an overall desire to reach agreement
with a union, violates his bargaining duty by conditioning his agreement to
a collective bargaining contract on acceptance of a management proposal not
within the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.
In United Electrical Workers v. NLRB," a case decided during the Sur-
vey year, a union charged an employer with an 8 (a) (5) violation on the basis
of Borg-Warner because the employer had bargained to an impasse over cer-
tain provisions related to arbitration. The union objected specifically to the
clauses which (1) gave the arbitrator the power to bring an action in the state
courts of New York to enforce an order by him against violations of the con-
tractual ban on strikes and lockouts, and (2) provided that if the arbitrator
sought enforcement, both union and employer would not seek removal to a
federal court. 15
By these provisions the employer was obviously seeking to avoid the
directive of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" prohibiting a federal court from
issuing an injunction in situations involving labor disputes. He was appar-
ently fearful that not all federal courts will follow New Orleans SS. Ass'n v.
General Longshore Workers Local 1418, 17 which held that a federal court may
enforce an arbitrator's cease and desist order. On the other hand, he recog-
nized that Norris does not apply to state courts. The only problem remaining
concerns the power of a federal court to remove a case in such situations.
He therefore sought to secure himself against this possibility by the contrac-
tual promise of the union not to remove.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a
Board decision that the employer was not guilty of an unfair labor practice
by insistence upon these provisions. The court held that the disputed clauses
were integral parts of the arbitration clause, a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. Furthermore, the arbitration clause taken as a whole was not so at odds
with national labor policy as to make the company's motives "patently mere-
tricious."" The court recognized that at the time of bargaining the legality of
the objective sought by the employer through the disputed provisions was
unsettled. Until it is finally settled, the employer can insist on them as a con-
13 356 U.S. 342 (1956).
14 409 F.2d 150, 70 L.R.R.M. 2529 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
15 Id. at 154-55, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2530.
10 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
17 389 F.2d 369, 67 L.R.R.M. 2430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
18 409 F.2d at 157, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2534.
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dition of his agreement with the union under Borg-Warner. "The issue is one
of the company's good faith, not its infallibility as a legal prophet." 1°
It should be emphasized, however, that the bargaining in Electrical
Workers preceded the decision of Avco Corp. v. Machinists iier0 Lodge
735,20
 which held that the federal courts had the power to remove suits
brought under Section 301 of the Act from the state courts. It is possible
that the court of appeals of a jurisdiction which does not accept Steamship
will consider the waiver-of-removal provisions as obviously contrary to sound
labor policy after Avco and therefore of no effect. It would then probably
decide that an employer does violate section 8(a) (5) by bargaining to an
impasse on the disputed clauses.
3. Coordinated Union Bargaining.—The International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE), experiencing frustration at
an efficient centralized bargaining strategy of the General Electric Company
geared to secure uniform terms from the many unions with which it dealt,
concluded that a program of mutually agreed upon national goals was needed
to offset GE's strategy. A Steering Committee, consisting of an TUE repre-
sentative and representatives from seven other unions, was formed to meet
with GE to discuss various contract issues. GE refused to meet with the Com-
mittee, regarding it as an attempt to engage in coalition bargaining. in April,
1966, an TUE negotiating committee notified GE that the unions would no
longer request joint negotiations. It suggested a meeting with the company
to discuss' preliminary matters concerning the negotiation of a new contract
to replace the one clue to expire in October, 1966. GE agreed to meet on
May 4. When GE arrived for the talks and discovered that seven men on the
Negotiating Committee were affiliated with other unions represented on the
Steering Committee, the company refused to commence contract talks and
left the conference room.
Acting upon a charge filed by the TUE, the Regional Director issued a
complaint that GE was engaging in an unfair labor practice and also, pur-
suant to Section 10(j) of the Act," sought an injunction in federal district
court restraining GE from refusing to meet with IUE's Negotiating Com-
mittee. The district court granted the injunction.22 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit set aside the injunction.23 Mr. Justice Harlan stayed en-
forcement and execution of the judgment of the court of appeals pending
certiorari proceedings. 24 Subsequently, the IUE Negotiating Committee and
19 Id.
20 376 F.2d 337, 65 L.R.R.M. 2193 (6th Cir. 1967).
21 Sections 10(1) and 10(j) provide the Board with authority to seek injunctions
from the federal district courts. Section 10(l) requires that the regional director seek
injunctive relief pending a formal Board decision when the regional director finds that
there is good reason to believe that a union is acting, picketing or boycotting in violation
of §§ 8(b) (4) (A), (B), or (C), 8(b) (7), or 8(e). Injunctions under § 10(j), however,
are discretionary with the Board and are not required by the finding of certain facts as
with § 10(e). The only formal prerequisite for seeking an injunction under § 10(j) is
that there be before the Board an unfair labor practice charge involving the enjoinee.
22 257 F. Supp. 690, 62 L.R.R.M. 2809 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
23 366 F.2d 847, 63 L.R.R.M. 2065 (2d Cir. 1966).
24 87 S. Ct. 5 (1966).
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the company, which bargained under protest, agreed upon a new contract.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, dissolved the stay, and set aside the
judgment of the court of appeals with directions to enter a new judgment
setting aside the order of the district court and remanding to that court for
further proceedings appropriate to the changed circumstances. 25
In its decision to grant the section 10(j) injunction, the district court
assumed, but did not decide, that IUE insistence upon coordinated bargain-
ing through its Negotiating Committee would be illegal. Apparently the court
regarded such insistence as arguably illegal under the rule of NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. 2° As noted above, Borg-Warner held that
an employer may not hold up a collective bargaining contract by his insis-
tence on nonmandatory, albeit legal, bargaining subjects.
During the current Survey year, the NLRB held that GE's refusal to
confer with the IUE Negotiating Committee constituted an 8(a) (5) viola-
tion. 27
 The Board reasoned that the section 7 right of the employees to
select their bargaining agent includes the derivative right of the duly elected
bargaining agent to select the bargaining team which will represent it at the
negotiating table. The Board did not feel that coordinated bargaining makes
good faith bargaining an inherent impossibility. Furthermore, it held that
the mere showing of a potential for abuse is not sufficient reason for abro-
gation of section 7 rights.
Because GE's representatives left the table before any actual bargaining
had taken place, the Board found it unnecessary to decide whether a refusal
to bargain would be justified after it had become apparent that (1) mem-
bers of IUE's Negotiating Committee were locked into an understanding
that no union would sign an agreement unless all unions did, or (2) mem-
bers other than the IUE representative were seeking to negotiate for their
own unions. The Board's discussion of these situations in the context of
potential abuses28 suggests that such conduct will in the future be regarded
as actual abuses and, consequently, as justification for an employer's ref usal
to bargain.
In support of its reasoning that coordinated bargaining was not in-
herently disruptive of the collective bargaining process, the Board pointed
out the absence of evidence of actual disruption of the negotiations con-
ducted pursuant to the injunction issued by the district court. In addition,
because GE traditionally made similar offers to all unions represented on
the Negotiating Committee and because these unions traditionally made sim-
ilar agreements with GE, such disruption would hardly be expected. Unions
bargaining for many of the same contractual benefits from an employer
which has traditionally refused to treat one union more favorably than
another will naturally have the common objective of securing the most
favorable terms possible for the union currently negotiating.
This argument prompts the question whether the Board should require
an employer to confer with a coordinated negotiating committee absent any
25 385 U.S. 533 (1967).
26 356 U.S. 342 (1956).
27 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1968) .
28 Id., 69 L.R.R.M. at 1307-08.
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real history of parallel offers by the employer to each union or of similar
agreements with the member unions. A greater strain is necessarily placed on
a committee member's allegiance where there is no such parallelism. If, in
fact, it is an abuse for a member other than the one whose contract is subject
to discussion to bargain for his own union, perhaps the mere possibility of this
abuse is great enough, in the absence of parallel offers and contracts, to free
the employer from the necessity of negotiations before the actual occur-
rence of the abuse. Certainly the need for such a coordinated union effort
appears to have lessened, since the employer, unlike GE, lacks or is not
exercising the power to exact favorable uniform terms from nearly all the
unions with which it bargains.
4. Union Interest in Employer's Competitor.—in Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co.,29
 the Board held that an employer could refuse to bargain with a union
which had established a competing enterprise in the same vicinity. The Board
based its decision on the fact that the union stood in the position of a
business competitor which, unlike the employees whom it represented, stood
to benefit if the employer could be forced out of business by concessions to
inordinate demands. The majority of the Board believed that this threat would
cause the employer to suspect the union's motives and objectives and there.:
fore would make successful bargaining virtually impossible.
During the Survey year, the First Circuit had before it for the second
time the case of NLRB v. David Buttrick Co.3° In Buttrick the company
refused to bargain with a certified local of the Teamsters on the ground that
the local was subject to a disqualifying conflict of interest. The alleged
conflict stemmed from the fact that a Teamsters' pension fund had made
substantial loans to a competitor of Buttrick. Since the General President
of the Teamsters Union was also a trustee of that pension fund, it was alleged
that he might, in order to protect the loans, induce the local to act adversely
to Buttrick's interests.
In its initial decision the Board found no actual connection between
the local and the loans made by the Teamsters to Buttrick's competitor. The
Board, therefore, ordered the company to bargain.5 ' The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit set aside the order and remanded the case to the Board
with instructions that it assess whether the potential conflict of interest
posed a threat sufficient to frustrate the bargaining process 32 It also re-
commended that the Board lay down guidelines to prevent the kinds of
investments in competing enterprises which had the inherent effect of cast-
ing suspicion on the collective bargaining relationship.
On remand the Board found that the possibility of the Teamsters'
intervention in the local's bargaining was too remote to disqualify the local.
It again ordered the employer to bargain with the loca1. 33 The Board also
stated that it lacked sufficient empirical evidence to lay down any meaningful
guidelines. This time the First Circuit enforced the order. In order to abro-
29 108 N.L.R.B. 1555, 34 L.R.R.M. 1222 (1954) .
39 399 F.2d 505, 69 L.R.R.M. 2044 (1st Cir. 1968).
31 154 N.L.R.B. 1468, 60 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1965).
32 361 F.2d 300, 62 L.R.R.M. 2241 (1st Cir. 1966).
'3 167 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 66 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1967).
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gate the section 7 rights of the employees to choose their representative, the
employer must show a clear and present danger of a conflict of interest
interfering with the collective bargaining process.'" The court deferred to the
Board's judgment with regard to the possibility of the Teamsters' interven-
tion in the local's bargaining. Furthermore, even if the NLRB ruling was
erroneous as to that issue, the court found no showing that the competitor's
financial status made it likely that the Teamsters' Fund had an equity-like
interest in it. Therefore, no proximate threat existed that the Teamsters' Fund
would influence the operation of the competitor so as to bring suspicion upon
the bargaining between Buttrick and the local.
B. Employer Discrimination
1. The Economic Lockout.—In American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB.,' the
Supreme Court held that, absent a showing of a discriminatory motive, an
employer may temporarily lock out his employees in support of his bargain-
ing position during an impasse without violating Sections 8(a) (1) or (3) of
the LMRA. 2
The Court postulated that "there are some practices which are inherently
so prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of significant economic justifi-
cation that no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership
or other antiunion animus is required. 13
 The Court concluded, however, that
the lockout under review in American Ship Bldg. did "not fall within that
category of cases arising under § 8(a) (3) in which the Board may truncate
its inquiry into employer motivation."4
A problem arising out of American Ship Bldg. is whether a bargaining
impasse is necessary to justify an employer lockout used solely as a means
to bring economic pressure to bear in support of his bargaining position. In
Darling & Co.,8 a case decided during the Survey year, the Board for the
first time clearly articulated the view that a bargaining impasse is not neces-
sary to justify such an employer lockout. In Darling the employer and union
had bargained extensively on all subjects and had reached accord on most
issues. They remained at odds, however, over certain key issues. The union
was threatening to strike in order to pressure employer concession on these
issues, but indicated that the strike would occur at a time of its own choosing.
34 399 F.2d at 507, 69 L.R.R.M, at 2045.
1 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
2 Section 8 provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization „ „
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1),(3) (1964).
3 380 U.S. at 311,
4 Id. at 312.
3 171 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 68 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1968).
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There had been a history of work stoppages. The employer was engaged in a
highly seasonal business and its busy season was fast approaching. Fearful
of losing the entire season because of a strike called at that time, the em-
ployer forced the issue by locking out his employees beforehand. The trial
examiner expressly found that no bargaining impasse had arisen, and
the Board adopted this finding.
The Board regarded the test of a lockout's legality in the absence of
discriminatory motivation, as set forth in American Ship Bldg., to be whether
the lockout is so inherently prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of
significant economic justification that no specific evidence of intent is
required.
In holding that this test is equally applicable to a pre-impasse lockout,
the Board stated:
While we recognize that the Court's holding [in American Ship
Bldg..' was limited to a situation involving a lockout after an im-
passe in bargaining, we do not find that the absence of an impasse
renders the test per se inapplicable. The Court indicated that a
careful evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances must be
made to determine whether there was unlawful motivation in the
lockout. The absence of an impasse is one of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, but it does not necessarily require a conclusion that the
lockout was unlawful on that ground alone. While the finding of an
impasse in negotiation may be a factor supporting a determination
that a particular lockout is lawful, the absence of an impasse does
not of itself make a lockout unlawful any more than the mere
existence of an impasse automatically renders a lockout lawful.°
On the particular facts of Darling the Board held that the lockout was
neither inherently prejudicial to union interests nor devoid of significant
economic justification when considered in the context of a possible union
strike interrupting the peak business season of the employer.
2. Lockout to Pressure Multi-Employer Contract Terms.—The test of a
lockout under American Ship Bldg. asks whether the lockout is discrimina-
torily motivated and whether it serves a legitimate business interest of the
employer. Ever since NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen), 7
it has been recognized that a lockout by an employer member of a multi-
employer bargaining unit to counter the whipsaw tactics of a union with
which the unit must bargain serves a legitimate business interest. 8
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, in News Union v. NLRB, 9 passed on the validity of a lockout by a mem-
ber of a newspaper publishers' multi-employer unit prompted by the refusal
of all the members of a printers' union under contract with the unit to cross
the picket lines set up in front of another unit member's business by another
6 Id., 69 L.R.R.M. at 1135.
353 U.S. 87 (1957).
8 "Whipsawing" is the process of striking one at a time the employer members of a
multi-employer association.
9 393 F.2d 673, 67 L.R.R.M. 2487 (1968).
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union which bargained solely with that unit member. In this situation, the
court assumed that legitimate business interests for the lockout comparable
to that approved in Buffalo Linen could be found only if the collective bar-
gaining contract between the multi-employer unit and the printer's union
barred the union's refusal to cross the picket lines of another union. The
relevant contract language provided:
The language and spirit of this Agreement guarantee the
prompt and faithful performance of the Union and the Office of all
obligations imposed by the terms of this Agreement. Both parties
agree that whenever any differences of opinion as to the rights of
either under the Agreement shall arise, or whenever any dispute as
to the construction of the contract or any of its provisions takes
place, such difference or dispute shall be promptly resolved in the
manner provided in this contract without strike [or] lockout . .
to the end that . . . harmonious relations be maintained. . . . 1 °
Elsewhere in the contract a grievance procedure was provided to handle
differences in the interpretation, scope, and enforcement of the contract terms.
The union argued that the strike prohibition in the contract should not
be read as also prohibiting the observance of picket lines. The court rejected
this contention on the ground the word "strike" is practically understood
to include the suspension of plant operations resulting from refusals to report
for work across picket lines.
The union further argued that the contract language was clear in its
failure to bar observance of the picket lines. Failure to cross picket lines is
not related in any way to the terms of the contract and, therefore, it does
not involve any differences of opinion as to the right of either party under
the agreement. The trial examiner had admitted that this argument was
supported by the legal principle that statutorily protected rights to strike
and to observe picket lines are not to be regarded as waived in the absence
of a clearly evident purpose to do so.n. The court, however, agreed with the
Trial Examiner that the contract language was not clear one way or the
other but, rather, ambiguous because of the words " 'spirit of this agreement'
guaranteeing prompt performance by the Union." Presumably the court felt
that one might conclude from this language that a union's refusal to cross
picket lines was as inconsistent with the union's duty of "prompt perform-
ance" of its obligations as a union strike specifically proscribed. Therefore,
it permitted the trial examiner to refer to external circumstances to clear
up the ambiguity. The trial examiner concluded that the statements and
actions of union officers, indicating disapproval of member picket observance
in the belief that the members were obligated to honor the contract, dissolved
the ambiguity of the contract term. It should be read as prohibiting union
picket line observance. The court found this conclusion amply supported by
the evidence.
Finally, the union argued that because the Board bad not found the
union formally responsible for, in the sense of condonation, the breach of the
10 See id. at 676, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2488.
11 5ec NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 293 (1957).
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contract ban against refusal to cross picket lines, the lockout should be
viewed merely as a device by one employer to aid another, and therefore
as unjustifiable. The court rejected this argument also. The expectation of
no work stoppages contemplated by the contract was defeated by the printer
union members' refusal to cross the picket Tines. Each employer in the multi-
employer unit had an interest in the protection of the integrity of this ex-
pectation which had been commonly bargained for. This expectation is a
legitimate business interest under Buffalo Linen. The destructive effect of
picket line observance is in no way lessened because the union has not for-
mally endorsed it. Therefore, for purposes of passing on the validity of an
employer lockout, "union" action can be reasonably equated with the action
of all the union members, even though that action is taken in defiance of the
union officers.
3. Partial Plant Closing.—In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
Co.,12
 the Supreme Court had before it the question whether an employer
has the right to terminate his business for any reason which he chooses. The
Court held that an employer can close his entire business for any reason
whatsoever, even if the liquidation was motivated by vindictiveness towards
a union recently successful in organizing a majority of his employees. If,
however, an employer with such anti-union motivation closes only a part
of his business, this action may result in an unfair labor practice under sec-
tion 8(a) (3). Such a partial closing may afford the employer the leverage
for discouraging the free exercise of section 7 rights among the employees
in the remaining business similar to those in the cases of the runaway shop's
and the temporary closing." In such cases there are remedies available to
the Board, including reinstatement of the discharged employees in other parts
of the business, which would not be available where an entire business is
terminated.' 5
The Supreme Court listed the necessary findings for an 8(a) (3) viola-
tion in a partial plant closing case:
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being
closed for antiunion reasons (1) have an interest in another busi-
ness, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the same line of
commercial activity as the closed plant, of sufficient substantiality
to give promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement
of unionization in that business; (2) act to close their plant with
the purpose of producing such a result; and (3) occupy a relation-
ship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable
that its employees will fear that such business will also be closed
12 38D U.S. 263 (1965).
13 The "runaway shop" describes the situation where a company closes its business
in one area and relocates in another in order to rid itself of a union.
14
 The "temporary closing" describes the situation where a company conditions the
renewal of its shutdown operations on employee renunciation of the union.
15
 See NLRB v. Norma Mining Corp., 206 F.2d 38, 32 L.R.R.M. 2466 (4th Cir.
1953) ; Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162, 41 L.R.R.M. 1038 (1957), enforced,
272 F.2d 184, 45 L.R.R.M 2137 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547,
48 L.R.R.M. 1679 (1961), enforced, 305 F.2d 825, 50 L.R.R.M. 2637 (3d Cir. 1962).
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down if they persist in organizational activities, we think that an
unfair labor practice has been made out."
In the Darlington case itself, members of the Milliken family owned,
directly or indirectly through controlled corporations, a majority of the stock
in the Darlington Company. They also held controlling interests in many
other textile plants in the Darlington, North Carolina area. Roger Milliken
exercised a dominant influence over the labor policies of all these plants. One
month after the employees of the Darlington plant opted for union represen-
tation, the plant was closed at the behest of Roger Milliken, who was pres-
ident and a member of the board of directors of the Darlington Company.
The Board found that the closing was motivated by antiunion animus
and this finding was not disturbed on appeal.
The Supreme Court found that the record would support a finding of
the requisite holding and interests of the Milliken family in the other textile
plants to make discouragement of union organization in those plants worth-
while. However, the Court held that the Board had made insufficient findings
as to the "purpose and effect" of the closing with respect to the employees
in the other plants comprising the Milliken group. Therefore, the Court
ordered that the case be remanded to the Board.
On remand the Board found that the forbidden purpose and effect existed,
and made the Milliken interests liable for an 8(a) (3) violation.'' During
the current Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit enforced the Board's order." In so doing, the court was faced with
the Deering Milliken" argument that a violation must be predicated upon a
finding that an organizing campaign was actually under way in the employer's
remaining businesses at the time of closing. There had been no actual
organizing at the other Milliken-controlled mills at the time when Darlington
was closed. Deering .Milliken buttressed its argument by reference to the
Supreme Court's opinion: "[`It must be] realistically foreseeable that its
employees will fear that such business will also be closed down if they persist
in organizational activities.' "20 Deering Milliken contended, " 'Actions which
are being persisted in are actually occurring, not foreseeable,' and there is
a 'difference between the realization of an immediate benefit (cooling off a
current union campaign) and a future one (discouraging the union from
starting a hypothetical campaign at some future and unknown date).' ""
The court rejected this argument. It agreed with the Board that con-
temporaneous organizational activity in the other plants is not a prerequisite
to finding an unfair labor practice. It is sufficient if the employer anticipated
such activity in the reasonably near future. In the Darlington case, Roger
Milliken's memorandum which stated, "The unions are going to be making
16 380 U.S. at 27.5-76.
17 Darlington Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 65 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1967).
18 Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760, 68 L.R.R.M. 2356 (4th Cir. 1968).
16 In 1960, after the closing of Darlington, Deering Milliken, Inc., became the prin-
cipal corporation through which the Milliken family exercised control over its textile mills.
20 380 U.S. at 276.
21 See 397 F.2d at 771, 68 L.R.R.M. 2363-64.
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a tremendous drive all through this area"22 was sufficient proof of such
anticipation.
4. Racial Discrimination.—In Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB," the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held for the first time that the prac-
tice of discrimination on account of race or national origin by an employer
constitutes a violation of section 8(a) (1). Packinghouse actually came before
the court on review of a Board order to remedy an 8(a) (5) violation by
the employer. Among other violations, the union had charged that the em-
ployer was guilty of discrimination based on race and national origin and had
requested the employer to bargain about these practices. The Board found
that the employer had in fact been practicing such discrimination. The com-
pany operated a plant in West Texas employing whites, Negroes and Latin
Americans. The Board found that the company had filled its highest paying
hourly jobs almost exclusively with whites. In one instance, it found that
a Latin American employee who actually performed the work of a weigher
had been classified as performing the work of a Iower-rated job and was
accordingly paid the lower rate. Again, all the other weighers, with one
exception, were white and were paid the higher wage. The Board found also
that the company had guaranteed weekly salaries to a few employees, all of
whom were white, and that from 1963 to 1966 the company had given the
overtime work of checking sprinklers only to whites, although the Negroes
and Latin Americans were qualified to perform and had actively sought the
work. Finally, the Board found that the company had practiced discrimina-
tion by holding separate picnics for its employees, one for the whites and
one for the Negroes and Latin Americans. The whites alone were offered the
option to bring their wives to these picnics. The Board concluded that the
company had taken evasive action on the union's request to bargain over
these various practices. It therefore ordered the company to cease the evasive
action and to bargain in good faith with the union. 24
Both parties petitioned for review, the union contending that the Board
should also have found an 8(a)(1) violation independent of the refusal to
bargain. In its opinion the court first observed that the Board has already
assessed itself competent to deal with questions relating to racial discrimina-
tion. It pointed out that the Board has adopted the principle, first formulated
in the federal courts,25 that a union, as the sole bargaining representative
of a group of employees, has a duty to represent all the employees fairiy. 26
22 See id. at 767, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2360.
	F.2d —, 70 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 7, 1969).
24 Farmers' Coop. Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 67 L.R.R.M. 1266 (1968).
25 See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
28 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172, 54 L.R.R.M. 2715 (2d Cir. 1963). Accord, Houston Maritime Ass'n,
Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 66 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1967), enforced, 379 F.2d 137, 65 L.R.R.M.
2309 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.I3. 312, 57 L.R.R.M.
1535 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 837 (1967); United Auto Workers, 149 N.L.R.B. 482, 57 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1964);
Local 1367, Longshoremen, 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 57 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1964), enforced, 368
F.2d 1010, 63 L.R.R.M. 2559 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
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The Board deems it an unfair labor practice for a union to fail in this duty.
The majority of the cases decided by the Board involving the breach of this
duty arose from charges that the union was practicing racial discrimination
in representation of employees.
The court recognized, however, that a holding that racial discrimination
by an employer violates section 8(a) (1) requires a demonstration not only
that the discrimination is unjustified but that it interferes with or restrains
subjected employees in the exercise of their statutory right to act concertedly
for their own aid or protection, as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. The
court maintained that section 7 rights were not to be interpreted narrowly:
"That section protects concerted activity by workers to alleviate oppressive
working conditions, regardless of whether their activity is channelled through
a union, through collective bargaining, or through some other means."'"
The court concluded that the crucial question reduces to whether discrimina-
tion because of race or national origin inhibits its victims from asserting their
rights against the employer. The court held that such discrimination did so.
According to the court, the effect of such discrimination is twofold:
(1) [R]aciaI discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of interests
between groups of workers which tends to reduce the likelihood and
the effectiveness of their working in concert to achieve their legit-
imate goals under the Act; and (2) racial discrimination creates
in its victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them from assert-
ing their rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination. 28
The presence of both these effects sufficiently deters the exercise of section 7
rights by the employees subject to the discrimination so as to violate section
8(a) (1). 29 Although the Packinghouse decision is a novel one, it is logically
sound and should receive wide endorsement in the near future.
C. Economic Strikers
It is established law that, although an employer may not discharge an
economic striker, he may temporarily or permanently replace strikers during
an economic strike.' Prior to the decision in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,2
it was also fairly well established through Board law that, after an economic
strike, the employer must reinstate strikers only if jobs were still available
at the time of the application for reinstatement.' If no jobs were available
F.2d	 70 L.R.R.M. at 2495.
28 Id. at —, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2495.
29
 The court noted that where a matter is litigated, even though the particular viola-
tion has not been specifically charged, the Board can find such a violation. Although the
issue of racial discrimination had been litigated in the context of an 8(a) (5) violation in
Packinghouse, the court nevertheless felt that in the interests of fairness, the employer
should have an opportunity to litigate the issue more fully after notice that the question
of an 8(a) (I) violation is specifically to be determined.
1
 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
2 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
3 See Bartlett-Collins Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 395, 35 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1954), aff'd, 230
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at that time, the employer was not required to seek out the employees or
put them on a preferential hiring list for future openings.
In Fleetwood Trailer the company hired replacements and operated
with a skeleton crew during an economic strike. Two days after the strike
ended, six employees offered to return to work, but the employer denied
them reinstatement on the ground that there were no openings. Nearly two
months after termination of the strike, the employer hired six new employees
who had not previously worked for the company. The strikers were eventually
rehired when the company resumed full operations, but there was substantial
evidence that the company had at all times intended to resume normal
operations as soon as possible. For failure to give the six striking employees
preference in hiring, the Board found violations of section 8(a) (1) and
(3) and ordered back pay from the date when the six new employees were
hired. The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's view that these strikers had
not really been permanently replaced. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order. Relying on previous Board
decisions it held that the right of the strikers to jobs must be judged as of
the date when they apply for reinstatement. Since the six strikers had applied
for reinstatement on a date when no jobs were available, the court concluded
that the company had not committed an unfair labor practice by failing to
rehire them.
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals. The
Court reasoned that under Section 2(3) of the Act an individual whose
work has ceased because of a labor dispute continues to be an employee if
he has not obtained regular and substantially equivalent employment else-
where. If, after termination of the strike, the employer refused to reinstate
striking employees, the effect is to discourage employees from exercising their
rights to organize and to strike as guaranteed by Sections 7 and 13 of the
Act. Under NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,' such employer interference
with employee rights constitutes a prima facie unfair labor practice under
sections 8(a) (1) and (3) even in the absence of any employer antiunion
motivation.
In some situations, legitimate and substantial business justifications for
refusing to reinstate economic strikers have been recognized. One recognized
exception arises when the jobs claimed by the strikers are occupied by
workers hired as permanent replacements during the strike in order to con-
tinue operations. Under Great Dane, however, the burden of proving such
justifications rests with the employer. 5 In Fleetwood Trailer the employer
F.2d 212, 37 L.R.R.M. 2409 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956); Brown
& Root, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 486, 48 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1961), enforced, 311 F.2d 447, 52
L.R.R.M. 2115 (8th Cir. 1963).
4 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
5 In Great Dane the Supreme Court enunciated the following standards for review-
ing an employer's alleged discriminatory conduct:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory con-
duct was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of an
antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice
even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by
business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory con-
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could not claim this justification. It was clear that the jobs of the six strikers
were available after the strike, as was evidenced by the hiring of the six
new employees. The temporary lull in production operations had no effect
on the status of the strikers as employees. The Court stated, "The right to
reinstatement does not depend upon technicalities relating to application.
On the contrary, the status of the striker as an employee continues until
he has obtained 'other regular and substantially equivalent employment.'"6
In Laidlaw Corp.,' decided during the Survey year, the Board was faced
with a case in which striking employees were permanently replaced during
an economic strike. Despite this fact, these economic strikers applied for rein-
statement. They had not obtained regular and equivalent employment else-
where. While their applications for reinstatement were on file, some of the
permanent replacements left their jobs. The company, however, did not recall
these prior applicants. It hired new employees instead. The Board, relying
on Fleetwood Trailer and Great Dane, held that the company had violated
sections 8(a) (1) and (3) by not first offering reinstatement to the prior
applicants. Economic strikers remain employees until they obtain other reg-
ular and substantially equivalent employment. Thus, they are entitled to rein-
statement absent substantial business justification, and regardless of anti-
union motivation. While the hiring of permanent replacements justifies a
refusal to take back economic strikers so long as the replacements are occupy-
ing their former jobs, it is no justification for refusing to recall them once
these replacements have departed. Fleetwood Trailer makes it clear that the
hiring of replacements by the employer has absolutely no effect on the status
of these economic strikers. They continue to be employees until they obtain
regular and equivalent employment elsewhere. Since the strikers in Laidlaw
were unable to gain such employment, they were entitled to reinstatement.
The Fleetwood Trailer and Laidlaw decisions mark a complete reversal
in the law regarding the reinstatement rights of economic strikers. In the
past, the economic striker's right to reinstatement was limited to those in-
stances where a job was available at the time of application for reinstatement.
Now, unless the employer is able to point to some legitimate and substantial
business reason for denying the striker's right to reinstatement, this right
continues in force until the employee finds substantially equivalent employ-
ment elsewhere.
In General Elec. Co., Battery Prod. Cap. Dept. v. NLRB, 5
 two strik-
ing employees applied for reinstatement to their jobs immediately after
termination of the strike. The strike ended on a Thursday and the employees
duct on employee rights is "comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation
must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with
• evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct.
Thus, in either situation, once it has been proved that the employer engaged in
discriminatory conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights to
some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated
by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him.
388 U.S. at 34.
6
 389 U.S. at 381.
7
 171 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 68 L.R.R.M. 1252 (1968).
8
 400 F.2d 713, 69 L.R.R.M. 2081 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1969).
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offered to return to work on the night shift that evening. These employees
had not been permanently replaced by the employer during the strike. The
employer had, however, hired temporary replacements for the duration of the
strike. The employer delayed reinstatement of the striking employees for
five days, only three of which were work days since Monday and Tuesday
were off days. For such delay the employees charged the employer with viola-
tions of 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (1). In defense, the company offered two reasons
for the delay. First, it wanted to retain the temporary replacements in dif-
ferent capacities, but adjustments in working shifts which had been disrupted
by the strike delayed their reassignment. Second, the reassignment of the
two replacements was not completed until Wednesday because Saturday and
Sunday were "overtime" days and the company wanted to avoid paying time-
and-a-half while it was retraining these new employees. The Board, how-
ever, found the employer guilty of the charged violations.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the Board. It recog-
nized that a delay in reinstating economic strikers after termination of the
strike is discriminatory conduct which could adversely affect employee rights,
at least to some extent. The court felt, however, that whatever adverse effect
the delay caused on union activities was comparatively slight. Therefore,
although such conduct is presumptively illegal under the principles of Fleet-
wood Trailer and Great Dane, it may be justified if the employer is able
to come forward with legitimate and substantial business reasons to sup-
port it.
Contrary to the Board, the court held that the two reasons offered by
the employer to explain the delay in reinstatement were legitimate and sub-
stantial. Essentially, the court reasoned that it would be inconsistent and
unfair to penalize an employer for reopening its strikers' former jobs by reas-
signment of the temporary replacements to different jobs, causing a few days
delay but avoiding excessive costs, when he could have permanently replaced
the striking employees without consequence.
D. Employer Anti-Strike Campaign
In General Elec. Co., Battery Prod. Cap. Dept. v. NLRB,' a com-
pany, fearing a strike after reaching a bargaining impasse with the union,
instituted an anti-strike campaign in its plant. During the campaign it dis-
tributed numerous publications to employees warning them of the loss of
business which might result from a strike and asking them to vote against
a strike in the union meeting and to continue working even if a strike were
called. The anti-strike drive was extensive and proved successful. The cam-
paign, however, contained no threats of retaliation and no special promises
of benefits to strikebreakers.
The Board found that such an employer campaign violates section
8(a) (1).2 The Board, adopting the trial examiner's opinion, based its deci-
sion on NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. 3 That case held
that an employer could not bargain to an impasse on a matter not a manda-
1 400 F.2d 713, 69 L.R.R.M. 2081 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1969).
2 163 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 64 L.R.R.M. 1312 (1967).
8 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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tory subject of bargaining. The employer in Borg-Warner bargained to an
impasse on a ballot clause requiring a pre-strike secret vote of both union
and nonunion employees as to the employer's last offer. The Supreme Court
concluded that the ballot clause was not a mandatory subject of bargaining
because it dealt only with relations between the employees and the union.
It represented an attempt by the employer to bypass the statutory repre-
sentative and to deal directly with the employees. The Board, borrowing from
the 8(a) (5) context of Borg-Warner, reasoned that the employer's anti-
strike campaign was an attempt to bypass the statutory representative, and
therefore interfered with the section 7 rights of the employees to channel
their bargaining through their chosen representative. Thus, the Board held
that the campaign violated section 8(a) (I).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. It distinguished
Borg-Warner on the basis that the company there had been insisting on a
contract clause which would automatically have removed all strike decisions
from union control. It viewed the instant case as an attempt by the employer
to avoid a single strike merely by persuasion. It felt that the Board decision
in Texas Co.' controlled such a situation. In that case the company had
sought to induce striking employees to return to work by sending them a
letter similar in content to the publication issued by the company in this
case. The Board found no violation by the company. It relied on the fact
that the company had never offered any illegal opposition to the union.
Furthermore, it did not seem to the Board that the company was seeking
to undermine the union's representative status, because the company had
published certain self-serving statements indicating a realization on its part
that a settlement of the dispute could be resolved only by negotiation with
the union. In the case at bar, the court concluded that the company had
shown no illegal opposition to the union and that there was insufficient evi-
dence of a company attempt to bypass the employees' representative. The
court did recognize that individual solicitation and polling of strikers
to determine their wishes had been held violative of the Act. Nevertheless,
it felt that vitality remained in the Texas Co. case.
The court did admit that the distinction between Borg-Warner violations
and permissible activity under Texas Co. may be rather slim. This admission
opens the opinion to criticism. If the question is such a close one, should
not the court allow the Board, as the expert body established to administer
the Act, to draw the line between the permissible and impermissible? The
Supreme Court stated in Republic Aviation Co. v. NLRB: 5
The Wagner Act did not undertake the impossible task of
specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident which
would constitute an unfair labor practice. On the contrary, the Act
left to the Board the work of applying the Act's prohibitory lan-
guage in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might
be charged as violative of its terms. Thus a "rigid scheme of rem-
edies" is avoided and administrative flexibility within appropriate
4 93 N.L.R.13, 1358, 27 L.R.R.M. 1587 •1951), rev'd on other grounds, 198 F.2d 540,
30 L.R.R.M. 2513 (9th Cir. 1952).
5 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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statutory limitations obtained to accomplish the dominant purpose
of the legislation. 5 (Emphasis added.)
Certainly it is not patently unreasonable for the Board to conclude that
such an anti-strike employee campaign has the same effect of bypassing the
employees' representative as does employer solicitation of individual strikers
aimed at inducing their return.
E. Per Se Violations
1. Contract Bar to Solicitation.—In Republic Aviation Corp. V. NLRB,'
the Supreme Court held that an employer violated section 8(a) (1) by pro-
mulgating and enforcing a broadly defined no-solicitation rule which included
within its ban union solicitation by employees in non-working areas and on
non-working times. Is, however, such a rule valid if it is included in a col-
lective bargaining agreement? The Board, in the 1963 decision of Gale
Prods.,2
 announced the policy, which it has continued to maintain, that such
a rule is still invalid despite its inclusion in a bargaining agreement. The
Sixth and Seventh Circuits, however, the only two circuits having occasion
to consider the Board's rule prior to the Survey year, rejected the Board's
position.3
 They held that maintenance of the integrity of the collective bar-
gaining agreement took precedence over any interference with employee rights
occasioned by the rule.
Recently, in NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prods.,' the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit became the first court to adopt the view of the Board
on this issue. The agreement provided that all solicitation was banned and
that bulletin boards would be the sole method of communication between
employees and the union. The court recognized that it was dealing with an
issue concerning the section 7 rights of employees to choose their own bar-
gaining representative. It recognized also that the union can waive some sec-
tion 7 employee rights in order to effect a collective bargaining agreement
with the union. The court concluded, however, that the employee right of
solicitation should not be considered one of these. The court reasoned that,
because the solicitation rights of employees related to the employees' rights
to select and to reevaluate their collective bargaining agent, they were to be
distinguished from rights which employees acting in concert, through their
collective bargaining agent, may exercise in the effort to gain economic ad-
vantage.5 On the latter type of issue the union and employee interests are
6 Id. at 798.
1 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
2 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 53 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1963).
3 NLRB v. Gale Prods., 337 F.2d 390, 57 L.R.R.M. 2164 (7th Cir. 1964), denying
enforcement to 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 53 L.R.R.M. 1242 (1963) ; Armco Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 344 F.2d 621, 59 L.R.R.M. 2077 (6th Cir. 1965), denying enforcement to '148
N.L.R.B. 1179, 57 L.R.R.M. 1132 (1964); General Motors Corp, v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 516,
59 L.R.R.M, 2030 (6th Cir. 1965), denying enforcement to 147 N.L.R.B. 509, 56 L.R.R.M.
1241 (1964).
4 403 F.2d 702, 69 L.R.R.M. 2656 (5th Cir. 1968).
5 See NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953), where the Supreme
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one and, therefore, it can be fairly assumed that employee rights will not be
surrendered except in return for bargained-for concessions from the employer
which are beneficial to the employees. However, the court felt that the same
reasoning would not apply in a situation where the subject matter waived
relates directly to the right of the employees to change their bargaining repre-
sentative, or to have no bargaining representative. In this situation, the
interests of the employees and the union may lie in direct conflict. "We
cannot presume that the union, in agreeing to bar such activities, does so as
a bargain for securing other benefits for the employees and not from the self-
interest it has in perpetuating itself as bargaining representative."
The court also indicated that the employee was violating section
8(a) (2) 7
 by agreement to the broad no-solicitation rule. The incumbent
union could at least make use of the bulletin boards to communicate with
the employees. Outside unions, however, did not have even this channel of
communication open to them. Therefore, by adoption of the rule the em-
ployer would be favoring or supporting one employee representative (the
incumbent) over another, conduct prohibited by Section 8(a) (2) of the Act.
2. Instructions to Supervisors.—In Elder-Beerman Stores Corps the Board
held that an employer violates section 8(a) (1) when it instructs a super-
visor to engage in surveillance of employees' union activities as part of an
integral plan to discover the identity of employees engaged in union activity
and to rid himself of union adherents, and discharges the supervisor for fail-
ure to carry out his instructions. This conduct is to be regarded as unlawful,
whether or not the employees were ever aware of such instructions. In so
deciding, the Board stated that it was overruling its previous decision in
General Eng'r, Inc.9 to the extent that it was inconsistent. In that case
the Board had held that unexecuted instructions to a supervisor to spy on em-
ployees have no impact on the employees and therefore cannot interfere with
their organizational rights unless the employees had knowledge of them.
F. Employer's Duty to Investigate Union Demand for Discharge
Section 8(a)(3) provides in part that
no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee
for non-membership in a labor organization ... (B) if he has rea-
sonable grounds for believing that membership was denied for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic
dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership.'
Court held valid a waiver of the employees' protected right to refuse to cross the picket
line of another union.
6 403 F.2d at 705, 69 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
7 Section 8(b) (2) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
8 173 N.L,R.B. No. 68, 69 L.R.R.M, 1460 (1968).
9 131 N.L.R.I3. 648, 48 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1961).
1 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
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The difficult task for the Board and the courts is the formulation of
standards to be applied in the determination whether information conveyed
to an employer must have been sufficient either to create the proscribed
belief or at least to prompt a further inquiry by him into a union's discharge
demand. This question was before the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in NLRB v. Zoe Chem. Co. 2
In Zoc the employees had selected a union as their bargaining representa-
tive. This union obtained a three-year contract from the employer which
contained a union security clause. The union, however, proved to be very
lax in servicing the employees, and as a result the employees became dissatis-
fied. When the contract had been in force for approximately half its in-
tended term, a rival union interjected itself and sought to win the support of
the employees. The employees favored a change but were unable to effec-
tuate it. Some of the employees exhibited their displeasure with the incum-
bent union's performance by refusal to pay dues or an initiation fee. That
union sent representatives several times to remind the employees of their
duty to pay and to warn them that they could lose their jobs if they did not.
Finally, the union made a written request of the employer to discharge the
non-paying employees. The employer balked and refused to comply for a
time. After several months, the union submitted to arbitration the ques-
tion whether the employer was bound to discharge the non-paying employees.
The arbitrator found that it was so required. The union sought confirmation
of the award in the state courts and received it. The employer then com-
plied with the award. The discharged employees filed charges with the
Board, claiming that both the union and the employer were guilty of unfair
labor practices. The Board found that the employees had made a tender of
dues which was rejected by the union because these employees had failed
to sign union membership cards as it required. Although the employees had
not tendered the initiation fees, the Board held that they were not required
to do so because the tender would have proved fruitless in light of the card-
signing requirement.
The Board held that the union had violated sections 8(b) (1) (A) and
8(b) (2) by requiring the card signing and by causing the employer to dis-
charge the employees who had not signed. 3 The Board also found that the
non-paying employees, on hearing of the union's request that they be dis-
charged, had made to the employer's managers on two occasions statements
alleging their offer to pay dues and requesting to continue on the job. On the
basis of these statements the Board held that the employer was under a
duty to investigate the reasons for the union's discharge requests and that
its failure to do so constituted a violation of section 8(a) (3).
Reviewing the Board's decision, the court at the outset made the point
that, absent actual knowledge of an alleged illegal union request, an employer
has no duty independently to inquire into the circumstances behind the
union's demand for an employee's discharge. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the employee to make clear to the employer that he had paid or had tried
to pay his dues and fees or that an improper condition was being demanded
2 406 F.2d 574, 70 L.R.R.M. 2276 (2d Cir. 1969).
3 160 N.L.R.13. 1001, 63 L.R.R.M. 1052 (1966).
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by the union as well as the dues and fees. The court further held, in regard
to the adequacy of the information available to the employer necessary to
give the employer "reasonable grounds for believing," that all the circum-
stances surrounding the controversy were to be considered. What in isolation
may seem to constitute sufficient evidence to hold the employer responsible
may seem insignificant amid the totality of circumstances.
On the facts of ,Zoe, the court refused to uphold the Board's finding that
the employer "had reasonable grounds for believing" that the union was re-
questing the employees' discharge for a reason other than failure to pay their
dues and initiation fees. The union letter requesting the employees' discharges
made no reference to the membership cards. The employer had been aware
of the intense hostility shown by the employees toward the incumbent union
and, absent a clear enunciation by the employees of their objection to the
membership cards, the employer might very reasonably have believed that
they still refused to meet such a valid union condition for membership as
payment of dues. The two isolated exchanges between the employees and
the employer's managers were insufficient notice in this context. The court
considered that this conclusion was especially warranted because section
8(a) (3) (B) was directed at the "prompt and unquestioning acquiescence
by the employer in discharging an employee towards whom the union is
hostile or arbitrary."4
 (Emphasis added.)
The court felt also that the circumstances of the case did not even
impose a duty of further investigation on the employer. It held that even
if the employer knew of the card signing requirement the company could
not be held to have violated section 8(a) (3). The court stated that "the Act
does not contemplate an exhaustive investigation by the employer into the
facts or legal implications of every union discharge request." 5
 (Emphasis
added.) On the facts of Zoe, the court concluded that the burden of inquiry
on the employer far outweighed the likelihood that its investigation would
lead to a prompt and certain resolution of its doubts. Therefore, the employer
was completely absolved even though it had made no inquiry. The court
reasoned that the union would probably have denied that the employees had
made a tender of dues, since it had done so in the past. Even if the employer
could have resolved, from all the conflicting evidence, that a tender had been
made, it would still have been faced with the complex legal issues as to
whether the employees were required to tender the initiation fees as well
as the dues, whether the time for tender had been extended by the arbitration
decree, and whether signing membership cards was a permissible requirement
of union membership. "To stake an employer's liability on his resolution
of such complex legal questions would be to go far beyond the reasonable
purpose of the statute to prevent employers from docily acceeding to patently
illegal discharge demands." 6
Therefore, according to this case at least, an employer can be held to
have violated section 8(a) (3) (B) only if (1) he is clearly notified by his
employees that a union has refused a tender of dues or fees or both, or is
4 406 F.2d at 582, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2282.
5
 Id. at 583, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2282.
a Id. at 584, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2283.
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imposing an additional condition of membership which is patently illegal,
and if he then discharges the employees without investigation of the charges;
or if (2) he discharges the employees when he possesses independent knowl-
edge of the illegal union action. Furthermore, in the absence of independent
evidence, if the employer is confronted in the course of his investigation by
a union denial of the employees' charges he will not violate section 8(a) (3)
(B) if he then proceeds to discharge the allegedly non-paying employees.
G. Union Discipline
Under section 8(b) (1) (A) 1 it is an unfair labor practice for a union
to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights, in-
cluding the right to refrain from concerted activity. The proviso to that
section, however, preserves to the union the right "to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership" in the union.
The following two cases decided during the Survey year considered the
extent to which unions may discipline their members, and the means available
for that purpose.
1. Exceeding Union Production Quotas.—The Board had decided in Local
283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Corp.) 2
 that a union did not violate section
8(b) (1) (A) by imposing fines on members for violating traditional union
production quotas. The validity of the Board's position on this issue was
placed in doubt by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Associated Home Builders
v. NLRB.3 A decision whether the fines themselves coerced the employees
so as to violate 8(b) (1) (A) was not necessary for a resolution of that case
and the court specifically declined to offer one. 4 The court did, however,
note the difficulty of the issue and its own relief at not having to decide it. 5
On the other hand, the court did decide that the unilateral imposition of
production quotas by a union would constitute a refusal to bargain and
thereby violate section 8(b) (3) because the quotas were not purely an in-
ternal affair, but rather were related to "terms and conditions of employment"
about which the union would be required to bargain under section 8(d). 5
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A)
as exempting only internal union affairs from the proscriptions of the body
of section 8(b) (1) (A). It held that what constituted an "internal affair"
for purposes of section 8(d) also applied to use of that term with respect
to the proviso of section 8 (b) (1) (A),
Last year, in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 7 the Supreme Court
decided that union regulation of its members, including the imposition of
fines, was free from the proscriptions of section 8(b) (1) (A), even without
1 Section 8(b) (1) (A) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents ... to restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7 .. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1964).
2 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 55 L.R.R.M. 1085 (1964).
3 352 F.2d 745, 60 L.R.R.M. 2345 (9th Cir. 1965).
4 Id. at 750, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2349-50.
5 Id. at 750-51 n.9, 60 L.R.R.M. at 2350 n.9.
See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
7 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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application of the proviso to that section, if the regulation concerned a legiti-
mate internal union affair. In Allis-Chalmers the Supreme Court held that a
union may fine members who cross the union's picket line and go to work
during an authorized strike against their employer. The fine related to a
legitimate internal union matter. The union regulation in no way affected the
member's employment status, nor was it excessive. It was designed to assure
the effectiveness of the employees' right to strike. It appears that the formula
espoused by the Ninth Circuit in Associated Home Builders for determining
whether union regulation falls within the proviso to 8(b) (1) (A) corresponds
to the formula which the Supreme Court has held in Allis-Chalmers to be ap-
propriate for determining whether the body itself of 8(b) (1) (A) has been
violated. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's finding that union enforcement of
production quotas was not merely an internal union matter for purposes of
section 8(d) might lead it to find that such enforcement violates 8(b) (1) (A).
Recently the Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's
order in the Wisconsin Motor Corp. case in Scofield v. NLRB.8 The court,
attempting to follow Allis-Chalmers, concluded that maintenance of produc-
tion quotas was a legitimate union affair for purposes of section 8 (b) (1) (A)
and, therefore, that union enforcement of the quotas through fines was be-
yond the reach of that section. In arriving at its conclusion, the court rea-
soned that such quotas on piecework production were reasonably designed
to protect the well-being of all employees because (1) if the younger and
more energetic employees were to receive higher pay for increased produc-
tion, the older members would be demoralized and even face layoffs; and
because (2) quotas prevented employers from reducing liberal pay rates for
each piece produced and from using the high earnings of some workers as an
argument against a general increase in the pay rates. In addition, the court
considered that these quotas were recognized as appropriate subject matter
for collective bargaining and felt that if a union could validly establish a
quota it must have the concomitant power to enforce it.
The Scofield decision seems to be a proper one. The considerations
weighed by the Seventh Circuit to demonstrate union interest would seem
to compel this result under Allis-Chalmers, despite the fact that such quotas
constitute "terms and conditions of employment" and are not therefore a
purely internal union affair for purposes of section 8(d). Allis-Chalmers sug-
gests a broader scope for the term "internal union affair" with respect to
section 8(b) (1) (A). It is submitted that under Allis-Chalmers, unless a
union regulation would affect a member's employment status or would frus-
trate the general policies which the LMRA was designed to foster, if a union
can demonstrate an interest in a particular regulation relating to its repre-
sentational function, then the union regulation may be classified as strictly an
internal matter for purposes of 8 (b) (1) (A). The reasonable enforcement of
such regulations would therefore be free from proscription.
Most recently, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in the Scofield
case. The Court upheld the union's right to maintain and enforce the pro-
8 393 F.2d 49, 67 L.R.R.M. 2673 (7th Cir. 1968), aff'd, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
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duction quotas)) In so doing it essentially confirmed the reasoning proposed
above.
2. Access to Board Processes.—In NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine &
Shipbuilding Workers," the Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit," held that a union could not fine a member for
filing an unfair labor practice charge against it, despite the fact he had not,
as required by the union constitution, exhausted the internal union remedies
available to him. In so doing the Court was approving the Board's position
on this issue, first announced in Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs
(Skura). 12
 The Third Circuit had declined to follow the Board's Skura rule
because it felt that requiring members to exhaust internal union remedies
before soliciting the outside help of the Board was a reasonable one. It
merely gave the union "a fair opportunity to correct its own wrong." 18 The
Supreme Court recognized its decision in Allis-Chalmers, but found that
case inapplicable to the situation before it. The Court declared that a pro-
ceeding by the Board was "not to adjudicate private rights but to effectuate
a public policy."14 It was concerned that the Board machinery to implement
this public policy could be brought into action only by the initiative of in-
dividual persons who must file a charge within six months of the occurrence
of the alleged wrongful conduct. The Court felt that under these operative
conditions petitioners should have unrestricted access to Board processes if the
LAMA were to function as an organic whole. Any coercion used to discour-
age that access was beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization.
The Third Circuit felt that Section 101(a) (4) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act15 supported its position requiring union mem-
bers to exhaust their internal union remedies before going to the Board.
While that provision prohibits a union from limiting the right of a member
"to institute an action before any administrative agency," it provides that
a member "may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures . • . not
to exceed a four-month lapse of time." The Supreme Court rejected the
Third Circuit's reasoning. It did not interpret section 101(a) (4) as buttres-
sing the union's power to police their members but rather as an assuring
statement to the agencies that in a given case they may stay their hands for
four months, while the aggrieved petitioner seeks relief within the union.
3. Other Union Regulation of Members.—In Steelworkers Local 1070" a
union had bargained for and obtained a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement governing the seniority rights of supervisors returning to the bar-
gaining unit as regular employees. The provision permitted those super-
visors who regularly paid the equivalent of monthly union dues to continue
9 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
10 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
11 379 F.2d 702, 65 L.R.R.M. 2629 (3d Cir. 1967).
12 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 57 L.R.R.M. 1009 (1964).
13 379 F.2d at 707, 65 L.R.R.M. at 2632.
14 391 U,S. at 424.
15 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964).
16 171 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 68 L.R.R.M, 1215 (1968).
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to accumulate seniority credits while they were outside the unit, but denied
this right to those supervisors who failed to make such payments. The Board
held that the union violated sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2) by maintain-
ing and enforcing this contract provision.'?
The Board reasoned that an individual who is a supervisor is excluded
from the bargaining unit. He is, therefore, under no obligation whatsoever to
the union. At the time when a supervisor applies for reemployment in the
bargaining unit, however, he is an "employee" as that term is defined by
the Act's The Board recognized that seniority is a valuable condition of
employment. As such, its grant or denial to a unit employee (the applying
supervisor) cannot be conditioned on whether he made payments when he
was outside the unit. To hold otherwise would be to approve unlawful dis-
crimination directed at the encouragement of union membership.
On the other hand, in Metal Workers' Alliance, Inc.,'" a union had
obtained a collective bargaining contract containing both a union security
clause and a clause providing that a supervisor who returned to the bargain-
ing unit would reacquire the seniority accumulated up to the time of his
departure from the unit to become a supervisor. The union in its constitution
and by-laws, however, had provided that an employee who left the bargain-
ing unit and later returned would have to pay a reinstatement fee ranging
from 50 to 150 dollars, depending upon the length of time spent outside the
bargaining unit. The union initiation fee for a new employee was five dollars.
When supervisors seeking to return to the unit refused to pay the reinstate-
ment fees, the union threatened to have the employer discharge them pur-
suant to the union security clause. The union was charged with violating
sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (2) for enforcing the fees. The Board found
no violation.
The Board reasoned that the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A) permits a
union "to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or reten-
tion of membership therein." The union's reinstatement fees, therefore, are
presumptively lawful under the proviso. The Board recognized the existence
of conditions under which such fees lose this protection. Under section
8(b) (5), for example, union membership fees, required by a union security
agreement, which are found to be excessive or discriminatory under all the
17 Section 8(b) provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the'exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7; Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein ; .
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an employee
with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or ter-
minated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership . .
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), (b)(2) (1964).
18 See Texas Co., 93 NLRB 1358, 27 L.R,R.IVI. 1587 (1951), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 198 F.2d 540, 30 L.R.R.M. 2513 (9th Cir. 1952).
19
 172 N.L,R.B.No.34, 68 L.R.R.M. 1351 (1968).
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surrounding circumstances are considered unlawful. However, there was no
charge here that the fees were excessive. Furthermore, under sections
8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2), where discrimination or attempted discrimination
is sought to be justified under a valid union-security agreement because of
non-payment of dues or initiation fees, the Board may inquire to determine
whether the dues and fees were "uniformly required as a condition of acquir-
ing or retaining membership." The Board recognized that reinstatement fees
fall within the statutory intendment of "initiation fees." It further noted
that the uniformity requirement does not prohibit unions from charging
different fees to different classes of employees so long as there is a reasonable
basis for the classification.'" Not only do the returning supervisors regain
their accumulated seniority but they also become entitled to immediate em-
ployment and other valuable benefits, such as participation in unit overtime,
eligibility for paid holidays and vacations, shift preferences, and insurance
coverage. New employees, on the other hand, must fulfill certain probation-
ary requirements before they become entitled to these benefits. The Board
concluded that the differences in benefits obtaining to these two groups upon
admittance to the bargaining unit justifies the difference in fees.
H. Secondary Boycotts
1. Product Picketing: The Tree Fruits Doctrine.—Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (b) 1
generally represents a congressional attempt to circumscribe union pressure
on a neutral employer caught in the cross-fire of a dispute between the union
and another employer. One particular practice within the intended proscrip-
tion of the section is the secondary boycott typically occurring when a
retailer (secondary employer) is compelled by a union to stop purchasing
from a supplier (primary employer) with whom the union has a labor dispute.
The Supreme Court has found, however, that not all secondary picket-
ing by a union is prohibited. In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local
760 (Tree Fruits),2 the Court held that union picketing at a supermarket,
limited to the request, consumers not to purchase Washington State Apples
from the store because the apples came from employers against whom the
union was striking, did not violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The Court recog-
nized that such product picketing might result in a diminution of the super-
market's apple purchases, and thus cause the picketing to fall literally within
20 Sec Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 1430, 30 L.R.R.M. 1171 (1952).
1 Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) provides in relevant part that
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents —
• • •
(4)-	 . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object
thereof is—
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person , ,
2 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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the statutory prohibitions of 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The Court was convinced,
however, that such conduct was not meant to be proscribed by that section
and that such a prohibition would be inconsistent with the "spirit" of the
Act. The Court reasoned that a basic difference exists between peaceful con-
sumer picketing at a secondary site aimed at persuading the customer of the
secondary employer to cease trading with him altogether, and peaceful
picketing aimed at persuading the customer of the secondary employer to
cease purchasing only the struck product. In the latter case, the union's
appeal to the public is closely confined to its dispute with the primary em-
ployer, since the public is not asked to withhold its patronage from the sec-
ondary employer, but only to boycott the primary employer's goods. The
Court felt that this kind of picketing does not have the effect of making any
essential change in the secondary employer's position as a neutral with
regard to the dispute between the union and the primary employer. On the
other hand, a union appeal to the public at the secondary site not to trade
at all with the secondary employer reaches beyond the goods of the primary
employer, and seeks the public's assistance in forcing the secondary em-
ployer to cooperate with the union in its primary dispute. This kind of
picketing, then, destroys the secondary employer's neutrality. The Court
noted that this distinction had become established in the state courts by the
time of the enactment of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The state courts had held
that product picketing was lawful but that picketing for a total boycott
of a secondary employer was unlawful. 3 Therefore, the Court felt that if
Congress had meant by 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) to prohibit product picketing, it
would,
 have been more specific in its ban. In holding that such product
picketing was legal, the Court stated that it merely practiced fidelity to the
principle that peaceful picketing is lawful except where Congress has specifi-
cally proscribed a species as unworthy of protection. This policy of the Court
presumably reflects a concern over the first amendment implications of
peaceful picketing and a deference to the role of peaceful picketing as the
traditional economic weapon of the unions.
Does the Tree Fruits exception to secondary picketing apply when the
struck product has become an integral part of the secondary employer's en-
tire output, and it is therefore impossible for consumers to cease pur-
chasing the primary product without entirely ceasing patronage of the
secondary employer? This was the question recently put before the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Honolulu Typographical Union
No. 37 v. NLRB.' Here, the union had a labor dispute with the Hawaii Press,
which published a group of newspapers, one of which is the Waikiki Beach
Press. In support of its dispute with Hawaii Press, the union set up pickets
outside a shopping center consisting of 50 to 60 shops. Each of the pickets
carried a placard identifying one of five shops located in the shopping center
which advertised regularly with the Waikiki Beach Press. The placard stated
that the named shop advertised in the struck Waikiki Beach Press and re-
quested the public not to buy any of the shop's products advertised in the
3 See Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937); Newark Ladder
& Bracket Sales Co. v. Furniture Workers Local 66, 125 N.J. Eq. 99, 4 A.2d 49 (1939).
4 401 F.2d 952, 68 L.R.R.M. 3004 (1968).
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Press. Four of these five shops were restaurants which advertised their entire
business rather than a particular product.
The court agreed with the Board that the Tree Fruits exception to sec-
ondary picketing did not apply to this situation, and therefore held that the
picketing violated section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The court was willing to accept
the union's argument that "advertising" constituted a product for purposes
of the Tree Fruits doctrine. It recognized holdings that a union engaged in
a dispute with the employer supplying these advertising services has the right
under the publicity proviso to section 8(b) (4) to advise the customers of
the secondary seller by handbills that such services are provided by an em-
ployer with whom the union has a primary dispute. 5 Since the proviso speaks
only in terms of "product or products" of the primary employer, the court
in essence held that "advertising" is a product. The court felt that a differ-
ent holding would, for purposes of the Tree Fruits rule, present conceptual
difficulties.
The court felt also, however, that the picketing in Honolulu represented
a union attempt to enlist consumer assistance in a total boycott against the
secondary employer. The only realistic meaning of the union's appeal as
applied to the restaurants was the traditional "do not patronize this establish-
ment." Tree Fruits specifically indicates that this appeal is not excepted from
the proscriptions of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).
In further support of its decision, the court indicated its belief that first
amendment considerations guided the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits. It
noted that the pickets in that situation made no request of the customers
not to cross the picket lines. They merely asked customers to be selective
in their purchases once they entered the store. The court of appeals, having
assumed that the effect of the Tree Fruits picketing would not be very dif-
ferent from the effect of the issuance of handbills making the same request,
felt that this kind of request approximates pure speech and that the broad
prohibition against it would raise serious constitutional questions. On the
other hand, the pickets in Honolulu were asking for an entire boycott of
the restaurants. This action constituted a request by the union not to
cross the picket lines at all. Such a request may constrain consumers not
wanting to be considered hostile or indifferent to unions. This constraint
destroys any analogy between the picketing and pure speech, and thus makes
the former subject to prohibition.
An interpretation of Tree Fruits is also central to the decision in Bedding
Workers Local 140 v. NLRB.° In this case, an agent of Local 140 of the
United Furniture Workers of America approached Modern Stoves, Inc., a
retail furniture store, and expressed the view that Modern was handling
too large a supply from U.S. Mattress Corporation, a bedding manufacturer.
Local 140 did not represent the employees of U.S. Mattress, but a Teamsters
local did. Modern balked at the union's suggestion that it buy more from
suppliers represented by Local 140. The union began to picket Modern.
The placards carried by the pickets requested consumers not to buy non-
5 See Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 61 L.R.R.M. 2364
(9th Cir. 1966).
390 F.2d 495, 67 L.R.R.M. 2392 (2d Cir. 1968).
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union furniture, upholstery and bedding and urged them to look for the
label of the United Furniture Workers of America when they purchased
these articles. Shortly thereafter, the union agent returned to Modern and
for the first time told Modern that its merchandise did not have union
labels. Modern pointed out that even the bedding supplied by the Local
140 shops had no such label. In the agent's presence Modern called one of
these suppliers whose employees were represented by Local 140 to request
union labels. This supplier wanted to talk to the agent, but the agent
refused. After two weeks of picketing, the president of Local 140, asked
again by Modern why it was being picketed, replied that Modern's dealings
with suppliers with non-union shops was the cause of the picketing. In fact,
all of Modern's suppliers had union shops. U.S. Mattress, however, was the
only one not represented by Local 140 or an affiliate of the United Furniture
Workers. Finally, Modern ceased buying from U.S. Mattress and the picket-
ing ceased.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the Board
that Local 140's entire course of conduct demonstrated that its real con-
cern lay with Modern's handling of bedding from suppliers not under con-
tract with it, specifically U.S. Mattress, and that the object of its picketing
was to force a cessation of business dealings between the picketed retailer
and such "non-union" manufacturer. These findings satisfy the requirements
for an 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) violation. In addition, the court found that the
picketing did not fall within the Tree Fruits exception to secondary picket-
ing. Since U.S. Mattress was the object of the union's picketing, the placards
of the pickets should have specified that company and its product in order to
fall within the Tree Fruits exception. The placards made no mention of U.S.
Mattress. Moreover, the appeal to look for the union label was not specific
enough in identification of the boycotted product or company. The lack of
a union label at Modern did not necessarily indicate non-union merchandise
and Local 140 knew as much. Finally, the placards requested the consumer
not to buy "non-union furniture, upholstery and bedding," a far broader
appeal than was necessary for a boycott of the products of U.S. Mattress,
a bedding manufacturer only.
The dissenting opinion reasoned that union label picketing should be
considered lawful under Tree Fruits,7 even though the picketing was not
narrowly directed at the specific product of the employer. In essence, the
dissenting view postulates that the court should focus on the type of peaceful
picketing allowable under Tree Fruits and not on the factual context of a
boycott directed at a product of an employer with whom the union has a
dispute. Focusing on the picketing, the dissenter could find no logical basis
for holding that a union may picket to persuade the public not to buy a
struck product but not to persuade it to refrain from purchase of non-union
made products. The dissent appears correct in its observation; the distinc-
tion is illusory. In both situations the union is requesting a limited, as op-
posed to a total, boycott of the secondary employer. In neither case are they
requesting the public to refrain altogether from crossing its picket lines or
producing a danger of the restraint discussed above in Honolulu. They are
7 Id. at 503, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2398.
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• merely petitioning the consumers to purchase selectively once they have en-
tered the secondary employer's establishment.
The majority opinion embodies the view that the Tree Fruits exception
to secondary picketing cannot be divorced from the factual context of a
boycott directed at the product of a primary employer. By so limiting Tree
Fruits, and thereby declaring the "union label" picketing in this case un-
lawful, the majority embraces an artificial distinction. Justice Harlan feared
such a consequence from the Tree Fruits decision when he questioned the
substance of the distinction of limited and total boycott espoused by the
majority in a situation where the picketed retailer depends largely or en-
tirely on sales of the struck product. 8
2. Reserved-Gate and Common-Situs Picketing.—In Local 761, Electrical
Workers v. NLRB (General Electric), 9 the Supreme Court held that picket-
ing of a gate reserved for exclusive use of employees of neutral contractors
at a struck manufacturing plant violates the secondary boycott prohibitions
of the LAMA, unless the work carried out by those employees using the
reserved gate is related to the normal operations of the manufacturer. The
Board, however, has distinguished reserved-gate picketing in the General
Electric context from that in a common-situs construction context, where a
gate is reserved for neutral subcontractors and their suppliers and where
the union has a dispute with the general contractor. In the latter situation
the Board has ruled in Building Trades Councill° that the Moore Dry Dock
standards" apply. In addition, in National Woodwork Mfgrs. Ass'n v.
NLRB" the Supreme Court held that neither did a union violate the sec-
ondary boycott prohibitions of the Act by obtaining and enforcing, through
a boycott directed at the products of a secondary employer, a contract clause
designed to protect or preserve work traditionally performed by its members.
The Board was called on recently to determine the applicability of these
three rulings to the facts presented in Janesville Typographical Union No.
197. 13 In Janesville a publishing company, in need of more space, decided to
construct a new building to house some of its present operations. The com-
pany planned to install in the building new machinery and systems affecting
composing-room jobs. The union was bargaining with the company concern-
8 377 U.S. at 80.
9 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
10 155 N.L.R.B. 319, 60 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1965).
11 Sailor's Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R,M, 1108 (1950).
The Board developed the Moore Dry Dock criteria to deal with the situation in which
the employer with whom the union had a primary dispute did business only on the
premises of a secondary employer—as, for example, a subcontractor on a construction
project—to determine if picketing the secondary employer's place of business was violative
of section 8(b) (4). There will be no violation of section 8(h) (4) where (a) the picketing
is strictly limited to times when the sites of dispute is located on the secondary employer's
premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal
business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location
of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary
employer.
12 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
13 173 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 69 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1968).
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ing these changes while construction was taking place. Unable to obtain
satisfactory terms with regard to job security, the union called a strike. The
company hired replacements for the strikers and continued operation. At
first the union picketed only the four gates leading into the existing build-
ing and the parking lot. Later, however, the union picketed at the gate lead-
ing into the construction site. The company had posted a sign reserving this
gate for employees of the general contractor, employees of subcontractors,
and suppliers. The construction employees honored the picket lines estab-
lished at the reserved gate, and thus caused construction to be halted. The
company charged the union with violation of section S(b) (4) (ii)(B).
The union argued that the "normal operations" exception of General
Electric includes future related operations, and thus allows the union to
picket the reserved gate to the new building as a measure to protect future
jobs when operations begin in the new building. The union maintained that
its picketing had the purpose of preserving the jobs of its members within
the principles of National Woodwork.
The Board rejected the union's argument. It felt that an exception for
future related operations would in effect negate the "reserved gate" doctrine
of General Electric. All work performed on a primary employer's premises
would contribute to the efficiency or profitability of the employer's oper-
ations, or else he would not authorize it. To create an exception for future
related operations would be to accuse the Supreme Court of conducting an
exercise in futility in its formulation of the exceptions in General Electric.
The Board found also that the picketing did not fall within the prin-
ciples of National Woodwork. It noted that the union, in quest of its de-
mands, had tried to bring primary pressure on the company by striking its
premises. When this tactic failed to produce the desired result the union
brought pressure against another employer (the general contractor) who was
neither an ally nor engaged in the primary work, but who was neutrally en-
gaged in the construction of a building. The Board did not consider this
picketing to be direct activity aimed at preservation of work. Rather, it was
"activity aimed at a secondary source to prevent it from performing an action
which may be followed by actions of other employers with the ultimate (not
direct) end of preserving work."" This picketing of a neutral is too remote
from the end of work preservation to fall within the principle of National
Woodwork. The Board agreed with the trial examiner that this was a classic
secondary boycott.
Finally, though the Board did not consider this case as presenting a
true common-situs problem because of the complete separation of the oper-
ations of the employees of the primary and secondary employers, it held
that the Moore Dry Dock standards should apply to the premises. There-
fore, since the union could have picketed at gates proximate to the com-
pany's operating premises, no legitimate reason existed for it to picket the
construction site and the reserved gate.
3. Work Preservation Agreements and Their Enforcement.—In American
14 Id., 69 L.R.R.M. at 1459.
882
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
Boiler Mfgrs. Ass's: v. NLRB, (Minneapolis case)," decided during the
Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had before it a
case in which a union representing the pipefitters in the Minneapolis area
had obtained a bargained-for fabrication agreement with a contractors asso-
ciation. This agreement essentially provided that member contractors of the
Association would not use on construction sites packaged boilers with trim
piping attached, but would secure the items separately and leave their assem-
bly to the pipefitters, as had been the custom. One of the member contrac-
tors entered into a contract with a toy company specifying that a packaged
boiler with trim piping attached was to be installed in the company's build-
ing. When the boiler was delivered at the job site the union demanded that
the unit be separated before the boiler was installed, and threatened a work
stoppage. The court, contrary to the Board, found that the contractor was
bound to the specifications. Despite the employer's lack of control over the
boiler specifications, however, the court held that the union's picketing threat
was protected activity under the principles of National Woodwork Mfgrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB.16 This finding is contrary to the Board's position on such
situations. The Board has held the view that where a union, seeking to pre-
serve job opportunities, exerts coercive pressure on an employer by calling
for a work stoppage or by threatening one, and where such employer has no
legal power to take the action requested by the union, the union violates
section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) . 17 The Board regards the employer having the control
as the primary employer, against whom secondary pressure is being brought
to bear. In this case the Board would consider the toy company as the pri-
mary employer and the contractor as a neutral because of his lack of control.
The Eighth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had specifically
stated in National Woodwork that the issue concerning the legality of the
Board's "right of control" rule was not before it in that case." The court of
appeals, however, considered the following language of the National Wood-
work opinion as determinative:
The determination whether the "will not handle" sentence .. .
and its enforcement violated § 8(e) and § 8(h) (4) (B) cannot be
made without an inquiry into whether, under all the surrounding
circumstances, the Union's objective was preservation of work for
. . . [the unit's] employees, or whether the agreements and boycott
were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere.
Were the latter the case .. • the boycotting employer would be a
neutral bystander, and the agreement or boycott would, within the
intent of Congress, become secondary. . . . The touchstone is
whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor
relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees."
15 404 F.2d 556, 69 L.R.R.M. 2858 (8th Cir. 1968).
141 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
17 See Local 1066, Longshoremen, 137 N.L.R.B. 45, 50 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1962),
enforced, 331 F.2d 712, 56 L.R.R.M. 2200 (3d Cir. 1964) ; Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist.
Council, 144 N.L.R.B. 91, 54 L.R.R.M. 1003 (1963), enforced, 339 F.2d 142, 57 L.R.R.M.
2509 (3d Cir. 1964).
18 386 U.S. at 616-17 n.3.
16 Id. at 644-45.
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The circuit court interpreted this language as establishing the principle
that employees have an absolute right to bring concerted pressure against
their employer so long as their objective is the preservation or protection of
work traditionally performed by them. The court noted, however, that the
"right of control is a factor to be considered in deciding whether concerted
activity by unit employees has an illegal objective."20
 In the case at bar the
court found that work preservation was the sole objective of the union and,
therefore, that its activity was lawful. The court's ruling appears sound. It
is difficult to regard the contractor as a neutral, as did the Board, since the
employees are seeking to affect his working conditions. Certainly if he had
not lost his power over the specifications the union's action would be lawful.
It should not make a difference that he transfers this control to someone
else. 21
In the companion case of American Boiler Mfgrs. Ass'n v. NLRB (St.
Paul case), 22 a sister union to the one involved in the Minnesota case ob-
tained, in 1963, a fabrication agreement with the Contractors Association
similar to the one discussed above. By 1963, however, packaged boilers with
trim piping attached were used in 60 to 85 percent of all boiler instal-
lations. When the union sought to secure compliance with the fabrication
clause on several jobs, it was charged with violation of sections 8(e) and
8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The Association argued that the agreement did not comply
with the requirements of National Woodwork. That case approved agree-
ments aimed at the preservation of work traditionally performed by the
represented employees. The Association argued that "traditional work" was
meant to encompass only that work "currently, continuously and exclusively
performed by unit employees." Here the union was seeking to reacquire work
for the employees which had already been lost. The Eighth Circuit rejected
this argument. It agreed with the Board that the Association's reading of
National Woodwork was too restricted. The record of National Woodwork
itself supports this conclusion because the trial examiner found in that case
that the union was likewise interested in reacquiring as well as preserving
work. The term "traditional work" at least includes work which unit em-
ployees have performed and are still performing at the time when they
negotiated a work preservation clause.
Another aspect of the St. Paul opinion involved the exaction of a 100-
dollar fine from one of the contractors for failing to comply with the fabrica-
tion agreement. The fine was levied by a fabrication committee composed of
union and Association representatives, formed to interpret, apply and
enforce the agreement. The issue before the court was whether the union
violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by bringing the contractor's violation to
the attention of the fabricating committee and by voting to assess the penalty
against him. The court ruled that, in light of its rejection of the Board's
20 404 F.2d at 561-62, 69 L.R.R.M, at 2861.
21 Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b) (4)
and 8(e), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000, 1038 (1965).
22 404 F.2d 547, 69 L.R.R.M. 2851 (8th Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed, 37
U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. May 29, 1969) (No. 1457).
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"right of control" rule,23 the union's action, even if coercive, did not violate
section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). The union's sole objective in instituting the en-
forcement proceedings was the preservation of traditional work for its mem-
bers and was therefore lawful under National Woodwork.
I. Recognitional Picketing by Non-Representative Union
In Dallas Bldg. Trades Council v. NLRB,' the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia considered an instance in which a Building Trades
Council, a labor organization including local craft unions in its membership,
sought an agreement with an Employer Association having collective bar-
gaining agreements with the local craft unions. The proposed agreement
would have restricted subcontracting to employers who had agreements with
Council-affiliated locals, and contained clauses disclaiming any intent on the
part of the Council to represent any of the employees. When the Association
would not consent to such an agreement, the Council struck the member
contractors. At the time, the picketed contractors were operating under col-
lective bargaining contracts barring the introduction of representation ques-
tions during the contract term. The Board found that the Council's picketing
was for recognitional purposes, and therefore violated section 8(b) (7) (A). 2
On appeal, the union argued, inter alia, that section 8(b) (7) (A) was
enacted to eliminate blackmail picketing by one union attempting to wrest
the representation of the employees from another weak, but recognized,
union. Here, not only did the Council disclaim any such intention, but the
local unions themselves did not consider the Council's conduct to interfere
with their exclusive representation. Therefore, the union argued, section
8(b) (7) (A) should not apply.
In response to this argument, the court expressed its agreement with the
Board that the proscriptions of section 8(b) (7)(A) are not confined to the
blackmail-picketing context. Congress outlawed any picketing which sought
to compel the employer to recognize and deal with a non-representative labor
organization on the subjects which could substantially affect the working con-
ditions of employees. The fact that subcontracting is such a subject is evi-
denced by the Supreme Court's recognition of it as a mandatory subject of
23 American Boiler Mfgrs. Ass'ri v. NLRB (Minnesota case), 904 F.2d 556, 69
L.R.R.M. 2858 (8th Cir. 1968).
1 396 F.2d 677, 68 L.R.R.M. 2019 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
2 Section 8(b) (7) (A) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an em-
ployer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of
his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or
select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless
such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such
employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with the Act
any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not
appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act ....
29 U.S.C.	 158(b) (7)(A) (1964).
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bargaining.3
 In the case at bar, to the extent that the general contractors might
contract out work to cheaper non-unionized subcontractors without the agree-
ment proposed by the Council, subcontracting would affect the number of em-
ployees hired by the general contractors. Although it might be argued that
the agreement proposed by the Council was meant to enhance the employees'
position by making their jobs more secure, it still violates section 8 (b) (7) (A)
if it is recognitional, since it removes the bargaining leverage of the local
bargaining representative on the matter of subcontracting controls. This
loss of leverage could substantially weaken the local union's position at the
bargaining table, a result that section 8 (b) (7) (A) was designed to prevent.
The agreement sought by the union through picketing would in effect
have compelled Association recognition of the Council. The proposed con-
tractual obligation included the concomitant obligation to discuss, upon the
CounciPS request, implementation of and compliance with the terms. "A
Union involved in such inevitable day-to-day dealings could truly be said to
have been recognized 'as the representative' of the employees with respect to
the subject matter of the agreement."4
The Council's principal argument was that "hot cargo" agreements 3
relating to the construction industry were expressly legalized by section 8(e)fi
and that, therefore, Congress could not have intended to outlaw the most
natural means of achieving such agreements—the strike. The court again
agreed with the Board that ne inconsistency existed between the Board's in-
terpretation of section 8(b) (7) and the purposes of section 8(e). It does not
follow from the fact that the agreement would be lawful if voluntarily
adopted that a labor organization can employ illegal means to obtain it.
Sections 8 (b) (7) and 8(e) were intended to resolve separate problems.
J. Remedies
The National Labor Relations Board is vested with exclusive jurisdic-
tion to prevent unfair labor practices. Section 10(a) provides that the power
of the Board in this regard "shall not be affected by any other means of ad-
justment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement,
3 See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
4 396 F.2d at 683, 68 L.R.R,M, at 2024,
5 "Hot cargo" agreements are generally considered agreements not to handle goods
which are produced under nonunion standards or not to handle the goods of an employer
whom the union for other reasons declares "unfair,"
6 Section 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using,
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other
employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or
agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement, shall
be to such extent unenforcible and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsec-
tion (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an
employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontract-
ing of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or
repair of a building, structure, or other work ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964).
886
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
law, or otherwise."I The grant of remedial power to the Board is couched
in broad terms, and allows the Board wide discretion in fashioning remedial
orders. Section 10(c) provides that the Board may "take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies" of the 'Act. 2 The Board adapts its remedy to fit
the circumstances of the particular case in order to dissipate the effects of
the unfair labor practices. The Supreme Court has held, however, that the
Board's discretion is limited to "remedying" unfair labor practices—the Act
does not confer "punitive" jurisdiction on the Board. 3
1. NLRB Discretion Under Section 10(c): Fringe Benefits and Implied
Seniority Standards.—In NLRB v. Strong4 an employer refused to sign a
collective bargaining contract negotiated with a union by a multi-employer
association to which he belonged. The Board found that the employer's re-
fusal to sign the agreement constituted an unfair labor practice under sections
8(a) (5) and 8(a) (1) and, despite the existence of an arbitration clause in the
contract, ordered the employer, among other things, to "pay to the appro-
priate source any fringe benefits provided for" in the collective bargaining
contract.5
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce that
part of the Board's order requiring the payment of fringe benefits. The court
stated that this was "an order to the [employer] to carry out the provisions
of the contract and is beyond the power of the Board." 0
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the
Board is empowered by the broad grant of authority of section 10(c) to
order the retroactive payment of fringe benefits to remedy an unfair labor
practice. The Court reasoned that such payments complied with the remedial
policy of the Act to make the worker whole. Furthermore, it noted that
although the Board does not have plenary authority to interpret the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, it is empowered under section 10(a) to prevent
an unfair labor practice even though the same act constituted a breach of
the contract and would provide the basis for a suit under section 301. The
Court considered the award of fringe benefits, which would have been paid
had the employer signed the contract negotiated on his behalf, to be anal-
agous to the judicially recognized award of back pay in a situation where
an employee is discharged for union membership even though such dis-
charge constitutes a violation of a collective bargaining agreement open to
arbitration.'
In Buncher v. NLRB 8 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit en-
forced a back-pay order of the Board computed on the basis of a seniority
1 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
2 29	 § 160(c) (1964).
3 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
393 U.S. 357 (1969).
5 See id. at 358.
6 Id.
7 See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
8 — F.2d	 70 L.R.R.M. 2552 (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 1969), petition for cert. filed,
37 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. June 10, 1969) (No. 1508).
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standard even though the offending company did not utilize a formal seniority
system in its employment practices. The company conducted its business
through several facilities, interchanging its employees among them. The
company discharged some of the employees working at one of the facilities.
The Board found that the discharges were discriminatorily motivated. Sub-
sequent to the discharges, the company was forced to lay off, for economic
reasons, a number of employees working at the same facility from which the
employees were discharged. The company claimed that it did not utilize a
seniority standard, but rather ten different criteria, in order to determine
whether it should retain or lay off an employee. The company argued that,
according to those criteria, the discriminatees would not have continued in
its employment beyond the layoff date. Therefore, its liability for back pay
to any of these employees should be limited to the time between the dis-
charges and the layoff date.
The Board rejected the company's argument. It held that the testi-
mony offered by the company to establish the use of the ten criteria in
making its employment decisions was so replete with infirmities that it was
not a reliable basis for a decision on the back pay issue. The Board instead
required an allocation of the available post-layoff jobs among the discrim-
inatees and the other employees on the basis of seniority. The allocation was
to be made first with respect to the facility from which the discriminatees
were discharged, but if sufficient work were not available at that facility
for the discriminatees, an allocation was to be made with respect to the
company's other facilities. Presumably, if such an allocation is made, it will
yield a finding that at least some of the discharged employees would not
have been laid off but for the discrimination practiced by the company. The
company would, therefore, be liable for back pay from the time when the
employees were discharged until they were reinstated or found substantially
equivalent employment.
Enforcing the Board's decision, the court of appeals pointed out that
it was established' law that where an employer has discharged employees
discriminatorily, but asserts in mitigation of back-pay claims that these em-
ployees would have been laid off even absent such discrimination, he has
the burden of proving that fact.° The court concluded that the company had
failed in its burden when its testimony regarding its employment criteria
was discredited. In light of the company's failure to sustain its burden and of
the broad remedial powers granted to the Board by section 10(c), the court
concluded that the Board was acting within its discretion when it computed
the back-pay award on the basis of seniority. The record demonstrated to the
court that length of service was at least a factor in the company's employ-
ment policy. Furthermore, the seniority standard represents "normal in-
dustrial practice generally."
The Strong and Buncher decisions suggest the probable outcome of
cases now pending before the Board concerning the validity of a remedy
which makes available retroactive compensatory relief in situations where the
employer has refused to bargain for an initial contract with his employees'
See NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 60 L.R.R.M. 2578 (2d Cir. 1965).
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certified representative. 10 The proposed remedy, as stated by the trial exam-
iner in Ex-Cell-0 Corp., would require the employer to "[c] ompensate
its employees for the monetary value of the minimum additional benefits
	 .
which it is reasonable to conclude that the Union would have been able to
obtain through collective bargaining . . . for the period commencing with the
date of the Respondent's formal refusal to bargain •
	 .""
The Supreme Court's decision in Strong, enforcing an award of fringe
benefits to remedy the employer's refusal to bargain, leads one to conclude
that the Board can make the award recommended by the trial examiner in
Ex-Cell-0 provided that (1) a reliable method exists for determining that
the employees would have received the fringe benefits and increment in
wages but for the employer's refusal to bargain, and (2) the amount due
the employees can be computed with some accuracy. These two related re-
quirements may be stated by the single qu6stion: Is there an objective
standard by which the Board may determine the losses, if any, suffered by
the employees?
It is true that in Strong the payment of fringe benefits had already been
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement negotiated on behalf of
the employer. Furthermore, it was presumably a relatively easy task to com-
pute the amount due the employees by reference to the negotiated agreement.
The Supreme Court's emphasis, however, on the plenary authority of the
Board to remedy unfair labor practices, and on the broad discretion allowed
the Board by section 10(c) in order to effectuate the general policy of the
Act to make the offended employees whole, strongly suggests that the Court's
reasoning was meant to reach beyond the factual boundaries of Strong. This
conclusion is supported by the Third Circuit's decision in Buncher, even
though it was rendered only five days after the Supreme Court's decision in
Strong and therefore makes no reference to that case. The Third Circuit
appeared to take a liberal view of the Board's remedial powers, a view
similar to that taken by the Supreme Court in Strong. As noted above, the
court in Buncher held that certain discriminatorily discharged employees were
entitled to full back pay from the time of discharge calculated with refer-
ence to a seniority system, despite the fact that the employer had not
utilized a formal seniority standard to control his past employment decisions.
The charging union in Ex-Cell-0 suggested in its brief three basic
standards for determining what, if any, losses were suffered by the employees
as a result of the employer's refusal to bargain: (1) a comparison of the
affected employees' wage increases and fringe benefits during the period at
issue with those of other employees in the same geographical area; (2) a
comparison of the wage and fringe-benefit increases during the same period
at Ex-Cell-O's other plants; 12 and (3) a comparison of the bargained in-
to Ex-Cell-0 Corp., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 80-67 (Case No. 25-CA-2377, 1967) ;
Herman Wilson Lumber Co., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 757-66 (Case No. 26-CA-2536,
1967); Zinke's Foods, Inc., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 662-66 (Cases Nos. 30-CA-372, 30-
RC-400, 1966); Rasco Olympia Inc., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 167-66 (Case No. 19-CA-
3187, 1966).
11 Ex-Cell-O Corp., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 80-67, at 18 (Case No. 25-CA-2377,
1967).
12 Ex-Cell-O had five other plants all represented by and under contract with, the
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creases nationally, tabulated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the same
period. 13
The approximation obtained by using a combination of these methods
would seem to be no less exacting than the approximation obtained through
use of the seniority standard approved in Buncher. Reference to the wage
and fringe-benefit increases in the employer's other plants seems to be an
especially reliable standard. The trial examiner based his award exclusively
on this comparison. The employer's argument that the remedy would con-
stitute Board dictation of collective bargaining terms should be rejected
because the award would span only the period up to the time when the
employer commences to bargain in good faith. It would not, therefore, affect
the terms of the contract ultimately negotiated by the parties. The argument
that the award is punitive in nature, the contention of the dissenter in
Buncher, should be rejected here, as it was there. The remedies recommended
in Ex-Cell-0 are tailored for the compensation of the employees for wages
and benefits to which they would have been entitled but for the employer's
unfair labor practices, just as they were in Buncher. The Strong case yields
the observation that no meaningful difference exists between the two cases
merely because the unfair labor practice here is a section 8(a) (5) refusal
to bargain, whereas in Buncher it was an 8(a) (3) discriminatory discharge.
The Supreme Court in Strong was affirming an award of fringe benefits to
remedy an 8(a) (5) violation. It is therefore submitted that the Strong and
Buncher cases offer the Board more than ample authority for adopting the
trial examiner's proposed remedial order in Ex-Cell-O.
2. Section .10( Injunctions.—In 1932, Congress passed the Norris-La-
Guardia Act," depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant
injunctions in labor disputes except under particular, specified conditions."
Certain exceptions to the Norris-LaGuardia Act were carved out by the
Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Section 10(h) of that Act" provides that injunc-
tive relief, sought by the NLRB under section 10 generally, shall not be
restricted by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Specifically, sections 10(e) 17 and
10(j)" provide the Board with authority to seek injunctions from the federal
district courts. Section 10(e) requires that the regional director seek injunc-
tive relief pending a formal Board decision when the regional director finds
that there is good reason to believe that a union is acting, picketing or boy-
cotting in violation of sections 8(b) (4) (A), (B), or (C), 8(b) (7), or 8(e).
charging unions. While the products of the plants were different, the employees were all
involved in some form of metal work.
13 Brief for UAW Before the NLRB, Ex-Cell-0 Corp., at 6.
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
15 Before any injunction may be issued in a labor dispute, it must be shown that
(1) unlawful acts have been threatened or committed and will be continued unless re-
strained; (2) substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant's property will result
or has resulted; (3) there will be greater injury to complainant if the injunction is denied
than there will be to the defendant if the injunction is issued; and (4) the complainant
has no adequate remedy at law.
18 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1964).
1 7 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) 0964).
is 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1964).
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Section 10(j) is dissimilar to section 10(e) in that injunctions under the
former are discretionary with the Board and are not required by the finding
of certain facts as with the latter. The only formal prerequisite for seeking
an injunction under section 10(j) is that there be before the Board an
unfair-labor practice charge involving the enjoinee. Beyond that, the court
to which the Board petitions is free to grant such temporary relief or re-
straining order as it "deems just and proper."'" The courts, however, have
not been in agreement as to the standards which govern a "just and proper"
application of section 10(j).
In McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 2° the Board, as noted above, 21 success-
fully petitioned a district court to enjoin the General Electric Company from
refusing to bargain with a coordinated bargaining committee representing
the electrical workers. In granting the injunction, the court essentially took
the position that Congress, in passing section 10(j), had entrusted the NLRB
with the discretion to determine the propriety of the injunction. It was, there-
fore, the duty of the court to determine whether the Board had properly exer-
cised that discretion, which, in effect, left the court to determine no more
than "whether the Board has 'reasonable cause to believe' that the accused
party has been guilty of unfair labor practices." 22
On appeal the Second Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction. 23
The crux of the court's opinion was its emphasis on the extraordinary nature
of the injunction as a remedy in labor disputes. After stating that section
10(j) was but a meager exception to the general prohibition of Norris-La-
Guardia against federal court injunctions, the court held that the Board
must establish that the injunction is necessary either to preserve the status
quo between the parties while the Board resolves the dispute or to prevent
"irreparable harm."
After the McLeod case, the Tenth and the Eighth Circuits had occasion
to pass on the standards governing the issuance of 10(5) injunctions. Both
of these courts considered that the inquiry of a court, when petitioned by
the Board for a 10(j) injunction, should be whether the Board had reason-
able.cause to believe that an unfair labor practice had been committed. Both
courts, however, felt that the inquiry should not end with a finding of
"reasonable cause." They reasoned, as did the Second Circuit in McLeod,
that in order to justify the granting of injunctive relief in a labor dispute
context, the Board must demonstrate something more than reasonable cause.
The two circuits' proposed formulations of the further demonstration re-
quired of the Board differ somewhat from each other and from that offered
by the Second Circuit.
In Sacks v. Angle,24 the Tenth Circuit made no mention of the "irrepara-
ble harm" consideration proposed by the Second Circuit in McLeod, but
19 Id.
20 257 F. Supp. 690, 62 L.R.R.M. 2809 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
21 see pp 855-57 supra.
22 257 F. Supp. at 709, 62 L.R.R.M. at 2824, citing Douds v. International Long-
shoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278, 281, 39 L.R.R.M. 2388, 2390 (2d Cir. 1957).
23 366 F.2d 847, 63 L.R.R.M. 2065 (2d Cir. 1966).
24 382 F.2d 655, 66 L.R.R.M. 2111 (10th Cir. 1967).
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focused exclusively on the desirability of the preservation of the status quo.
The Angle court limited this consideration, however, to situations where there
exists "a reasonable apprehension that the efficacy of the Board's final order
may be nullified" unless temporary relief is granted. 25 In Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Meter (3M) 728 the Eighth Circuit, while expressing general agree-
ment with the Angle case, proposed that section 10(j) relief was warranted
(1) "where the unfair labor practices, unless contained, would have an ad-
verse and deleterious effect on the rights of the aggrieved party which could
not be remedied through the normal Board channels," and (2) where "the
remedial purpose of the Act would be frustrated unless immediate action
is taken."27 The first element of the 3M test seems equivalent to the "irrep-
arable harm" elements of the Second Circuit's test. The second element is
but a restatement of the Angle test.
During the Survey year, two federal district courts gave extensive con-
sideration to the 10(j) problem and to the cases discussed above. In both
cases, the courts found that the Board "had reasonable cause to believe"
that unfair labor practices had been committed. Furthermore, both courts
required something more than this finding to justify the issuance of an
injunction.
In Greene v. Senco, Inc., 28 the Board petitioned the District Court for
Massachusetts for a 10(j) injunction to prevent a certain company from
recognizing a minority union as the bargaining representative of its em-
ployees. The Board's processes were initiated by a rival union which charged
both the company and union with unfair labor practices. Included in the
rival's charges was a contention that the company had violated section
8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain with this rival union, which had represented
the company employees before the company had moved from its old location
and changed its name. However, charges other than the 8(a) (5) contentions
prompted the Board to seek the 10(j) injunction.
The claimed minority union offered a three-part argument to support
its position in opposition to the majority. First, the union contended that
the court should take notice of the 8(a) (5) complaint pending before the
Board. Second, if the company had in fact violated 8(a) (5), the Board
would order reinstatement of the charging rival union as the bargaining
representative of the company's employees. Third, since the Board would
order reinstatement of the rival if the 8(a) (5) violation were established, the
injunction against the company's recognition of the alleged minority union
would not be necessary to insure the efficacy of the Board's final order, as
required by Angle.
The court rejected the union's argument. It did not, however, propose
any new standards for the issuance of 10(j) injunctions, nor did it elect
to adopt one from among those already proposed. The court considered the
issuance of an injunction as proper, despite the union's argument, no matter
which of the tests were applied. Even if it was obliged to consider the pendency
25 Id. at 660, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2114.
26 385 F.2d 265, 66 L.R.R.M. 2444 (8th Cir. 1967).
27 Id. at 270, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2447.
28 282 F. Supp. 690, 67 L.R.R.M. 2922 (D. Mass. 1968).
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of the 8(a) (5) violation before the Board, the court felt that the union's
argument ignored the irreparable harm tests of General Electric and 3M.
The court concluded that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent irrepara-
ble harm to the rival union arising from its inability to represent the com-
pany's employees during the . time between the proceeding then before the
court and the Board's final order.
• The court felt that even if the Angle test was the proper one the same
result should obtain, but for different reasons. First, the court did not con-
sider itself compelled to recognize the 8(a) (5) violation pending before the
Board and reasoned that, absent such a recognition, the union's argument
failed, because the injunction would be needed to insure the efficacy of a
Board order based on the charged unfair labor practices other than the
alleged 8(a) (5) violation. Secondly, even if it were compelled to consider the
pendency of the 8(a) (5) charges, the court concluded that it could still prop-
erly issue an injunction. The Board, on hearing the 8(a) (5) charge, might
not order reinstatement as a final order. It might find the 8(a) (5) charge to
be without merit yet at the same time find the other charges to be meritorious.
In this case, the Board would order an election. The injunction is necessary to
insure the efficacy of such an order.
In Sachs v. Davis & Hemphill, Inc., 29 an employer refused to bargain
with the certified union representative of its employees. The company's re-
fusal was based on a claim that it had reasonable grounds for doubting the
union's majority status. In deciding whether an injunction should properly
issue in this situation, the court felt bound to consider "whether there exists
a probability that the purposes of the Act will be frustrated unless temporary
relief is granted."3° The court was satisfied that the Act would be frustrated
without the issuance of the injunction. It reasoned that the Act was intended
to promote industrial peace through collective bargaining. The public inter-
est in this result weighs in the determination of the propriety of an injunc-
tion. Furthermore, if the employer is allowed to continue in its refusal to bar-
gain with the representative chosen by its employees, it will be able to erode
employee support for the union. If the temporary injunction is not granted,
the delays inherent in the Board processes will enable the employer to con-
tinue in its unjustified refusal for so long a time that the normal Board pro-
cedures provided by the Act will not afford the employees and the union an
adequate remedy. "The public interest requires that the purposes of the Act
be not frustrated in this way."n
VII. LABOR UNIONS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
During the current Survey year the Supreme Court has rendered one
major decision seeking to refine the uneasy accommodation between labor
and antitrust law.' In American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll= orchestra
29 Id. 70 L.R.R.M. 2399 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 1969).
30 Id. at 2403.
31 Id. at 2404.
1 For a brief history of the development of the law in this area, see 1965-1966 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations Law, 7 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 909, 954-61 (1966), and
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leaders brought an action against the American Federation of Musicians
(AFM) alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 3
The AFM had acquired a virtual closed shop in the New York area by means
of agreements with booking agents, recording companies and other similar
music industry groups. The union's bylaws in effect regulated the musicians'
terms of employment. The bylaw challenged by plaintiffs as violative of the
antitrust laws was one requiring orchestra leaders to follow a "Price List
Booklet" which imposed minimum prices for orchestra "club-date" appear-
ances. A "club-date" is usually a one-time engagement to provide orchestra
music for a special occasion. The sponsor of the event may obtain an orchestra
by contacting a booking agent or a leader. The leader obtains the sidemen
and attends to the business details of the engagement. The four orchestra
leaders in this case were fulltime leader-employers, although in many other
instances the leader performs as a musician with the orchestra. These leaders
maintained offices and employed a staff to solicit engagements. Proceeding
on the theory that they constituted a "non-labor" group, 4
 the plaintiffs
charged that the union's involvement of orchestra leaders in the setting of
price scales for club-date appearances created a combination with a "non-
labor" group in violation of the Sherman Act. 5
The district court dismissed the action, holding that the union's activities
were exempt from the antitrust laws as activities affecting a "labor group"
which is party to a "labor dispute" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.6 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the issue of price fixing,
stating that
these regulations, in fact, establish price floors because the orchestra
leader is required to charge the music purchaser not less than the
total of his "leader's fees," the sidemen's wages and other fees.?
Otherwise the circuit court affirmed the dismissal.
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and
affirmed the district court decision. The Court essentially adopted the rea-
soning of the district court. Two significant issues were raised by the facts:
first, whether the plaintiff orchestra leaders constituted a "labor group;"
second, whether a union may unilaterally impose price scales without viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. The Court answered both questions in the
affirmative.
1966-1967 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 771, 894-
901 (1967).
2 391 U.S. 99 (1968), noted in 10 B.C, Ind. & Corn. L, Rev. 480 (1969).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
4 The court of appeals held that the leaders did constitute a "non-labor" group.
Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 372 F.2d 155, 159, 64 L.R.R.M. 2276 (2d Cir.
1967).
A union is denied exemption from the antitrust laws if it combines with a nnn-labor
group to restrain trade. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp, 865, 894, 59 L.R.R.M. 2657,
2678 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
7
 372 F.2d at 160, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2280.
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Definition of a "Labor Group." On the issue whether club-date
orchestra leaders constitute a labor group, the Court agreed with the district
court that the applicable criterion was the
presence of a job or wage competition or some other economic inter-
relationship affecting legitimate union interests between the union
members and the independent contractors. If such a relationship
existed the independent contractors were a "labor group" and party
to a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 8
The district court had found that such competition existed because orchestra
leaders perform work which actually or potentially affected the hours, wages,
job security and working conditions of union members. Because there is in-
tense competition for positions as leaders, the full-time leader "displaces"
another union member simply by securing an engagement for himself) )
There appears to be a serious question whether the Court properly
included plaintiffs, who were full-time orchestra leaders, in a group with
those musicians who only occasionally perform as leaders. Such grouping
ignores the time and energy which plaintiffs devoted to organizing and man-
aging their businesses. Even when they lead the orchestra, the plaintiffs
could be considered supervisory personnel. The Couft, however, adopted the
district court's conclusion that the plaintiff-leaders' non-business activities
had at least a potential effect on union members. Thus, it concluded that
plaintiffs comprised a "labor group." 10
Two considerations are raised by the Court's decision on the "labor
group" issue. The first is the question of its applicable scope. If the Court's
criterion of job or wage competition and its permission to separate the
leaders' functions into labor group and non-labor group work is applied to
industries other than music performance, the Carroll rationale could lead
to anomalous results. An employer who occasionally does work normally done
by a union member may find himself legally obligated to join the union.
Unless the decision is limited to what Mr. Justice White in his dissenting
opinion calls the "peculiar role of bandleaders and the peculiar economics
of the club-date music industry," 11 Carroll does not foreclose such a situation.
The second consideration is the ease with which the Court removes the
collective bargaining process from the club-date music industry. The decision
held that "in the light of the job and wage competition . . . it was lawful
for . . . [the union] to refuse to bargain collectively with the leaders . . . . P)12
Since the policy of the National Labor Relations Act is to promote collective
8 241 F. Supp. at 887, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2672.
9 391 U.S. at 111 n.11.
10 Besides concluding that plaintiff-leaders constituted a "labor group," the Court
upheld the district and court of appeals holdings that the AFM could lawfully "pressure
the orchestra leaders to become union members .. .." 391 U.S. at 106-07. For a complete
analysis of this and other aspects of the Carroll case, sec 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 480
(1969).
11 391 U.S. at 114.
12 Id. at 106-07.
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bargaining, 13
 it seems that the Court should not have denied the bargaining
process to an entire industry."
The Price-Fixing Issue. Having disposed of the question whether the
leaders constituted a labor group, the Court turned its attention to the
market price-fixing issue. Because the leaders had been defined by the Court
as a "labor group," it was concluded that their acquiescence in union-imposed
price floors could not be construed as creating a combination in restraint of
trade under the Sherman Act. The union could lose its antitrust exemption
only if it combined with a "non-labor group." 15 This determination was not
dispositive of the issue, however, since the further question remained whether
the union could unilaterally impose price scales which reflected not only the
sidemen's wages but also the leader's wages and fees. In short, even though
the union might not be acting in combination with a non-labor group, it
had unilaterally set prices at which the leader could sell his own services
as well as those of the entire orchestra.
The Court considered the "critical inquiry" to be "whether the price
floors in actuality operate to protect the wages of the .. sidemen." 16 The
Court agreed with the district court's statement that, "Fi in view of the
competition between leaders and sidemen and subleaders which underlies the
finding that the leaders pare a labor group, the union has a legitimate interest
in fixing ... minimum engagement prices . . ."' 7 The engagement price was
of immediate and direct concern to the union since the price bore a direct
relationship to union members' wages. 18 Because of the potential competition
with leaders, the union could set the leaders' minimum fees to prevent them
from undercutting the sidemen's established fees.
Even if it is conceded that the union was not acting in combination
with a non-labor group, it is submitted that the Court should not have
approved the union's unilateral price fixing merely because the market price
bears an "immediate and direct" relationship to wages. First, this conclusion
overlooks the fact that market price for the product must always reflect
some element of wages. Concededly, in the Carroll situation, the product
itself was labor—the live production of music—and, therefore, an un-
usually close relationship existed between wages and market price. The Court
13 NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
14 Although Mr. Justice White's dissenting comments are directed to the broader
issue of antitrust immunity, they are relevant here:
The Court appears to feel that because respondents' work includes some "labor
group" tasks, all aspects of respondents' activities are proper subjects of union
concern. I see no reason why the law in this area cannot be sufficiently flexible to
grant the union antitrust immunity for regulation of those activities of band-
leaders which sufficiently affect union members, while denying that immunity
where the union has no proper concern.
391 U.S. at 115 (dissenting opinion).
15 See note 5 supra.
18
 391 U.S. at 108.
11
 241 F. Supp. at 890, 59 L.R.R.M. at 2674.
18
 The Court could, therefore, conclude that the union's activity met the labor
exemption tests set out in Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
First, the union acted in its own self-interest rather than in combination with a non-labor
group. Second, the union's unilateral activity intimately concerned a subject of immediate
and direct union concern, i.e., wages.
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would not, presumably, permit a union specifically to force an employer to
raise the market price of the product in order to pay for a wage increase.
Such action would constitute the most blatant form of labor group-non-
labor group combination in restraint of trade." Despite the Court's discus-
sion of competition between the leaders and union members, it is difficult
to see why the restraint of trade should be any less objectionable where, as
in Carroll, one labor group imposes a market price scale on another labor
group.2°
Second, the Court's conclusions overlook the fact that the'union's re-
quirements could be met by methods consistent with both the antitrust laws
and the labor laws. Because the AFM has a virtual closed shop in the New
York area, it could simply insist on minimum wage scales for its members.
Full-time club-date orchestra leaders could then bargain on an industry-
wide basis with the union on sidemen's wages and other terms of employ-
ment for club-date appearances. This method would not restrict the freedom
of leaders to bargain with purchasers of the musical performances. •
Finally, the Carroll Court's allowance of unilaterally imposed market
prices does not appear consistent with the achievement of an accommoda-
tion of the antitrust laws and the labor laws. Carroll overbalances the scales
in favor of protection of the union's interest in the "mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining"—wages, hours and working conditions—at the expense
of creating restraints in the market for "club-date" music performances. The
Court's method is surely an efficient means of promoting one of the strong
national labor policies—the protection of employers' legitimate interest. The
problem inherent in the decision is that it does not conform with an equally
strong national trade regulation policy—the prevention of market restraints.
It may be, as Mr. Justice White suggests, that the music industry has special
problems of supply and demand requiring special treatment under the anti-
trust laws. If such was the majority's conception of that industry it should
have confined the rules of law announced to that industry.
More appropriately, the Court should leave to Congress the task of
making special provisions in the antitrust laws for the special cir-
cumstances of the music industry. On more than one occasion Con-
gress has seen to it that the full rigors of the antitrust laws are not
felt by industries which cannot survive under competitive condi-
tions.2 '
THOMAS R. MURTAGH
M. JAMES SHUMAKER
JOHN V. WOODARD
10 See note 5 supra.
20 Mr. Justice White stated in his dissent:
I cannot believe that the Court intends . . . to hold that unilateral demands,
enforced by threats, combined with willing cooperation or reluctant acquiescence
by leaders . , cannot amount to a combination in restraint of trade.
391 U.S. at 120 n.9 (dissenting opinion).
21 Id. at 121-22 (dissenting opinion).
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